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Citizen Disenchantment in New Democracies: The Case of Mexico

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Citizen Disenchantment in New Democracies: The Case of Mexico

by

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Dedication

To Georgina, Ben, and Danny

To Linda Brown, my mother

To Brad Crow, my father

In memoriam Terry LeRoy Brown, my second father

Preface and Acknowledgements

Some of the most common fictions of comparative political research concern case selection, descriptions of which almost always have an air of *post hoc* rationalization. The truth is that all the comparativists I know chose their countries before choosing the subject of their research. I am no exception—though I do believe that Mexico *is* well-suited to a study of disenchantment with politics in new democracies.

I first visited the interior of Mexico in 1992 when in May I went on vacation to Mexico City to visit a friend, Alec Gershberg. Four months later, with my last paycheck from a job at a San Francisco law firm, two suitcases, and a box of CD's and books, I went down to Mexico for a year to practice Spanish and learn the culture. One thing led to another—I found work, friends, intellectual and cultural stimulation—and a year turned into two, two into three, and three into seven.

The 1990's were extraordinary times in Mexico. It is difficult, especially with the drabness (or worse) presently afflicting Mexican politics, to convey the exhilaration of those days. There was uncertainty—the Zapatista uprising on New Year's Day in 1994, the assassination of presidential candidate for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) Luis Donaldo Colosio in March of that year—but, at the same time, the promise of long deferred but deeply desired change. I immersed myself in that heady atmosphere,

devouring books about Mexico's modern history, weekly news magazines, and scholarly articles on politics. Mostly, though, I met people, lots of people, from political parties and civil society organizations (CSOs, though they were called NGOs, non-governmental organizations, when I met those people) who were, in their way, artificers of the change that would culminate the decade: members of the "red set" (as the Chileans call it), supporters of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) who had attended summer camp in Havana and Odessa, joined such earlier incarnations of the left as the Unified Mexican Socialist Party, PSUM, and cut their teeth on the student strike of 1987 in the National University of Mexico (UNAM); National Action Party (PAN) members, committed to the principles of free markets and free elections with equal fervor, heirs to a grand tradition of opposition since 1938; reformers within the PRI itself, who saw internal party democratization as imperative; and, on the civil society side, members of NGOs devoted to labor and free trade, like the Authentic Labor Front (*Frente Auténtico de Trabajo*, FAT) and the Mexican Free Trade Action Network (*Red Mexicana de Acción ante el Libre Comercio*), and election reform, like *Alianza Cívica* and *Movimiento Ciudadano por la Democracia* (MCD); Jesuits from the Center for Theological Reflection; parish priests and laity alike in the Diocese of San Cristobal's Mexico City office; and many more. In 1994, some of these friends would invite me to collaborate in the NGO *Fronteras Comunes* as co-author of a bilingual, weekly electronic column on Mexican politics and society, which we dubbed *El Pulso de México / The Heartbeat of Mexico*, of which Javier Medina and I published some 200 numbers.

The explosion of civic society paralleled, and perhaps precipitated, a similarly seismic shift in electoral politics. In 1997, the PRI lost its stranglehold on the Congress for the first time ever, relinquishing power to a coalition of opposition parties, and in

2000 it ceded the presidency for the first time ever, to a plain-spoken rancher from the conservative central Mexican state of Guanajuato, Vicente Fox.

Democratization during the 1990's resulted in a desire to know what people thought on issues of the day, how they evaluated politicians and policies, and, especially, whom they intended to vote for. Correspondingly, public opinion polling got off the ground in earnest. Spearheaded by such pioneers as Enrique Alduncin, Edmundo Berumen, with his Michigan training, and Ulíses Beltrán in the Office of the Presidency under Salinas producing data sets now archived at the *Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas* (CIDE), pollsters produced abundant, high quality data, a trend that accelerated during the first decade of this century and shows no signs of slowing down.

On the eve of the new decade and of Vicente Fox's election, I decided to systematize the deep contextual knowledge I had gained and entered the University of Texas at Austin. At UT Austin, I would meet my wife, Georgina Rojas García, of Tulcingo, Puebla, by way of Mexico City, which would ultimately lead to two sons, two *compadres*, two *comadres*, a mother-in-law whose *mole* is incomparable, several brothers- and sisters-in-law, many uncles, aunts, and cousins in Tulcingo, and, of course, even deeper ties with Mexico.

As I learned the principles of comparative politics and the techniques of quantitative analysis and survey research at UT Austin, my interest in Mexico and its politics continued unabated. I was an official election observer in both 2000 and 2003, and visited Mexico frequently while in Austin. I moved to Mexico City again in 2004 to join my wife and first-born son, and observed first-hand what I had glimpsed from afar. The effervescence of the 1990's was fizzling rapidly and the country, settling back into its mold of almost congenital skepticism.

Why? My attempt to answer that question resulted in this study. Certainly, the Fox presidency had disappointed many. But the disillusionment seemed to run deeper than that which the foibles of one man could produce. Fox had identified himself as the candidate of change (his administration even referred to itself as the "Government of Change" on public works announcements), and those who voted for him did so because they wanted change. But what sort of change? Merely a change of parties in power, or something more profound? I began to intuit that the change to which Mexicans aspired was more than simple turnover in government; citizens invested the concept of change with hopes of betterment—particularly socioeconomic betterment. Disenchantment, it occurred to me, owed to a deep chasm between what people expected of democracy and what it was delivering. This dissertation elaborates on and tests empirically the impression that had gradually formed in me.

To the extent the dissertation does so successfully, it is because of the generous support and sage counsel, both professional and personal, I received from many, many people along the way. I extend my most heartfelt thanks to the members of my dissertation committee: my supervisor, Bob Luskin, who has been, by turns, teacher, trusted advisor, employer, and cheerleader, and whose encouragement helped sustain me through the troughs of graduate school; Peter Ward and Victoria Rodríguez, early champions of my work, whose passion for Mexico is as inspiring as their knowledge of it is deep, and whose wry wit and graciousness leavened my time at UT Austin; Ken Greene, who spent long hours critiquing the survey instrument before I went into the field, helping me make sense of numbers when it seemed I was drowning in them, and poring over the dissertation; and Raul Madrid, who prodded me early in my graduate career to switch from Latin American Studies to Government, and whose advice, backing, and big-heartedness have meant much to me. Kurt Weyland also played a major

role in shaping the dissertation as teacher, critic, and mentor. Mel Hinich, Tse-min Lin, and Dan Powers helped expand and refine my understanding of quantitative methods.

Many academics and pollsters in Mexico lent their support to this project. Foremost among them is Edmundo Berumen, of Berumen y Asociados, who gave me work, collected data at a generously discounted price, and, in his endearingly gruff manner, imparted valuable business lessons. The *Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores de Antrolopología Social* (CIESAS) hosted me for two years as a visiting scholar from July, 2006, to July, 2008, generously offering me office space, a computer, access to its library and, more importantly, to its community of scholarship. In particular, I would like to thank Alberto Aziz Nassif for his sponsorship and critique of my dissertation, and Ernesto Isunza for his sharp observations.

In 2004, during the formative stage of the project, I interviewed a number of academicians and public opinion professionals whose insights helped me generate and refine hypotheses. I list them here (with their institutional affiliations at that time): Jacqueline Peschard (UNAM, Ciencias Políticas y Sociales), Yolanda Meyenberg Léycegui (UNAM, Office of the Presidency), Víctor Manuel Durand Ponte (UNAM, *Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales*), Alejandro Moreno (*Reforma*, *Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México*, ITAM), Federico Estevez (ITAM), Jorge Buendía Laredo (ITAM, Geo-Issa), Benito Nacif (*Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas*, CIDE), José Antonio Crespo (CIDE), Allyson Benton (CIDE), Mauricio Merino (CIDE), Ulíses Beltrán (CIDE, BGC), Alejandro Poiré (*Instituto Federal Electoral*, IFE), Silvia Gómez-Tagle (*Colegio de México*, Colmex), Soledad Loaeza (Colmex), Fernanda Somuano (Colmex), Ilán Bizberg (Colmex), Enrique Alduncin (Alduncin y Asociados), Carlos Ordóñez (*El Universal*), and Roy Campos (*Consulta Mitofsky*). Carlos Ordóñez and

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After data collection, in December, 2006, I enlisted several academics and consultants from Guadalajara to help interpret the results: Juan Manuel Ramírez Saez (*Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Occidente*, ITESO), Rossana Reguillo (ITESO), Jorge Alonso Sánchez (CIESAS Occidente), Jesús Gómez Esquivel (RVOX), José Sosa (*Revista de Administración Pública*), Salvador Peniche Camps (*Universidad de Guadalajara*, UdeG), Leonardo Gática (UdeG), Patricia Murrieta Cummings (UdeG), Jaijme Preciado Coronado (UdeG), Jorge Regalado Santillán (UdeG), and Érika Loyo Beristain (UdeG). Special thanks are due to Érika Loyo for her facilitating contacts with the academic community in *la Perla de Occidente*.

Several institutions financed data collection and travel to Mexico. I gratefully acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation (Dissertation Research Improvement Grant SES 0519262), the Tinker Foundation, and UT Austin's Public Policy Institute, and the UT Austin Mexican Center, which bankrolled electoral observation during the tenures of William Glade and Peter Ward.

On a more intimate note, I humbly express my gratitude to friends and family who have, over the years, piqued and indulged my enthusiasm for Mexico and its politics. I lovingly blame Alec Gershberg for having invited to Mexico City in 1992. I thank my colleagues and friends at *Fronteras Comunes,* the Mexico City NGO where I worked from 1994 to 1998: Víctor Osorio, Patricia Férnandez Chase, Azucena Franco, and, especially, Javier Medina Ibarra, my guide through the labyrinth of Mexican politics and accomplice in writing *El Pulso de México*. Argentinian-born Mexican philosopher Horacio Cerutti Goldberg oriented me in the intricacies of Latin American ontology and political thought. To Peruvian-born Mexican historian Norma Mogrovejo I owe my

knowledge of Latin American feminist-lesbian thought. Alejandro González Arreola and Juan René Químbar, former *Alianza Cívica* workers and flat-mates, offered insight and camaraderie over dominoes and *Pacífico.* Two other friends bookend extended periods of living in Mexico: Folko Mueller, whose companionship greatly enlivened my first year in Mexico, and Clarisa Pérez-Armendáriz, colleague at UT Austin, collaborator, brilliant scholar, and trusted friend during my last few years in the country.

Finally, I wish to thank Linda and Terry Brown, my mother and second father; Brad Crow, my father; and my brothers Jonathan, Jim, and Devo and sister Kelly. I'm not sure my parents ever fully understood my passion for Mexican culture and politics or my decision to move there, but they always accepted it and encouraged me to follow my heart. And all my family is positively thrilled with my life partner, Georgina Rojas García—a direct result of my interest in Mexico—and the two sons, Ben and Danny, we have produced. Georgina's patience, while not limitless, is greater than I deserve. Without her love and support I would be lost. I dedicate this dissertation to her, in love, gratitude, and admiration, and to our two sons, in the hope that they claim their place in the world as both Mexicans and Americans and full heirs to both cultures.

Citizen Disenchantment in New Democracies: The Case of Mexico

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In July, 2000, Mexico ended seven decades of single-party rule with the election of Vicente Fox as president, culminating its *gran fiesta democrática* of the 1990's. Less than a decade later, though, the party's over. Citizen disenchantment with politics is widespread: Mexicans profoundly distrust parties, politicians, and parliament. Mexico is hardly unique. Satisfaction with democracy is low, declining, or both in 72 new (or older, poor) democracies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa.

This dissertation analyzes the causes and consequences of the current Mexican malaise—and of discontentment with democracy around the world. It addresses two groups of questions. First, what causes dissatisfaction with democracy? Does it attach to specific politicians or institutions, or to poor evaluations of government performance? Or does it bespeak a deeper frustration with democracy and its inability to meet citizens' expectations—particularly socioeconomic ones? Second, what does disillusionment bode for political participation? Do dissatisfied citizens quit voting? Do they become alienated or turn to confrontational participation?

I argue that a main cause of political dissatisfaction is a citizen concept of democracy, "substantive" democracy, emphasizing economic improvement and social equity, combined with poor government performance in just those respects. This combination poses challenges for democracy in many countries, not just Mexico. Though citizens in apparently ineffective democracies are more disposed to entertain authoritarian alternatives—which have already toppled some wavering democracies—most new democracies, including Mexico, have hung on.

Widespread and deep dissatisfaction with democracy may jeopardize the survival of some new democracies, but the more immediate concern raised by dissatisfaction is its detrimental impact on political participation—and, ultimately, the quality of democracy. For citizens who conceive of democracy as an instrument of economic equality, their governments' failure to ameliorate poverty leads to disengagement from politics. These citizens vote and engage in institutional participation less often. Dissatisfaction also predisposes a small but significant minority of citizens to contentious political participation. Political dissatisfaction makes new democracies more likely to consolidate as what scholars have described as "semi-", "partial", or "illiberal" democracies.

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CHAPTER 1

The Party's Over: Democracy and its Discontents (and Malcontents)

In July, 1997, Mexican voters loosened the grip of the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) on power, depriving the party of its congressional majority for the first time ever in that year's midterm elections. Then-President Ernesto Zedillo, putting a good face on what was for his party a bad situation called the elections a "*gran fiesta democrática*." The epithet was an apt description of not only the 1997 by-elections but the entire decade of the 1990's. Opposition parties began winning state and local elections. Groups of intellectuals united in calling for political reform. Civic organizations flourished as citizens revelled in a newfound sense of their own potential. Congress responded by passing reform bills that culminated in a major 1996 overhaul of campaign rules and the federal election board. That reform, together with an increasingly strong opposition and empowered civil society, set the tableau for the momentous 1997 elections.

Finally the 2000 presidential election brought National Action Party (PAN) candidate Vicente Fox to the presidency, ending the PRI's seven-decade hold on power. Celebrations erupted in the streets of Mexico's capital, its cities and towns, as citizens chanted the new president's nickname in unison—"*Chente! Chente!*"—and waved the giant "V" for "*¡Victoria!*" foam hands more typically seen at sporting events. Indeed, the joyous scene being played out in public thoroughfares across the country resembled a still-only-dreamt-of Mexican World Cup championship more than a post-electoral victory. The democratic *fiesta* was in full swing and the whole country, those who did not vote for Fox included, was living it up.

POST-TRANSITION MALAISE IN MEXICO

Scarcely a decade later, the party's over. Citizen disenchantment with politics is widespread. Fox's presidency disappointed most Mexicans. He remained personally popular throughout his six-year term but was ineffective at getting his legislative agenda through Congress. Beset by divided government and a recalcitrant majority coalition of opposition parties, Fox's political operatives proved incapable of steering his budgets, fiscal and energy reform proposals, and other bills through Congress. Allegations of corruption and influence peddling swirled around the first lady and the president's stepsons.

But the disillusionment went deeper than frustration with Fox. The 2003 midterm election turnout was 41%, down from 58% and 61% in the two previous by-elections, in 1997 and 1991. Satisfaction with democracy similarly declined. Only 17% of Mexicans reported themselves "satisfied with democracy in Mexico" in 2004, down from 45% in 1997. In 2008, the figure hovered around 23%.[1] Surveys consistently reveal Mexicans' deep distrust of parties, parliament, and politicians. Even after completing the transition to democracy, Mexicans believe, business elites continue to monopolize political power. Even the hitherto incontestably bright spot of Mexican democracy—free and fair elections—has been tarnished. The controversial 2006 election that returned the PAN to the presidency was riddled with irregularities (Crespo 2008). Two years later, a third of all voting-age Mexicans continue to believe that the 2006 election was fraudulent, including 40.7% of those identifying themselves as PRI supporters and 14.2% of those identifying with the PAN.[2] In sum, a process of disenchantment that had unfolded over decades in older, industrial democracies was condensed to a decade or less in Mexico.

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[1] All figures are from the Latinobarometer 2007 and 2008 reports (www.latinobarometer.org).

[2] Consulta Mitofsky, "Dos años después de la elección presidencial", (http://72.52.156.225/Descargar.aspx?q=ArchivoEstudio&a=9 [accessed April 21, 2009).

The Mexican story is sadly familiar. Some if its elements find echoes, often amplified, in other new democracies, whose stories also add to the litany of woes faced by countries that have emerged from authoritarianism. Ineffectual, mediocre, and corrupt leadership has plagued many of the new democracies. Few have been blessed with men and women of Nelson Mandela's or Lech Walesa's moral solvency, or Adolfo Suarez's commitment to inclusiveness, to shepherd their countries from dictatorship to democracy. Electoral irregularities and outright fraud all too frequently undermine citizens' right to choose their leaders. Human rights violations persist, at times seemingly impervious to democracy's entreaties. Oligarchs continue to cast long shadows over politicians, in whom they often find eager accomplices. And democracy appears to have done little to mitigate long-standing social ills that spring from poverty and inequality.

This study analyzes the causes and consequences of the current Mexican malaise—and of discontent with democracy around the world. It addresses two main groups of questions. First, what, exactly, causes dissatisfaction with democracy? Does dissatisfaction attach to individual politicians or specific institutions? Does it owe to poor evaluations of government performance? Or does it bespeak a deeper frustration with democracy and its ability to meet citizens' expectations—particularly their socioeconomic expectations? Second, what does disillusionment bode for political participation? Do dissatisfied citizens sit out an election or two? If so, do they remain alienated or turn to more confrontational forms of participation?

I argue that a main cause of political dissatisfaction is a conception of democracy emphasizing economic improvement and social equity, combined with poor government performance in just those respects. This combination poses challenges for democracy in many countries, not just Mexico. Citizens in apparently ineffective democracies are more disposed to entertain authoritarian alternatives, which have already toppled teetering

democracies in Russia, Belarus, Thailand, Bangladesh, and elsewhere.[3] It is conceivable that citizen dissatisfaction helped pave the way for the return of autarchs and generals.

But most new democracies have hung on so far. As widespread and deep as dissatisfaction with democracy may be, it has not jeopardized the survival of democracy in most cases. A more certain consequence of dissatisfaction is its detrimental impact on political participation and, ultimately, the quality of democracy. For citizens who conceive of democracy as an instrument of economic prosperity and social justice, their governments' failure to ameliorate poverty leads not only to discontent with politicians, parties, and parliaments but to alienation from the political system. Dissatisfaction also predisposes a small but significant minority of citizens to contentious political participation. Thus, as I will argue, political dissatisfaction makes new democracies more likely to consolidate as "semi-" or "partial democracies."

SOCIOECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS AND POLITICAL SATISFACTION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

Many of the challenges now facing emerging democracies are similar to those faced by the industrial democracies several decades ago. Widespread disgust with politicians, parties, and parliaments, generally seen as venal and unresponsive, led to worries that democracy, during the late 1960's and mid-1970's, was "in crisis" (see, e.g.,

[3] For example, a 2004 United Nations Development Programme study asserts, "For many Latin American citizens, development is so important an aspiration that they would be willing to support an authoritarian regime if it could guarantee their well-being" (PNUD 2004: 34). The report classified 26.5% of Latin Americans as "non-democratic" and another 30.5% as "ambivalent", finding that non-democrats, on average, had experienced downward social mobility (2004: 140-143). In Mexico, Beltrán (1996) (especially Flores's contribution to that volume), Flores and Meyenberg (2000), Peschard (2002), and Meyenberg (2002) have all found that though most Mexicans how exhibit a "civic" citizen culture (in Almond and Verba's terms), perhaps as many as a third hew to the old, authoritarian political culture typical of "subjects". Rose and Mishler (1994) examine lingering authoritarian sentiment in the former Eastern bloc, where democrats form a "bare majority" of the citizenry.

Crozier *et al.* 1975). Observing a drastic decline in trust in the U.S. government from 1964 to 1970, Arthur Miller wrote:

> A democratic political system cannot survive for long without the support of a majority of its citizens. When such support wanes, underlying discontent is the necessary result, and the potential for revolutionary alteration of the political and social system is enhanced. . . . [E]xtended periods of widespread political malaise suggest that the normal means by which conflict is managed [ ] are not fully operative. (1970: 951)

Such talk turned out to be overblown. Although citizens in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere sharply questioned the quality of their democracies, the "revolutionary alterations" never materialized. Decreasing trust in the U.S. government reflected frustration with specific policies and disapproval of the president rather than long-term cynicism (Citrin 1974, Hetherington 1998), implying that new policies and leadership could reverse the trend.[4]

Citizens responded to democracy's failed promises by "tuning out" or participating outside traditional channels, far more than by radicalizing. The trend toward apathy and alienation, though apparently enduring and global, has not upended any of the old democracies. When Pharr and Putnam (2000) asked the question, "What's troubling the trilateral countries?" they had to admit, "Not much." Other citizens responded to discontent by redoubling their efforts to influence public policy, chiefly through issue-oriented public interest groups. Dalton has argued that declining electoral turnout and party activism in the United States, Britain, France, and Germany has been

[4] In fact, political trust in the U.S. nearly regained its early 1960's levels at the beginning of the Reagan administration and in the middle of the Clinton administration.

offset by a countertrend of increased participation in “communal” political activity (1996: 51-54).

Some dissatisfaction with democracy, moreover, may be healthy. Norris (1999) asserts that waning support for “actually existing democracy” has not decreased allegiance to democracy as an ideal form of government. Rather, the tension between ideal and reality produced “critical citizens” or “dissatisfied democrats,” both devoted to the values of liberal democracy and (partly because of that) exceedingly distrustful of political institutions (see also Inglehart 1999). Looking back, Dalton observed, “If democracy was in crisis, it was a crisis of institutions and not the spirit of democracy and its participants” (1996: xi).

But does dissatisfaction with democracy have more pernicious consequences in new democracies like Mexico’s—i.e., those of Huntington’s (1991) “third wave” of democratization that began in 1974? The older democracies enjoy at least two advantages that attenuate the harmful effects of dissatisfaction. First, the old democracies’ long, uninterrupted experiences with electoral democracy generate in their citizenries a sort of pro-democratic inertia that enables even highly imperfect democracies to weather temporary spells of apathy and confrontation. In a cross-national study of European, “European-heritage”, and Latin American countries, Muller and Seligson (1994) found that the longer democratic institutions endure, the more citizens adopt civic values. Democracy, they say, *engenders* “civic culture” more than it is

engendered by it. Citizens in emerging democracies have much less of this institutional legacy.[5]

Second, the older democracies emerged out of relatively prosperous, egalitarian societies, whereas the new or renewed democracies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa were born into varying combinations of persistent poverty, stark inequality, and economic crisis. Most wealthy countries had already become democratic by the mid-1970's, leaving mostly poorer countries in the pool of countries eligible for third-wave democratization. Half or more of Mexico's population lives in poverty. In addition, economic crisis often has a hand in bringing down authoritarian regimes.

Thus institutional trust and evaluations of democracy appear to depend more on socioeconomic performance in emerging democracies.[6] In Latin America, many citizens have an "immediate" conceptualization of politics (as von Mettenheim [1990] wrote of Brazilians). They "perceive and judge political objects and issues by exclusive reference to a substantive democratic meaning, without the mediating influences or rationale supplied by party, ideology, or group interest" (1990: 29). The 2004 Latinobarómetro survey intimates that low satisfaction with democracy is related to discontent with the market economy: only 29% of Latin Americans report being satisfied with democracy, and a paltry 19% report a positive evaluation of the economy (Latinobarómetro 2004: 38). Camp *et al.* find that whereas Costa Ricans, living in Latin America's oldest

[5] See also Converse (1969) on party identification's role in maintaining political stability and its development over time, as citizens gain experience with democracy.

[6] See, e.g., McDonough *et al.* on Spain (1986: 453-454); von Mettenheim on Brazil (1990: 29, 41); Miller *et al.* on Russia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine (1994: 409); Mishler and Rose on Eastern Europe (1997: 436); Powers and Cox on Poland (1997: 627); and Vassilev on Bulgaria (2004: 119).

democracy, "see democracy largely in political terms, … Mexicans and Chileans, who are likely to be more representative of Latin Americans from other countries, view democracy in social and economic, not political, terms" (Camp 2001: 11, 15-16). In older democracies, frustrated socioeconomic aspirations typically produce changes of government. In emerging ones, such frustration may cause citizens to exchange newly democratic regimes for authoritarian ones.

To be sure, most new democracies have survived their economic crises so far, and—diminishing—majorities of their citizens continue to back democratic ideals. On the other hand, as I show in Chapter 7, most new democracies remain stuck in the "partially free" category, according to the widely used Freedom House Index. Relatively few become fully "free", and a handful backslides into authoritarianism. In brief, dissatisfaction does not appear to put democratic survival or long-term quality at risk in old democracies, but may do so in new ones.

THE *CITIZEN DISENCHANTMENT IN MEXICO* SURVEY

The empirical analysis in this study rests primarily on *Desencanto Ciudadano en México* (Citizen Disenchantment in Mexico), an original national survey conducted June 16-26, 2006—shortly before the July 2 presidential election—by the experienced market research firm *Berumen y Asociados*. The respondents were 650 voting-age Mexican citizens, randomly sampled in a nationwide, three-stage process. The primary sampling unit was the "electoral section", analogous to a polling precinct in the United States, followed by households at the second stage and individuals at the third. Sixty-five electoral sections were selected at random out of around 134,000 nationwide. Within

each section, ten households were chosen at random and one individual was chosen in each household by the "last birthday method," in which interviewers ask to speak to the adult who last had a birthday (a widely used approximation of random selection). Since only one person was interviewed in each household, this sampling design effectively gave rise to a two-tiered data structure in which all individuals are "nested" in electoral sections; that is, each individual belongs to one, and only one, electoral section.

I complement the *Citizen Disenchantment* survey with data from other national and cross-national surveys. In particular, my analysis of disenchantment in Mexico relies on the Mexican National Survey of Political Culture (*Encuesta Nacional de Cultura Política*, ENCUP), Latinobarometer, and the National Evaluation of Democracy surveys undertaken by the Mexican daily *El Universal*. For my cross-national analyses, I turned to the World Values Survey (WVS) and several regional polls: Latinobarometer, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), the Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (CDCEE) survey, AsiaBarometer, and Afrobarometer.

To analyze these data, I employ standard descriptive statistics and multivariate, maximum likelihood regression. Where data exhibited the nested structure described above, I used hierarchical models to remedy possible violations of certain statistical assumptions—particularly, that of independence among observations—wrought by geographical clustering of interviewees.

ROAD MAP

I proceed as follows:

Chapter 2 sets forth a new explanation of disenchantment for democracy. I assert that an important, but generally ignored, explanation for dissatisfaction is the disconnect between what citizens expect of democracy and what it actually delivers. In new

democracies, I theorize, citizens believe democracy entails greater prosperity and social equality—something that new democracies, by and large, are not delivering. I identify three basic conceptions of democracy. *Electoral democrats* view free and fair elections as a sufficient condition for democracy. *Liberal democrats* emphasize freedoms and rights as immanent in democracy. Finally, *substantive democrats* view greater socioeconomic equality as a necessary component or consequence of democracy. Substantive democrats are, on average, most disenchanted precisely because new democracies are largely failing to bring about what citizens need and demand most: greater socioeconomic equality.

In Chapter 3, I quantify disenchantment with democracy in Mexico and in 72 new (and low-income) democracies around the world. In general, citizens in these countries are dissatisfied with their democracies and becoming more so over time. I outline some country-level conditions that could help shape average satisfaction, including economic crisis, elections and post-electoral conflict, international and civil strife, and ethnic and religious tensions, among others.

The next three chapters turn to Mexico in greater detail. Drawing on the three-fold typology of citizen conceptions of democracy presented in Chapter 2, Chapter 4 presents a brief history of the idea of democracy in Mexico. I show that each of the three views of democracy (liberal, electoral, and substantive) has deep roots in Mexico. Data from the *Citizen Disenchantment* survey reveal that the substantive idea of democracy predominates among Mexicans today.

Chapter 5 tests in Mexico my theory on the causes of disenchantment. I explain the impact each conception of democracy is likely to have on satisfaction. Mexican democracy has done a reasonable job of ensuring trustworthy elections (up until 2006, anyway), so I theorize that electoral democrats are likely to be most satisfied. But

Mexicans remained mired in poverty, and deep social inequality continues to afflict the country. So substantive democrats should be least satisfied. Since the Mexican government has a mixed record on rights, liberal democrats' satisfaction should lie somewhere in the middle. My analysis shows this is the case. Even controlling for evaluations of government economic and political performance and sociodemographic conditions, conceptions of democracy influence satisfaction. Ideas count.

In Chapter 6, I explore the consequences of dissatisfaction with democracy. Data from the *Citizen Disenchantment* survey, as well as from the ENCUP, demonstrate that dissatisfied citizens engage in *institutional* political participation (voting and other forms of civic engagement) less—and in *contentious* activity (protest), more—than satisfied ones. Contrary to much of the thinking in the "democratic consolidation" paradigm, dissatisfaction does not necessarily lead to political instability and, in the final instance, democratic breakdown. Rather, low-quality, semi-democracy appears to be a stable equilibrium. Dissatisfaction reduces the quality of democracy by reducing political participation, which is itself an aspect of the quality of democracy and an influence on other aspects, including accountability and representation.

The concluding Chapter 7 validates the Mexican analysis internationally, testing hypotheses on the causes and consequences of disenchantment using data from Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. The dynamic of disenchantment and alienation from institutional politics at work in Mexico appears to operate worldwide. The medium-term prognosis for democratic progress, therefore, is less than encouraging: it is difficult for the many new and low-income democracies that are only "partially free" to escape that status. But it is not impossible. Citizens can tone down their expectations of democracy and refuse to succumb to apathy when faced with inevitable disappointments. For their part, governments can induce citizens to place greater

emphasis on the vote and liberal values with well-designed civic education programs. Improving the specifically political components of democracy—free elections and respect for human rights—will go a long way in making up for economic shortcomings. But new democracies must eventually address citizens' socioeconomic demands with policies that spread opportunity more equitably.

CHAPTER 2

Citizen Concepts: A New Theory of Disenchantment with Democracy

Citizens in Mexico—and, as we shall see, in the vast majority of newly-democratic countries—are disenchanted with their democracies. Why is that? And why does it matter? This chapter examines the causes and consequences of disenchantment, both dependent and independent variable here. My explanation focuses on a cause that has received virtually no scholarly attention: citizen concepts of democracy. Among the possible consequences, I focus on those for political participation, which appear to be particularly widespread. Disenchantment, I show, both reduces conventional participation like voting and contacting legislators and increases contentious political action like street demonstrations—both worrisome results for the quality of democracy.

CONTESTING THE MEANING OF "SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY"

I begin by describing my measure of disenchantment, a commonly-asked survey item that inquires about "satisfaction with democracy." More precisely, the item asks, "How satisfied are you with democracy in [your country]?"[7] Respondents may answer "very" (*muy*), "somewhat" (*algo*), "not very" (*poco*), or "not at all" (*nada*)—and sometimes "neither satisfied nor dissatisfied" as a fifth, intermediate category. Researchers typically combine the percentages of survey respondents falling into the two highest response categories to obtain an overall country satisfaction rating.

[7] Other common variants are, "How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working in [your country]?" and "How satisfied are you with the way democracy is developing in [your country]?" The latter formulation is used especially on questionnaires administered in new democracies since they

But what does it mean to say that one is "satisfied with democracy"? Democracy comprises many elements, including incumbent politicians, policy outputs, government institutions, normative principles, and so on. Political psychologists have arrayed these "attitude objects" along a scale of abstractness (see, e.g., Almond and Verba 1963, Easton 1965, Klingemann 1999). At one extreme lie the most immediate, concrete objects: people ("incumbents") and policies ("outputs"). At the other is the most intangible, the "political community," or country. These poles correspond roughly to the Eastonian concepts of "specific" and "diffuse" support (Easton 1965). Between the extremes sit political institutions and democratic principles. Figure 2.1 is a graphical depiction of the concrete-abstract dimension of attitude objects.



Figure 2.1: Objects of Political Attitudes on Scale of Abstractness.

So when survey interviewees are asked to evaluate "democracy", which of these political objects are they being asked to offer an opinion about? What is it that people

have in mind when they think about democracy, the political system as a whole or some particular part of it? What are these attitudes about?

Attempts to answer this question have generated considerable debate among students of comparative public opinion. Some have argued that satisfaction with democracy refers to incumbent authorities and policy outputs (Dalton 1999, Merkl 1998)—the two most concrete political objects on the abstractness scale in Figure 2.1. Others have interpreted satisfaction as an indicator of "mid-level system support", somewhere between incumbents and democracy as an ideal (Anderson and Guillory 1997). The item would thus include assessments of the economic and political performance of the democratic regime (over several governments) and of regime institutions, placing it on the lower-middle part of the scale between "incumbents" and "regime principles". Still others argue that the item is a "summary indicator" of overall satisfaction embracing the entire gamut of political objects (Clarke *et al.* 1993), from the most concrete to the most abstract. At the extreme, some have averred that the "satisfaction with democracy" survey item is essentially meaningless. Canache *et al.* (2001) argue that its polysemy—having different meanings for different people—renders it invalid for use in comparative research.

It is worth a brief detour to evaluate Canache *et al.*'s claim, for if they are correct then most (or all) research on satisfaction with democracy, including mine, is of dubious value. The authors identify three possible referents of "satisfaction with democracy": 1) "support for authorities," or incumbent officeholders; 2) "system support" of governmental institutions such as armed forces, police, courts, central governments, and legislatures; and 3) "support for democracy", measured by the standard "Churchillian" question that asks whether respondents prefer democracy to other forms of government, despite its imperfections. Using data from separate Romanian, Salvadorian, and Latin

American surveys, the study presents bivariate correlations between satisfaction and each of these three referents as well as multivariate regressions of each referent on satisfaction and the other two referents (to partial out the effects of correlations *between* the referents). The values of the correlations and coefficient estimates differ across the putative referents of satisfaction in Romania, across levels of political knowledge in El Salvador, and across countries in the Latin American survey. For example, the relationship between support for authorities and satisfaction with democracy is much stronger for Salvadorians with little political knowledge (an estimated regression coefficient of 2.01) than for their more knowledgeable counterparts (1.15). Similarly, system support weighs more heavily in Uruguayans' concept of satisfaction with democracy (coefficient of 2.89) than in Venezuelans' (.99). These differences, conclude Canache *et al.*, imply that the satisfaction item's "substantive content … is [not] constant across observations" (2001: 507). If the question measures something different for different respondents, findings about the causes or consequences of satisfaction with democracy are bound to be unreliable.

This argument is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, the numbers Canache *et al.* present do *not* generally support their claims. They note that the correlations between satisfaction with democracy and its conceptual referents (and the regression coefficients of satisfaction on the referents) are, for the most part, statistically distinguishable from zero. But they do not test for *differences* between parameters, a test critical to sustain their claim that satisfaction with democracy means different things to different people. In the vast majority of cases, the estimates do *not* different significantly from one another. Furthermore, the low correlations between satisfaction and each of its three potentially equivalent concepts suggest that *none* of the three could be taken as an observed indicator of a latent satisfaction with democracy construct. Rather, each would

appear to be a factor that *shapes* satisfaction—consistent with the view of satisfaction as a "summary indicator."

Second, and more important, even if the correlations and regression coefficients *do* differ across the referents of satisfaction with democracy, this does not necessarily mean that the concept's substantive content varies across groups of respondents. Satisfaction can be conceived of as a weighted sum of many components (as in Clarke *et al.* 1993). There is no reason to suppose that these components should contribute equally to respondents' overall satisfaction with democracy. That is, it is perfectly possible—and reasonable—for satisfaction's constituent components to have regression weights that differ from one another. Furthermore, the relative emphases among these elements may be the same for all respondents, or may differ by subgroup. In either case, satisfaction retains the same substantive content: survey respondents include the same elements in their concept of satisfaction, but emphasize some over others.[8]

EXPLAINING DISSATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

After examining what satisfaction with democracy *is,* I turn to the problem of what causes it. Scholarship on individual-level determinants of satisfaction with democracy has emphasized either citizens' retrospective evaluations of political and economic conditions, or their socioeconomic circumstances and psychological dispositions and resources.[9] I argue here that these variables are only part of the story—

[8] For an excellent, more thorough rejoinder to Canache *et al.*, see Anderson (2002).

[9] Another set of influences is institutional, where institutions are understood as the rules and organizations that structure interaction between political actors. For example, Guillory and Anderson (1997) find that electoral systems affect satisfaction with democracy: citizens in proportional representation (PR) systems are more satisfied than those in majoritarian systems because PR is better at compensating losers of elections. I do not consider institutions' effects here because my data do not permit it. My survey covers Mexico at a single moment in time, and subnational government structures and electoral systems, required in Mexico to be homologous with those at the federal level, do not vary geographically either.

that disenchantment also rests in good measure on a disconnect between how citizens conceive of democracy and what they expect of it, on the one hand, and what their governments are actually delivering, on the other. In new democracies (and old but low-income ones), I argue, the prevalence of a "substantive" view of democracy as greater socioeconomic equality, combined with most neo-democratic governments' failure to achieve this, significantly dampens enthusiasm for democracy.

Here, then, are the variables I believe account for individual-level variation in satisfaction with democracy, starting with those I am introducing here:

Conceptions of Democracy

The continuing debate over the nature of democracy has produced a bewildering array of definitions. One study counted over 550 varieties of democracy (Diamond 1996: 21, referring to an earlier version of Collier and Levitsky 1997). I suggest, however, that all these many definitions can be grouped into three broad categories: electoral (clean elections), liberal (respect for political rights and civil liberties). These different definitions may coexist—in a given culture, in the minds of given individuals—but my key contention here is that the relative emphases they receive should affect citizens' expectations of, and therefore their satisfaction with, democracy.

Let us consider these three sorts of definitions more closely.

Electoral democracy holds that democracy is a set of rules for choosing political representatives in competitive contests. This view thus rejects notions of direct democracy, in which citizens themselves make law, in favor of representative democracy, in which citizens choose others to make law.[10] Because of its emphasis on the laws and institutions that govern competition, this variety of democracy has been referred to

[10] Dahl argues that the sheer scale of modern societies makes representative democracy inevitable for the vast majority of collective decisions (1989).

(sometimes disdainfully by advocates of "thick" democracy) as "formal" or "procedural" democracy. Electoral democracy has also been tagged "minimalist", since it constricts democracy's ambit to political authority, explicitly excluding social and economic considerations.

Perhaps the best-known exponent of this view is Joseph Schumpeter, whose famous formulation characterized democracy as an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." Schumpeter was quite clear in limiting democracy's scope, further writing that "[d]emocracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them" (1942: 284-285). For his part, Huntington and others have explicitly hewed to this minimalist definition, arguing that it is both conceptually and operatively advantageous (Huntington 1991). It is conceptually clearer than other, "thicker" definitions of democracy: elections are a bright-line test that separates democracies from autocracies, avoiding the subjective difficulty in measuring more abstract phenomena like rights and freedoms (Huntington 1991). Practically, too much democracy might result in a profusion of demands that under-institutionalized governments are incapable of handling, threatening the stability of fledgling democracies (Huntington 1968). Certainly, much empirical comparative work seeking to explain democratization or democratic consolidation uses elections almost exclusively in classifying regimes as democracies or non-democracies (see Przeworski *et al.* 2000, Boix and Stokes 2002, Epstein *et al.* 2006).

But, as a number of theorists have recognized, since many autocratic regimes also hold elections, *democratic* elections must fulfill requirements beyond carrying out the balloting process (Dahl 1971, 1989). For electoral competition to be real, countries should guarantee minimal freedoms (including those of expression and association)

without which elections are merely a hollow shell devoid of democratic content. Voters must choose freely, with no coercion or buying of votes. More than one party should contend so that voters have a genuine choice. And the competitors must vie for office under minimally equitable conditions, which include the ability to convey their programs and proposals to potential supporters unfettered by censorship. Schmitter and Karl dubbed the idea that elections alone make for a democracy the "fallacy of electoralism" (1991: 78). Even competitive elections may be insufficient for democracy if some social sectors are denied the right to voice their interests or if important decision-making powers are kept out of the hands of elected officials and maintained in "reserved domains" of unaccountable authorities, such as the military or technocratic elites (see Linz and Stepan 1996).

This conceptual "precising", or "expanded procedural" definition of democracy, leads us beyond the frontiers of electoral democracy and into the terrain of liberal democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 1999). The essence of liberal democracy is, as inheres in the name itself, liberty—that is, freedom of thought and action, especially vis-à-vis government intrusion. Liberty, in turn, implies other principles valued and practiced by governments and publics alike, including tolerance of dissent, pluralism (the existence of many social actors autonomous from the state), and active participation of the citizenry in politics. Upholding liberties requires constraints on governmental power (both "vertically" between the ruled to rulers and "horizontally" between governmental institutions). Unchecked, governments propend toward curtailing freedom. Finally, effective political participation in public decisions requires the free circulation of ideas and information about government activities.

The list of liberal democracy's attributes becomes quite extensive. Diamond, for instance, enumerates nine indispensable traits for liberal democracies: 1) elected officials

have real power to effect policy changes; 2) governmental institutions restrain executive power and are "horizontally accountable" to one another; 3) parties alternate in power over time and all have the right to form and participate in elections; 4) cultural, ethnic, and religious minorities are free to express their interests; 5) citizens have means besides elections for influencing decision-making, including civic associations and interest groups; 6) there are independent sources of information; 7) individuals have extensive freedoms, including speech, belief, assembly, and petition; 8) an independent judiciary enforces political equality under the law; and 9) the rule of law guarantees freedom from arbitrary government attempts to inhibit liberty (1996: 22-23).

Theoreticians in the Anglo-American tradition of Locke and Adam Smith would add property rights to this list, perhaps implicit in the ninth attribute above. That is, citizens have the right to enjoy the fruits of labors, be secure in their material possessions, and acquire and alienate property as they wish. Though income and wealth may be subject to reasonable levels of taxation—and commercial activity, to regulation—state intervention is inimical to property rights in this view.

Obviously, this collection of rights goes well beyond holding periodic elections. Some scholars have noted broad "convergence", especially among U.S. academics, on limiting democracy to a system of political authority and leaving social and economic features outside of the definition (see Diamond 1996: 20). But some elements of liberal democracy clearly entail social practices not necessarily related to elections or attempts to sway political authority. For example, the free exercise of religious beliefs may demand translation of faith-oriented values into public policy, but is not primarily a political act. Likewise, effecting business transactions is an economic act that may have political consequences, but whose main purpose is not political. Notwithstanding academic

agreement to exclude the social from democracy, clarification of even the electoral definition of democracy remits us to broader social concerns.

Furthermore, the current scholarly consensus on democracy as political rather than social or economic can perhaps be viewed as an oscillation of a definitional pendulum that swings back and forth between minimalist and thick definitions of democracy—and may be swinging back toward thick definitions after two decades or so at the opposite end of the spectrum. In the 1960's and 1970's, for example, the New Left's touchstone was "participatory" democracy, the idea that citizens should participate directly not just at election time, and not just in political decisions, but also in the universities, the workplace, the family, and so on. Today, international development organizations are emphasizing the need for economic improvement to accompany political democratization. As I demonstrate in Chapter 4, the Mexican public patently does *not* share the academic consensus that would limit democracy strictly to the sphere of political authority, but believes that democracy has economic ramifications.

Substantive democracy has at least two meanings: political participation beyond elections and greater socioeconomic equality. Though I use the second definition in this work it is worth commenting on the first as well, and on the relationship between the two. Participatory democracy views voting as a highly reduced form of political participation and insists on the need for mechanisms to influence policy between elections. In this view, a well-developed civil society—that is, a dense network of civic associations and high levels of social engagement—are necessary to make democracy effective (Barber 1984). A number of studies have emphasized the influence of public opinion and interest group activity on decision-making as indicators of substantive democracy.[11] The ability

[11] See Jacobs and Shapiro (1994) for an excellent review of the evidence that what the public thinks does indeed matter to policy makers in the United States.

of citizens to assert their interests between elections, and policy-makers' responsiveness to these expressions of preferences, are crucial components of substantive democracy. Furthermore, substantive democrats (in the first sense) also favor measures of direct democracy, such as plebiscites, revocation of legislative mandates, citizen initiatives, and so on.

The second thread of substantive democracy, "social democracy", rests on the foundation of what T. H. Marshall (1950) called "social citizenship", the right of all citizens to share in the benefits of society. Participating in society requires a minimal material platform of economic security and well-being. For example, to get a good job, one needs an education. To get an education, one needs a way to get to school, clothes to wear in the classroom and on the playground, food to sustain physical and mental activity, etc. Thus, substantive democracy expands the panoply of rights to include education, health, work, and so on, creating a corresponding general obligation of the state (or, more precisely, the welfare state) to provide these goods to citizens who are unable to do so for themselves. Where material conditions truncate citizenship for some citizens, "[S]ocial democracy concerns itself with [rectifying] asymmetries produced by exploitative social relationships", in the words of Mexican political philosopher Carlos Pereyra (1990: 97).

Many thinkers, including Guillermo O'Donnell, have explicitly embraced an expanded version of democracy based on "social citizenship" as necessary for Latin America (PNUD 2004: 27-31). They reject the notion that elections are sufficient for democracy since "imbalances in resources and political power frequently undermine the 'one-person, one-vote' principle, and the purpose of democratic institutions" (PNUD 2002: 4).

These two versions of substantive democracy are complementary, in some views. More popular participation would, in theory, lead to greater socioeconomic equality.[12] Public pressure could induce redistributionist economic policy, government intervention on behalf of society's less privileged, and more government investment in goods like health and education. And if citizens' ability to influence policy is proportional to the material resources they possess, a more equitable distribution of goods among citizens also spreads possibilities for effective political participation more evenly. As Pereyra puts it:

> In capitalist societies, democracy cannot achieve full popular sovereignty because an ineradicable socioeconomic inequality of producers underlies the supposed legal-political equality of citizens, which definitively hinders strict equality among citizens. (1990: 32)

In this view, participatory and social democracy are mutually reinforcing—as is their absence.

However, opponents of substantive democracy aver that the combination of direct and social democracy can result in illiberal government. According to this critique, populist leaders—exemplified by Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia, Velasco in Peru, Chávez in Venezuela, and others—attempt to bypass representative institutions seen as captive of special interests. Such leaders ground their support in direct appeals to the "people". The resulting plebiscitary government delegates virtually unchecked power to the executive, who often abuses this power by truncating the rights of political opponents.

[12] This may not always be the case, however. For example, Latin American publics initially awarded solid electoral support to politicians who espoused "neoliberal" economic reform that *exacerbated* social inequality (see, e.g., Weyland 1998).

Is Socioeconomic Equality Part of Democracy?

Of course, adherents to the electoral and liberal views of democracy might object that while greater socioeconomic equality may be desirable, it is not an indispensable element of democracy *per se*. Democracy, they might reason, is compatible with many different forms of economic organization and degrees of state intervention in the economy. It does not guarantee any social outcome. To insist on social democracy as the true definition of democracy is, according to this line of argumentation, to impose unreasonably stringent requisites on democracy.

This objection is misplaced for at least two reasons. First and most important, my objective here is not to argue for any definition of democracy as correct. Rather, I am concerned with how Mexicans and citizens of other countries *themselves* conceptualize democracy, and how these conceptualizations affect their satisfaction with democracy and political participation. For many scholars, especially in the Anglo-American tradition, substantive democracy may not be a legitimate definition of democracy. But it is a common—and consequential—conceptualization of democracy in Mexico and other new democracies (and in older social democracies, for that matter).

Second, there are theoretical and empirical reasons for expecting citizen conceptualizations of democracy to encompass greater social equality. Spatial theories of politics and the median voter theorem teach us that the candidate with policy preferences closest to those of the average citizen will win elections most frequently (see Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984). In every society, most people earn less than the "average" income, since mean income is invariably above median income. Thus, the "median" voter has an incentive to vote for politicians who support income redistribution.

In fact, democratic countries engage in more social spending than authoritarian regimes (Brown and Hunter 1999).[13]

COMPLEMENTARITY OR CONTRADICTION? A MODEL OF CITIZEN CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRACY

Are these three concepts of democracy mutually exclusive? Some of their key elements clash. For instance, historical liberalism opposed universal suffrage because of concerns (unwarranted, as it turned out) that newly enfranchised citizens would vote in representatives who threatened private property (see Pereyra 1990: 84). Przeworksi (1992a) notes that Marx favored universal suffrage, and Ricardo opposed it, for precisely this reason. Liberalism's emphasis on property rights also enters into tension with substantive democracy's redistributive tendencies and emphasis on social equality (see, e.g., Thomassen 1995: 388).

Electoral and substantive democracy conflict over the extent of political participation feasible (or desirable) in a democracy. Electoralism would limit participation to the periodic contests for power among political parties, whereas substantive democrats demand the right to make their voices heard in between elections.[14]

Liberal and electoral democracy diverge over minority rights and the permissible scope of the majority's power. For liberals, certain rights are immanent to human existence and, thus, beyond the legislative reach of a majority. They are "inalienable", in

[13] For the contrary argument that regime type's impact on economic policy is vastly overstated, see Remmer (1990).

[14] In Mexico, the discord between these two views of democracy played out in the taco stand and barroom discussions over the myriad "citizen consultations" carried out by PRD governments in Mexico City on whether, for example, the government should construct double-decker freeways. Some felt that the non-binding consultations gave citizens a chance for at least some direct input into policy. Others, annoyed, would argue, "That's what we elect representatives for—to make decisions!"

one famous formulation, and cannot be taken away legislators. For electoral democrats, the cardinal principle is majority rule. Electoral democrats are fearful of potential authoritarianism latent in putting some policy domains beyond the people's elected representatives. They adduce the self-correcting capacity of majoritarian democracy to counter liberals' fears of the majority running roughshod over minority rights.

And constellations of ideas typically associated with one another shift over time. In the 19th Century, defense of property rights and anti-clericalism were both pillars of the liberal pantheon of ideas. In the 20th Century, however, Christian Democratic parties (including the PAN in Mexico) are laissez-faire and confessional. Liberalism's erstwhile Jacobinism, it appears, got religion.

Yet these concepts can also coexist. Few, even of those who advocate more direct democracy, would propose scuttling representative institutions. Virtually all definitions of democracy include free and fair election of political leadership. Similarly, substantive democrats' insistence on greater socioeconomic equality does not exclude freedoms like those of speech and association, indeed may even depend on them. Nor should greater socioeconomic equality obviate the procedural mainstays of democracy. Pereyra chides his fellow leftists for their disdain of formal democracy: "*Democracy is always political … always formal … always representative … always pluralist*" (1990: 85-86, original emphasis).

The core elements of all three views may figure, to some degree or another, in each individual citizen's idea of democracy. Concepts of democracy are a question of emphasis. Some aspects of democracy are more salient than others in each individual's image of democracy, and this mix varies from person to person. *Which* concepts stand out to *which* people is important because, as I demonstrate in Chapter 5, how one views democracy is critical for how one evaluates it.

Thus adherence to any one conception a matter of degree, not inconsistent with adhering to the others in some degree as well. Indeed, as I show below, adherence to each conception is independent of adherence to the others. An individual can be, to a high degree, an electoral democrat, a liberal democrat, and a substantive democrat—or any one or two of them, or none at all. These three conceptions of democracy occupy a three-dimensional "conceptual space" in which each conception may be represented by an axis and each individual's mix of conceptions, by a point in the conceptual space.[15]

CITIZEN CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AS A CAUSE OF DISENCHANTMENT

The causal relationship between conceptions of democracy and satisfaction with it is both under-theorized and under-explored empirically. Only a handful of prior analyses hint at this relationship. Conceptions of democracy and satisfaction have been examined independently, but not in combination. Exploring definitions of democracy in three Latin American countries, Camp (2001) has established that Mexicans tend to view democracy in socioeconomic terms but does not relate this view to Mexicans' evaluations of democratic performance. On the other hand, explanations of why citizens have soured on democratic politics virtually ignore the role that definitions of democracy play. Scholars have focused on explanations that fall into the categories of "retrospective evaluations" and "personal resources", including regime performance and institutional trust (Seligson, Booth, and Gómez 2006), local government performance under decentralization (Hiskey and Seligson 2003), education and electoral competitiveness (Moreno 2003), and attitudinal holdovers from authoritarianism (Klesner 2001), among other causes.

Here, I tie together two threads of scholarship—conceptions of democracy and satisfaction with it—and assert that conceptions are an important, largely overlooked,

[15] Figure 4.5 (in Chapter 4) presents a three-dimensional scatterplot of conceptions of democracy based on data from the *Citizen Disenchantment* survey.

ingredient in explaining disenchantment in Mexico and elsewhere. I construct an account of how the three broad conceptions of democracy—electoral, liberal, and substantive—affect satisfaction with democracy. This account involves both a general argument and a specific realization of it in the Mexican case. The general argument states that conceptions of democracy will influence satisfaction in *all* countries. The specific realization of the argument in Mexico—and in all countries—says the precise *way* in which conceptions of democracy influence satisfaction differs according to the historical peculiarities and present socioeconomic circumstances of each country.

Each conception of democracy entails expectations about what life in a democratic society should be like, and satisfaction with democracy is greater when these expectations are met. On the other hand, when people perceive a gap between what they expect and what they are actually getting, they may conclude that democracy is not working in their country—and, in the extreme, that democracy may not be a suitable form of government for their society.

This is true in both developed and developing democracies. In their study of public conceptions of democracy in Canada, Kornberg and Clarke argue that congruence between "beliefs about democracy" and "the realities of political life in their country" result in favorable evaluations of democracy's functioning (1994: 538). Identifying four broad dimensions along which Canadians array their beliefs about democracy, the authors find that those who viewed democracy as equality between social groups were most satisfied, given Canada's multi-cultural character. On the other hand, Canadians hewing to a minimalist definition of democracy as elections coupled with capitalism were least satisfied, given the country's redistributive bent.

Of more relevance to the Mexican case, perhaps, are views of democracy in emerging democratic polities. Russians and Ukrainians who conceived of democracy as

a set of freedoms had better-than-average evaluations of regime performance (Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1997). In contrast, citizens who emphasized the rule of law had worse-than-average evaluations of the current regimes, as did those who expected that democracy would increase economic prosperity. Miller *et al.* explain the relationship between views of democracy and backing of democratization as a function of the perceived "fit" between citizen ideals and government execution of those ideals: "[I]f [citizens] believe that the present regime is not fulfilling their expectations of [their] ideal of democracy, then they will be less supportive of current attempts at democratization" (1997: 185)

These cases illustrate the general proposition that how citizens conceive of democracy drives how they evaluate its performance. There are many types of democracies, and the idea of democracy comprises many elements. When individual citizens think about democracy, they typically emphasize one of these constituent elements at the expense of others, creating specific expectations about what democratic governments should do, and what political and economic life should be like under democracy. They then judge the performance of their particular democratic regime by how well it lives up to these expectations.

Other Influences

The rest of the story, though more familiar, cannot be left out. Established explanations might be classified under the rubrics of "retrospective evaluations" and "personal resources". The first perspective attributes satisfaction primarily to the public's assessments of incumbents, policy outputs, and government political and economic performance. For scholars who hold that retrospective evaluations mostly determine satisfaction with democracy, satisfaction results from an essentially rational process in which citizens size up the economy and polity, and determine how to ascribe blame—or

credit—for the present state of affairs. "Personal resources" encompass material conditions (e.g., income and education) and personal characteristics (e.g., cognitive abilities and party identification) that shape one's attitudes toward the political system. According to this second point of view group attachments like social class, as well as psychological predispositions toward the political system and those who embody it, are the main determinants of satisfaction with democracy.

Retrospective Evaluations

A robust line of research establishes that citizen evaluations of past regime economic and political performance, as well as evaluations of politicians and the policies they make, condition satisfaction with democracy (see, e.g., Norris 1999). Performance comprises many dimensions, including economic policy, political development, provision of services, and approval of incumbents politicians. Positive judgments in each of these areas carry over to democracy considered in the abstract, whereas negative evaluations may cause citizens to question democracy as a form of government.

Economic Performance

Citizens' judgments about specific aspects of government performance affect satisfaction with democracy. Scholars have repeatedly focused attention on economic performance, which shapes citizens' views of democratic governments in both established and emerging democracies. In the United States a long tradition of research links perceptions of economic performance to presidential approval ratings. Positive evaluations of the economy have increased satisfaction with democracy in Canada (Clarke and Kornberg 1992, Kornberg and Clark 1994) and Western Europe (Anderson and Guillory 1997).

Evaluations of government depend even more on economic performance in new democracies. Since wealthy countries mostly democratized before the third wave, new democracies are poorer. And since economic crisis often precipitates democratic transition, new democracies typically face economic pressure from the beginning. Thus, Mishler and Rose observe that "[e]conomic considerations are likely to be especially relevant in post-Communist societies because economic problems are profound" (1997: 436). Trust in political institutions depends greatly upon current and prospective macroeconomic evaluations and, to a lesser extent, upon perceptions of one's own family finances. In Spain, high hopes that democratic governments will deliver economic benefits and social justice "carry an evident potential for disillusion and conflict" (McDonough *et al.* 1986: 454-55). Perceptions of general economic performance and the government's handling of the economy were the most important determinants of support for Felipe González's Socialist government (1986: 465). The relationship between economic performance and political support has also been widely noted in Latin America (see the studies cited *supra*, in Chapter 1 of this volume).

Political Performance: Respect for Rights

Of course, citizens in new democracies expect things other than economic improvement from their governments. They also insist that governments uphold hard-won rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and belief, and deal with citizens equitably, enforcing the rule of law regardless of social position and political connections. In other words, denizens of emerging democracies make specifically *political* demands on government.

In post-Communist Europe, political performance is about as important as economic performance in generating trust in political institutions. Citizens who believe

that their governments had bettered their Communist antecessors in "providing individual freedom" and "treat[ing] everyone more fairly" had much more confidence in political institutions than those who had experienced no difference (Mishler and Rose 1994: 441).

Political Performance: Elections

Another important aspect of political performance, especially in new democracies, is the government's ability to hold free and fair elections. Several scholars have found that citizens' evaluations of electoral processes are highly correlated with their satisfaction with democracy. Assessing evidence from over 30 countries included in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) survey, Henderson found high bivariate measures of association between "satisfaction with democracy" and the "conduct of the previous election" (2004: 5). Similarly, Kornberg and Clarke found that "electoral process evaluations" were significant determinants of satisfaction with democracy. Their effect was roughly of the same magnitude as that of "government performance evaluations", and larger than that of income and age.

Given the importance of overcoming a weighty history of election fraud in Mexico, I expect that evaluations of electoral processes will figure prominently in assessments of Mexican democracy. This expectation is concordant with previous research on turnout in Mexico. Moreno found that voters who believe that elections are rigged and harbor suspicions about electoral authorities' impartiality are, understandably, less likely to vote (Moreno 2003: 320). In their analysis of the 2000 presidential election, Buendía and Somuano found it troubling "that political attitudes developed in the *ancien régime* continue to have such a large impact on participation rates" (2003: 318).

Government Services

Citizens also expect their government to provide basic services and infrastructure, including roads, schools, and electricity, among many others. These demands are not specifically democratic, but citizens in a democracy are in theory better positioned than subjects of authoritarian rule to influence the provision and distribution of these services. Thus, citizen evaluations of these services may constitute a *de facto* indicator of how responsive politicians and governments are to citizen demands—in other words, of how well democracy is working.

Approval of Incumbents

As Figure 2.1's typology of attitude objects demonstrates, citizens may have different things in mind when they think about democracy. They may be thinking about things as abstract as rules and institutions, or as concrete as current officeholders. In the established democracies, satisfaction with democracy is related to assessments of incumbent politicians. Studying public opinion in four old democracies, for example, Dalton notes "clear evidence of a general erosion in support for politicians in most advanced industrial democracies," finding that this mistrust had broadened to include political regimes and institutions (1999: 63, 74).

If approval of incumbents shapes satisfaction with democracy in the industrial democracies, this should be true *a fortiori* of new democracies. There, institutional roles such as the presidency or legislature may be virtually indistinguishable from the "incumbents of those roles", in Almond and Verba's language (1963). This is especially so in Mexico, where the experience of electoral democracy has been virtually synonymous with Vicente Fox.

Personal Resources

A second theoretical current holds that individuals' material circumstances, cognitive abilities, and psychological dispositions—what might be termed collectively "personal resources"—affect satisfaction with democracy. Studies on voting and participation in the U.S. and abroad emphasize "citizen competency" (the ability to make informed, reasoned political choices) and "personal efficacy" (the belief that one can effectively influence political decisions) as important determinants of other political attitudes and behavior.[16] More politically efficacious citizens may be more satisfied with democracy. Furthermore, emotional identification with the political system and its components—particularly political parties—also bolster satisfaction with democracy.

Income

Income is a material resource that shapes one's ability to influence public decisions. It also helps shape a sense of connection to (or alienation from) the political system. Furthermore, higher income may be more satisfied with life in general. They may conclude that democracy is working well for them, and so should exhibit greater political satisfaction. Beyond the spillover effects of life satisfaction to politics, money increases the specifically political resources that citizens have at their disposal. It gives them (potentially) greater access to government institutions and more information about government activities. In short, higher income should result in greater satisfaction with democracy.

Education

Similarly, greater education should also result in favorable evaluations of democracy (Moreno 2001: 35-36). At the system level, higher education levels give rise

[16] The classic studies are Campbell *et al.*'s *The American Voter* (1960) and Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* (1963). See also Converse (1964).

to a middle class that ameliorates redistributive battles, favoring the growth of democracy (Lipset 1959). At the individual level, education gives citizens the cognitive skills—"internal political efficacy" or "citizen competency" (Almond and Verba 1963)—that enable them to participate meaningfully in politics. In their study of societies as diverse as the United States, Costa Rica, and Turkey, Muller *et al.* discovered that education contributed most to "enhancing commitment to democratic institutions and procedures" (1987: 23). Education plays an important role in socializing democratic norms such as tolerance for diverse points of view and increased demand for individual freedom.

Age

As a proxy for experience and wisdom, age is another resource that might influence satisfaction with democracy. In Mexico (and other new democracies), older survey respondents may be more satisfied with democracy, since they have direct memories of authoritarianism. Older respondents are also likelier to have more stable incomes and social positions. On the other hand, youth are notorious detractors from politics in general. Also, their other preoccupations (completing their studies, finding work, seeking a mate, and so on) may preclude them from high levels interest in politics—a variable potentially associated with political satisfaction.

Gender

Gender is a personal resource in at least two senses. First, it conditions access to political networks. Despite relative gains by women in parliamentary representation and cabinet appointments over the past decade or so, politics in Mexico continues to be mostly a boy's game. Second, gender shapes how men and women think about politics. Adherence to traditional gender roles Mexico means the public sphere is thought of as the province of men, whereas the domestic ambit is "feminized". Even where women are

active in leading social movements and civic organizations, they may not see this participation as especially "political".

Partisanship

Membership in a political party, or affective affinity with one, contributes to satisfaction with democracy. Democratic elections produce winners and losers, and "people who voted for a governing party … are almost by definition more likely to believe that the government is interested in and responsive to their needs" (Anderson and Guillory 1997: 68). The party becomes a synecdoche for democracy, and judgments about a specific component of the political system generalize to the whole system.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF DISENCHANTMENT: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Why should slipping satisfaction with democracy concern us? After all, democracies routinely feature citizens who criticize politicians, parties, and policies but who nonetheless support democratic ideals deeply. Fears in the late 1960's and early 1970's that enduring political dissatisfaction would erode support for democratic ideals—possibly paving the way for recrudescent authoritarianism—proved greatly exaggerated.

But political dissatisfaction in new democracies may have fundamentally different causes and meanings than it does in old ones (Anderson 2001, Torcal 2003). Dissatisfaction's consequences may be more pernicious in new democracies, given their frailer institutions and less-deeply rooted democratic values. The most obvious and dramatic consequence is an elevated probability of democratic breakdown—that is, of a return to frankly authoritarian government after a democratic spell. This was the main concern of early exponents of "consolidation theory" (see, e.g., Huntington 1991, O'Donnell *et al.* 1986, and Whitehead 1989). Some of the third wave democracies (Russia, Belarus, Pakistan, Thailand, Kenya, and others) have broken down, but most

remain at least minimally democratic. Declining satisfaction with democracy may have played a role in some cases of democratic collapse, but it also may have reflected (rather than caused) a progressive lapse back into authoritarianism.

Disenchantment's potential contribution to democratic breakdown is its most drastic effect, but not its most widespread. Here, I examine other consequences, also important, more widespread, and more readily examined: the effects of dissatisfaction on political behavior—specifically, on voting, individual non-voting participation, and protest. As Chapter 6 argues, dissatisfaction's impact on participation differs according to the *type* of participation involved. I hypothesize (and find) that dissatisfaction reduces *institutional* political action and increases *contentious* behavior. Disenchanted citizens perceive their governments as unresponsive, and the ballot (as well as other institutional mechanisms of representation) as futile. Discouraged, they vote and participate otherwise less often. A handful, however, resort to contentious action to goad the government into responding.

Dissatisfaction, then, most often results in lower *quality* of democracy, not its demise. The sub-discipline of "transitology" generally foresaw two potential, opposite outcomes of democratic transition: breakdown or consolidation into an enduring, liberal democracy. But Mexico and many other new democracies have steered a middle course, congealing into low-quality "illiberal", "partial", or "semi-democracies". They continue to hold multi-party elections (often plagued by irregularities), while continuing to violate human rights and suppress liberties. Contrary to the democratic consolidation paradigm, then, illiberal democracy is a stable equilibrium somewhere in between breakdown and full consolidation—an equilibrium that less institutional citizen participation and greater conflict help perpetuate.

Figure 2.2 is a diagram that represents of this theory of dissatisfaction with democracy. Recapitulating, the liberal, electoral, and substantive conceptions of democracy (represented in the upper left-hand box) influence satisfaction with democracy. They complement existing explanations based on retrospective evaluations of government performance (handling of the economy, respect for rights, provision of services, incumbent approval), personal resources (income, education, age, gender, party identification), and institutions (such as the electoral system)—represented in the three boxes below conceptions of democracy.

How satisfied one is with democracy, in turn, influences the type and extent of political participation in which citizens engage. I distinguish between two broad classes of political participation, which Chapter 6 spells out in greater detail: institutional (voting and other forms of conventional participation, represented in the rightmost top box) and contentious (various forms of protest, represented in the rightmost bottom box). Dissatisfaction will decrease institutional participation, and increase contention.

The diagram shows only the direct effects of conceptions of democracy (and other independent variables) on satisfaction with democracy, and of satisfaction on political participation—seemingly implying that conceptions of democracy affect participation only indirectly. That is, conceptions of democracy influence satisfaction, which, in turn, influences participation. Nonetheless, conceptions of democracy (and other independent variables) may influence political behavior directly. Thus readers should imagine a series of arrows, omitted here for the sake of clarity, from each of the four boxes representing causes of satisfaction to each of the two boxes representing types of political participation.

In the statistical model of satisfaction developed in Chapter 5, the independent variables combine linearly and additively to predict satisfaction.[17] Of course, conceptions of democracy could shape satisfaction interactively with evaluations of government performance. The impact of these evaluations on satisfaction would differ for different types of democrats: economic performance would matter more for substantive democrats; respect for rights, for liberal democrats; and elections, for electoral democrats. As I explain in Chapter 5, the evidence reveals no such interactive effects. Thus I present results only for a model that omits interaction terms.



Figure 2.2: Diagram of Theory on Causes and Consequences of Satisfaction with Democracy.

In short, my theory of dissatisfaction with democracy posits that citizen conceptions of democracy are an important but virtually unexplored factor shaping assessments of democracy. The theory also stresses the concrete behavioral ramifications

[17] Since Chapter 6 operationalizes different forms of political participation as categorical variables, the independent variables in those models combine log-additively.

of dissatisfaction with democracy, often overshadowed by weighty concerns of democratic collapse. In the next chapter, I document the extent of disenchantment in Mexico and new democracies around the world. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 flesh out the specific realization of Chapter 2's general theory in the Mexican case and test my theory against the evidence. The concluding chapter returns to the wider world.

CHAPTER 3

Disenchantment with Democracy in Mexico and Other New Democracies

Citizens in Mexico—and, as we shall see, in the vast majority of newly-democratic countries—are disenchanted with their democracies. But just how disillusioned are they? In the previous chapter, I essayed an explanation for disenchantment: unmet socioeconomic expectations of democracy. This chapter puts numbers on levels of disenchantment in Mexico and around the world. First, I explore trends in satisfaction with Mexican democracy over the past decade, placing them in the context of salient political events. Satisfaction has declined significantly in Mexico from 1997 to the present, though with fluctuations contingent upon the general political environment at the time of the survey.

Of course, Mexicans are not alone in their increasingly pessimistic judgments about democracy. I present descriptive data on satisfaction with democracy in some 72 new and/or low-income democracies (most are both) in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Western Europe. The data show satisfaction to be low or falling in the great majority of these. This chapter's main goal is to quantify, rather than explain, disenchantment in these 72 countries. I do, however, outline some possible country-level causes that influence aggregate disenchantment, including post-election violence, economic crisis, and domestic and international strife.

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO

Satisfaction with democracy in Mexico has declined since its apogee in 1997. Figure 3.1 presents data taken from three cross-sectional series carried out between 1997 and 2008. The Mexico City daily *El Universal*, one of two with in-house survey analysis

units (the other is *Reforma*), conducted six national evaluations of democracy from November, 2002, to May, 2006. The Mexican Interior Ministry (*Gobernación*) sponsored three editions of the National Survey on Political Culture (ENCUP, in Spanish), carried out in 2001, 2003, and 2005. Finally, the Latinobarometer organization, with headquarters in Santiago, Chile, has carried out (almost) yearly regional surveys in Latin America since 1995.



Figure 3.1: Satisfaction with Democracy in Mexico, 1997-2008.

The data reveal several interesting patterns. First, satisfaction with democracy in Mexico has been consistently low over the last decade. In none of the three series are more than half of Mexicans satisfied with their democracy. The highest rate of satisfaction in any survey, 45%, occurs in 1997, at the very beginning of the period under observation. On only three occasions after (of 19 remaining data points) does satisfaction come close to its 1997 maximum by exceeding 40%. On the other hand, more than half

the times the question was asked (12 of 20 measurements occasions), less than a third of Mexicans professed satisfaction with their democracy. The Latinobarometer series registers an average satisfaction rate of 28%, much closer to its low point of 17% than to the maximum of 45%. Similarly, satisfaction in the ENCUP surveys averages 32% (nearer the minimum of 26% than the maximum of 41%) and the *El Universal* polls put mean satisfaction at 35%.

Moreover, satisfaction has, on the whole, fallen over the last decade. The longest series available, Latinobarometer, shows that satisfaction in Mexico dropped from a high point of 45% in 1997, when the PRI lost its congressional majority for the first time ever, to around 17% in 2003 to 2005. It rose significantly in the run-up to the 2006 general election, only to fall sharply afterwards. More generally, in all series the high point antecedes the low point. Intervals in which satisfaction declined outnumber those in which it rose by nine to seven. Quantifying, satisfaction plummeted by an average of 3.2% per year over the three ENCUP surveys (an average decrease of 7.5% between measurement occasions) for a total decrease of 15% between 2001 and 2005. In the same vein, satisfaction fell yearly by 1.6%, on average, in the *El Universal* series, summing -5.5% over all six polls, and by half a percent annually in the Latinobarometer series, yielding a net drop of 6%.

Finally, within the general panorama of low, falling satisfaction the level of satisfaction with democracy fluctuates considerably. The satisfaction rate appears highly sensitive to the general political context at the time the surveys were taken. It follows electoral cycles closely, spiking during the mid-term election year of 1997 (45%) and the presidential election years of 2000 (36%) and 2006 (41%).[18] The *Desencanto*

[18] The 2003 mid-term election is the exception, when not even the congressional races could lift Mexicans' evaluations of their democracy out of the doldrums.

Ciudadano survey seconds the 41% satisfaction rating registered by Latinobarometer in 2006, with 39% of citizens calling themselves "very" or "somewhat" satisfied. These peaks, however, are ephemeral, and after each election satisfaction settles back in to its normal, low level. The sharp 2006 recovery was also temporary. The excitement generated by the heated presidential race focused attention on what had been one of the uncontestable achievements of Mexican democracy: free and fair elections. Both the PAN and PRD believed their candidate had a reasonable shot at the presidency up until election day and beyond, as uncertainty about the winner persisted in the weeks following polling. Yet Mexicans' enthusiasm subsided rapidly, with half of Mexicans believing the election was plagued by irregularities[19] and the vast majority calling the country "undemocratic".[20] The Latinobarometer surveys since 2006 have ratified Mexicans' renewed malaise. In 2007, satisfaction came in at just 31%, a decline of ten percentage points from the previous year, and in 2008, satisfaction declined even further to 23%.

If the high points tracked election years, the low points seemed to coincide with scandal and conflict. The 2003-2005 trough in satisfaction was marked by the failure of significant Fox administration policy initiatives (most notably on tax and energy reform); the *videoescándalos* revealing kickback schemes in public contracts administered during Rosario Robles's left-leaning Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) government in Mexico City; and the Fox government's attempt to prosecute PRD presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador criminally and prevent him from running for president in

[19] *El Universal*, "Comicios dañaron la imagen del IFE, revelan", November 10, 2006, and Parametría poll, September, 2006, http://www.parametria.com.mx/carta-parametrica.phtml?id=4040&text1=septiembre [accessed April 23, 2009].
[20] GEA-ISA poll "Escenarios políticos, 2004-2006: gobernabilidad y sucesión", August, 2006, http://www.isa.org.mx/contenido/Gimx0608p.pdf [accessed on April 23, 2009].

2006. Some 72% of Mexicans believed this move was a politically motivated attempt to eliminate a rival candidate from contention.[21]

Why Do the Surveys Differ?

A brief digression on the apparent inconsistencies between the surveys is in order. The three series at times diverge significantly. For example, in February, 2003, the ENCUP estimated satisfaction at 29%, compared to 37% for the *El Universal* figure for the same month—a difference of 8%. The Latinobarometer survey of April, 2004, yielded a 17% satisfaction rate (the lowest of all 19 data points), but the *El Universal* survey of just a month later put satisfaction at 33%, a discrepancy of 16%. The July, 2003, Latinobarometer (18%) and November, 2003, *El Universal* (42%) estimates exhibit an even wider margin of 24%.

What explains these differences? Naturally, all other things being equal we would expect some divergence due to sampling error, but these differences are probably too great to be explained by sampling error alone. Different sample designs and field methodologies may account for some of the disagreement. Variations in question wording and the number of answer categories provided to respondents also affect the measurement of satisfaction. The ENCUP surveys asked about satisfaction with Mexican democracy "at present" (2001) or "today" (2003 and 2005), whereas the *El Universal* and Latinobarometer items were variants on satisfaction with "the way democracy is working". The latter formulation suggests a narrower, more immediate focus on incumbents and policy results—that is, on attitudinal objects located at the more concrete end of the concrete-abstract continuum shown in Figure 2.1—whereas the former

[21] *El Universal*, "Desafuero por razón política, señalan", April 21, 2005.

phrasing reflects the more holistic approach of the "summary indicator" interpretation of satisfaction with democracy.

Furthermore, whereas the *El Universal*, Latinobarometer, and the first ENCUP survey only provided the customary four response categories ("not at all", "not very", "somewhat", and "very" satisfied), the 2003 and 2005 ENCUP surveys report data for a fifth, intermediate category ("neither dissatisfied nor satisfied"). This category was not read to respondents, but used to record spontaneous neutral responses. Evidently, accepting a middle-of-the-road answer yields a different distribution of responses than forcing positive or negative answers, which the four-point scale does: respondents who might otherwise have offered a neutral evaluation will skew one way or the other when that option is taken away.

Finally, the surveys were conducted at different times, coinciding only in February, 2003. If satisfaction with democracy is sensitive to current events, as I surmise above, a difference of even a few months could produce very different estimates of satisfaction. In short, all these factors make comparison across different surveys problematic—a difficulty that also inheres among different cross-national surveys.

Nonetheless, a clear picture of satisfaction with democracy emerges from the three series, considered separately or taken together: Mexicans have been generally dissatisfied with their democracy during the past decade and, aside from momentary, election-year upticks, have become less so over time.

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES WORLDWIDE[22]

Disenchantment with democracy is hardly unique to Mexico. Satisfaction with democracy is generally low, declining, or both in new democracies. In broad strokes, the third wave of democratization began in Southern Europe in 1974 with the peaceful deposing of the Salazar dictatorship in Portugal (Huntington 1991). It reached South America in the early- and mid-1980's, ending military rule in many countries there, and touched down in Asia in the middle and end of that decade. The three years from 1989 to 1991 saw a massive swell of democratization with the demise of communism in Eastern Europe, culminating in the collapse of the Soviet Union. The third democratic wave also washed over Central America in the late-1980's and early-1990's, finally reaching African shores in 1990.

In this section I examine citizens' assessments of their democracies in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. I present descriptive statistics from new democracies (and a few older, low-income democracies) in which surveys posed the satisfaction with democracy question on at least one occasion. "New democracies" are those that democratized—or, in some cases, redemocratized—during the third wave. "Democratization" is defined as having achieved a Freedom House rating of at least "partially free" *and* a positive score in the Polity IV data set for three consecutive years

[22] Among the books and articles I consulted for historical background on transitions to democracy in the regions and countries included in this study are: Ake (1991), Bunce (1999), Callaghy (1994), Case (1996), Dagi (1996), Diamond (1999), Fumonyoh (2001), Hedman (2001), Jones (1998), Joseph (1997), Khan (1993), J. Lee (2002), H.Y. Lee (1993), Linz and Stepan (1996), McFaul (2002), Mulikita (2003), Nasang'o (2007), 'Nyong'o (1992), Rose et. al (1998), Suryadinata (1997), Thompson (1996), and Van de Walle (2002). Also helpful were the survey organizations' reports, available at their web sites (www.latinobarometer.org, www.asiabarometer.org, www.afrobarometer.org), the CIA World Fact Book country reports (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook), the Freedom House's "Freedom in the World" reports (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15), and Wikipedia (www.wikipedia.org).

since 1974. "Low-income" democracies are those with a median per capita gross domestic product of $10,000 or less (unadjusted by purchasing power parity).

These two categories, new and low-income democracies, overlap almost completely. By the beginning of the third wave, most wealthy countries had already become democracies. Thus, the pool of countries eligible for democratization comprised almost entirely low-income countries. There are some exceptions, however. Eight low-income countries included here (Botswana, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Venezuela) had democratized before the third wave. Conversely, four countries that democratized during the third wave (Greece, Portugal, South Korea, and Spain)—three in Western Europe—are high-income.

Though this study focuses on new democracies, I include some low-income, older democracies. Contrasting these with the wealthier, new democracies may help shed light on whether citizen disenchantment springs from these democracies' newness, economic underdevelopment, or both. That is, does dissatisfaction owe more to the newness of democracy or to its apparent failure in promoting material well-being? Newer democracies tend to be marked by a fragile rule of law, inefficient or corrupt governmental institutions, tenuous ties between representatives and constituents, and uneven implantation of democratic values in mass publics and, especially, elites. These problems may become more apparent as the novelty of democracy fades. At the same time, most new democracies have made little headway against perennial problems of poverty and inequality.

This chapter focuses on describing levels of and trends in satisfaction with democracy around the world. Using the World Values Survey (WVS), the regional "barometer" surveys (Latinobarometer, Afrobarometer, and AsiaBarometer), and the Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (CDCEE) 1990-2001 study, I

present means and linear trends in satisfaction with democracy for some 72 new and low-income democracies around the world. I leave systematic exploration of satisfaction's individual-level determinants for Chapters 5 (in the case of Mexico) and 7 (for the rest of the world).

In addition to these individual determinants there are also, of course, characteristics of *countries* that affect satisfaction for all citizens in the country, raising (or lowering) aggregate satisfaction relative to that of other countries. Among the factors that appear to increase satisfaction are holding elections, healthy economic performance, effective post-transition leadership, prior experience with democracy, and a favorable international environment. Country-level causes of dissatisfaction include post-electoral violence, economic crisis, ethnic and religious conflict, and border disputes or international war. Satisfaction also varies widely by region. I first give an overview of satisfaction with democracy around the world. Then, I organize the discussion by country-level variable, adducing cases to illustrate these variables' possible effects on satisfaction.[23]

Table 3.1 shows means and trends in satisfaction for 72 new and low-income democracies, as these terms are defined above. Columns 2 and 3 together identify the source of the data. Column 2 names the survey organization and Column 3, the year of the survey. The World Values Survey (WVS) has been conducted every five years or so since 1981, and has grown to include over a hundred countries. It began including the "satisfaction with democracy" item in the third wave (1996-1998 for the countries considered here), and asked the question in most new democracies only in the fourth

[23] Though I carry out cross-national tests of *individual* determinants of satisfaction with democracy in Chapter 7, I do not test for the effects of *aggregate-level* determinants in this dissertation. This testing remains, for now, an area of further exploration.

wave (1999-2001).[24] The Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (CDCEE) survey comprises two waves, the first conducted in eleven countries from 1990 to 1992, the second, in 15 from 1998 to 2001. The Latinobarometer survey has been carried yearly since 1995 and now includes 18 countries. The Afrobarometer and AsiaBarometer surveys are of more recent vintage. The former has been carried out biannually since 2002 and now covers 18 countries, while the latter has been carried out annually since 2003 in a total of 33 countries.

Sometimes a given survey organization asked inhabitants to rate their satisfaction with democracy on a single occasion—as happened, for example, in Albania during 2002. Columns 4 and 5 list satisfaction scores for these countries. The "Single Shot Mean" (Column 4) presents the average score for each country projected onto a 0 to 1 scale. In all cases, the means were significantly above or below the (normed) midpoint of 0.5. Since the polls use different scales, norming means in this fashion facilitates comparisons among countries.[25] Latinobarometer, Afrobarometer, and WVS provide respondents the four traditional response categories, "very," "fairly," "not very," and "not at all" satisfied with "the way democracy is working." AsiaBarometer poses the question differently, as part of a battery on general life satisfaction: "Please tell me how satisfied you are with the following aspects of your life," one of which was "the democratic system." Interviewees had five response categories available, including a neutral midpoint: "very satisfied," "satisfied," "neither satisfied nor dissatisfied," "dissatisfied," and "very dissatisfied." The CDCEE asked respondents to rate how satisfied they were

[24] The exceptions are the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Moldova, surveyed in both the third and fourth WVS waves.

[25] Comparability across surveys also depends on the assumption that, despite variations in their wording, the questions are functionally equivalent.

with “democracy in their country” on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 was “totally dissatisfied” and 10 was “totally satisfied”.

Analysts commonly report satisfaction scores as the combined percentage of respondents with positive answers (i.e., ones above the midpoint of the scale: 2.5 for WVS, Latinobarometer, and Afrobarometer, 3 for AsiaBarometer, and 5.5 for CDCEE). I adhere to this convention to Column 5. Note, however, that these combined percentages often distort the true level of satisfaction, as indicated by the mean, because they conceal the internal frequency distributions among the categories that constitute the combined score. For example, the mean for a country in which zero percent of respondents are “fairly satisfied” with democracy and 50% are “very satisfied” will differ from a mean where 50% are “fairly satisfied” and zero percent, “very satisfied”. Respondents in the first country are much more satisfied than their counterparts in the second, but both report a 50% satisfaction rate when the top two categories are combined. This distortion may be especially pronounced in cases with an odd number of response categories, such as the five-point AsiaBarometer scale. Whereas an even-numbered scale balances positive and negative responsive categories, an odd number of categories yields a lopsided satisfaction score: the number of categories that contribute to a positive satisfaction rating is less than half of the total. Thus, the satisfaction percentage scores reported in Column 5, though easier to grasp intuitively and more commonly used, are less accurate indicators of satisfaction than the means.[26]

[26] Unfortunately, the Latinobarometer micro-data are not publicly available and very expensive to purchase. So, I could not calculate mean satisfaction for countries; I instead relied on satisfaction percentages that Latinobarometer publishes in yearly summary reports.

			Single Shot		Trend						
Country	**Survey**	**Year(s)**	**Mean***	**%**	**Start**	**End**	**B**	**Start(%)**	**End(%)**	**B(%)**	
Albania	WVS	2002	0.340	26.7%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Argentina	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	39.5%	33.3%	-0.6%	
Armenia	WVS	1997	0.252	4.7%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Bangladesh	WVS	2002	0.623	77.3%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Bangladesh	ASB	2005	0.635	58.6%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Belarus	CDCEE	1998	0.368	25.5%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Benin	AFB	2006	0.560	57.8%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Bolivia	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	24.1%	28.9%	0.5%	
Bosnia-Herz	WVS	2001	0.389	34.0%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Botswana	AFB	2002,2004,2006	--	--	0.660	0.564	-0.024	76.7%	63.5%	-3.3%	
Brazil	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	19.2%	27.9%	0.9%	
Bulgaria	WVS	1999	0.365	28.6%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Bulgaria	CDCEE	1990,1999	--	--	0.300	0.312	0.001	13.0%	18.6%	0.6%	**
Cape Verde	AFB	2004,2006	--	--	0.434	0.555	0.061	35.5%	52.9%	17.4%	
Chile	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	28.4%	37.1%	0.8%	
Colombia	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	24.5%	26.3%	0.2%	**
Costa Rica	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	67.8%	47.9%	-2.0%	
Croatia	WVS	1999	0.311	17.9%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Czech Republic	WVS	1999	0.419	37.7%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Czech Republic	CDCEE	1990,2001	--	--	0.416	0.391	-0.002	34.1%	29.2%	-0.4%	**
Dominican Rep.	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	47.6%	36.6%	-1.1%	
East Germany	CDCEE	1992,2000	--	--	0.390	0.455	0.008	26.8%	42.2%	1.9%	
Ecuador	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	26.8%	21.1%	-0.6%	
El Salvador	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	40.6%	31.4%	-0.9%	
Estonia	WVS	1996,1999	--	--	0.433	0.422	-0.004	40.6%	36.7%	-1.3%	**
Estonia	CDCEE	1991,2001	--	--	0.360	0.394	0.003	20.7%	26.5%	0.6%	**
Georgia	WVS	1996	0.315	15.9%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Ghana	AFB	2002,2004,2006	--	--	0.511	0.695	0.046	59.6%	79.1%	4.9%	
Greece	WVS	2000	0.512	55.2%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Guatemala	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	45.9%	26.3%	-2.0%	
Honduras	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	49.9%	34.0%	-1.6%	
Hungary	WVS	1999	0.402	31.4%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Hungary	CDCEE	1990,1999	--	--	0.349	0.393	0.005	19.6%	28.2%	1.0%	
India	WVS	2001	0.563	63.5%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Indonesia	WVS	2001	0.397	28.8%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Indonesia	ASB	2004	0.773	83.7%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Kenya	AFB	2004,2006	--	--	0.663	0.554	-0.054	83.2%	63.9%	-19.3%	
Latvia	CDCEE	1998	0.372	24.3%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Latvia	WVS	1996,1999	--	--	0.317	0.404	0.029	13.6%	30.2%	5.6%	
Lesotho	AFB	2002,2004,2006	--	--	0.534	0.491	-0.011	57.0%	50.7%	-1.6%	
Lithuania	CDCEE	1991,2001	--	--	0.453	0.362	-0.009	40.8%	23.6%	-1.7%	
Lithuania	WVS	1997,1999	--	--	0.379	0.350	-0.015	26.1%	25.5%	-0.3%	**
Macedonia	WVS	2001	0.270	17.5%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Madagascar	AFB	2006	0.441	40.0%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Malawi	AFB	2002,2004,2006	--	--	0.565	0.361	-0.051	61.1%	29.7%	-7.9%	
Malaysia	ASB	2003,2004	--	--	0.704	0.748	0.044	73.5%	83.1%	9.6%	
Mali	AFB	2002,2004,2006	--	--	0.571	0.577	0.001	65.4%	60.9%	-1.1%	**

			Single Shot		Trend						
Country	**Survey**	**Year(s)**	**Mean***	**%**	**Start**	**End**	**B**	**Start(%)**	**End(%)**	**B(%)**	
Mexico	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	31.8%	26.4%	-0.5%	
Moldova	WVS	1996,2002	--	--	0.258	0.268	0.002	6.5%	10.2%	0.6%	**
Mongolia	ASB	2005	0.512	39.3%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Mozambique	AFB	2004,2006	--	--	0.568	0.667	0.042	61.4%	71.1%	9.7%	
Namibia	AFB	2002,2004,2006	--	--	0.645	0.667	0.006	71.2%	75.1%	0.9%	**
Nepal	ASB	2005	0.391	25.8%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Nicaragua	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	37.0%	30.3%	-0.7%	
Nigeria	AFB	2002,2004,2006	--	--	0.653	0.261	-0.098	78.9%	20.3%	-14.7%	
Pakistan	WVS	2001	0.273	17.9%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Panama	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	38.4%	32.7%	-0.6%	
Paraguay	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	17.6%	11.2%	-0.6%	
Peru	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	20.1%	15.2%	-0.5%	
Philippines	WVS	2001	0.473	43.0%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Philippines	ASB	2004	0.534	47.5%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Poland	WVS	1999	0.436	43.1%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Poland	CDCEE	1991,2000	--	--	0.409	0.330	-0.009	28.7%	17.5%	-1.2%	
Portugal	WVS	1999	0.618	78.6%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Romania	WVS	1999	0.319	20.9%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Romania	CDCEE	1990,1998	--	--	0.457	0.317	-0.017	48.8%	16.8%	-4.0%	
Russia	CDCEE	1998	0.279	11.8%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Russia	WVS	1999	0.187	6.8%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Senegal	AFB	2004,2006	--	--	0.581	0.588	0.003	66.3%	63.5%	-2.7%	**
Slovakia	WVS	1999	0.334	23.4%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Slovakia	CDCEE	1990,2001	--	--	0.371	0.341	-0.003	26.6%	22.9%	-0.3%	**
Slovenia	WVS	1999	0.451	45.1%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Slovenia	CDCEE	1991,1999	--	--	0.419	0.392	-0.003	33.3%	25.9%	-0.9%	**
South Africa	AFB	2002,2004,2006	--	--	0.483	0.570	0.022	50.4%	63.4%	3.3%	
South Korea	WVS	2001	0.420	32.6%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
South Korea	ASB	2003,2004	--	--	0.476	0.408	-0.069	18.0%	14.4%	-3.7%	
Spain	WVS	1999	0.559	66.2%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Sri Lanka	ASB	2003-2005	--	--	0.540	0.590	0.025	51.2%	47.8%	-1.7%	
Tanzania	AFB	2002,2004,2006	--	--	0.592	0.740	0.037	73.2%	84.5%	2.8%	
Thailand	ASB	2003,2004	--	--	0.711	0.729	0.018	74.6%	76.7%	2.1%	**
Turkey	WVS	2001	0.255	23.8%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Uganda	AFB	2002,2004,2006	--	--	0.653	0.597	-0.014	76.8%	68.7%	-2.0%	
Ukraine	CDCEE	1991,1998	--	--	0.291	0.198	-0.013	8.8%	4.6%	-0.6%	
Ukraine	WVS	1996,1999	--	--	0.254	0.270	0.005	7.3%	15.4%	2.7%	**
Uruguay	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	63.7%	57.9%	-0.6%	
Venezuela	LB	1997-2007	--	--	--	--	--	32.5%	51.0%	1.8%	
Yugoslavia	WVS	2001	0.409	39.5%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
Zambia	AFB	2002,2004,2006	--	--	0.573	0.416	0.039	65.8%	36.6%	-7.3%	

Table 3.1: Levels and Trends in Satisfaction with Democracy around the World, 1990-2007.

A. Country
B. AFB = Afrobarometer; ASB = AsiaBarometer; CDCEE = Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe; Survey; LB = Latinobarometer; WVS = World Values
C. Years survey was conducted; discrete years separated by commas; dash indicates yearly between start and end dates
D. Normed mean of "single-shot" survey (conducted by a given survey house in only one year), where means on 4-, 5-, and 10-point scales are projected on 0-1 scale
E. Percentage of respondents above the midpoint on each satisfaction with democracy scale
F. Normed predicted mean (i.e., projected onto a 0-1 scale) in the starting year of a multi-year survey
G. Normed predicted mean in the end year of a multi-year survey
H. Average yearly (linear) change on a 0-1 scale
I. Predicted percentage of people above the midpoint on satisfaction with democracy scale in the starting year of a multi-year survey
J. Predicted percentage of respondents above the midpoint on satisfaction with democracy scale in the end year of a multi-year survey
K. Average yearly (linear) change in percentage of respondents above midpoint on satisfaction with democracy scale

* All means differ significantly from the midpoint (with 95% confidence) at $p < .001$
** T-tests for differences of means between starting and ending values insignificant at $p < .05$

In many cases, a survey organization polled a given country on more than one occasion. The CDCEE carried out surveys for most countries on two occasions; Afrobarometer, on three; and Latinobarometer, on 11. AsiaBarometer surveyed citizens of some Asian democracies on two or three consecutive years between 2003 and 2005. I report trend data in Columns 6 through 11. A "trend" is simply a regression line drawn through the available data points, where a "data point" is aggregate satisfaction in a given country in a given year.[27] The figures in Column 6, labelled "Start", are linear predictions—*not* raw data points—of mean satisfaction (normed as in Column 4) in the first year of the data series, and Column 7, "End", contains linear predictions for the last year. Column 8, "B", is the slope coefficient representing average yearly (linear) change of the normed means. Similarly, Columns 9 through 11 are predicted values for satisfaction percentage scores in the first and last years of a survey (Columns 9 and 10), and linear change in satisfaction percentages (Column 11). I have denoted cases where

[27] In the Eastern European countries, the trend is a linear extrapolation between two data points.

change was statistically insignificant (as revealed by t-tests for comparisons of independent means in the starting and ending years of a survey) with a double asterisk after Column 11.

Satisfaction: Low, Declining, or Both

Table 3.2 classifies new and low-income democracies by their level of satisfaction with democracy. It is low, falling, or both in about three quarters of the world's new and low income democracies. The first column, labelled "Single Shot", synthesizes data contained in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.1 and includes countries measured at only one point in time by a given survey house.[28] Satisfaction above the normed midpoint of 0.5 was reckoned "High", and below 0.5 was "Low". Of the 23 single-survey countries, satisfaction was low in 17 (74%) and high in just six (26%). Three of the six high satisfaction countries are Western European democracies—Greece, Spain, and Portugal—that, according to modernization theory, should democratized long before the third wave.

The second and third columns ("Falling" and "Rising", respectively) contain 50 countries surveyed on two or more occasions. The table cross-classifies these countries by absolute level of satisfaction *at the initial survey* (rows) and change over time (columns). Satisfaction with democracy is low, falling, or both in 42 (in Row 1, Columns 2 and 3, and Row 2, Column 2) of these 50 countries (84%). Countries that *began* the observation period with low satisfaction (Row 1, Columns 2 and 3) outnumbered those that started at high satisfaction levels (Row 2, Columns 2 and 3) by 31 (68%) to 19

[28] Some countries (Russia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and others) were measured on two occasions, but by different survey organizations; given methodological differences between surveys, however, prudence seemed to militate against taking the different measurements as indicative of a trend. In all cases save one, Indonesia, both surveys' satisfaction scores fell above or below the 50% mark. Indonesia is, thus, reported twice, leading to 73 table entries (but only 72 countries).

(32%). Of the 11 countries where satisfaction started high but fell (Row 2, Column 2), fully six—marked by a double asterisk—descended below the midpoint threshold into low satisfaction territory. In contrast, only one of the 11 countries with initially low but rising satisfaction (Row 1, Column 3)—Cape Verde, marked by a single-asterisk—ended up with a high satisfaction rate. Finally, considering only the direction of change and not the starting point, countries which satisfaction fell (Rows 1 and 2, Column 2) outnumbered those in which it rose (Rows 1 and 2, Column 3) by 31 (68%) to 19 (32%). In short, citizens of new (and older, low-income) democracies are disenchanted with democracy.

COUNTRY-LEVEL CAUSES OF DISENCHANTMENT

I now turn to some country-level variables that appear to affect satisfaction for citizenries as a whole. I present each variable's hypothesized effects, then exemplify with several prominent cases.

Economic Crisis and Growth

Poor economic performance and economic crises, in some cases brought about by harsh market-oriented shock therapy, undermine satisfaction with democracy. On the other hand, prosperity increases satisfaction—especially when broadly distributed. If resource-hoarding elites in authoritarian regimes foster social inequality, then democracy should promote greater equality. At the very least, alternation in power should spread the benefits of patronage more widely. At a deeper level, greater political equality brought about by democracy should redress social inequality through policy change aimed at redistributing the benefits of growth more evenly. Citizens could see poverty, then, as not only a failure of economic policy, but of democracy itself.

	Single Survey	Falling	Rising
Low	Albania	Argentina	Bolivia
	Armenia	Costa Rica	Brazil
	Belarus	Czech Republic	Bulgaria
	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Dominican Rep.	Cape Verde*
	Bulgaria	Ecuador	Chile
	Georgia	El Salvador	Colombia
	Indonesia (WVS)	Guatemala	Estonia
	Latvia	Honduras	East Germany
	Macedonia	Lithuania	Hungary
	Madagascar	Mexico	Moldova
	Mongolia	Nicaragua	Venezuela
	Nepal	Panama	
	Pakistan	Paraguay	
	Philippines	Peru	
	Russia	Poland	
	Turkey	Romania	
	Yugoslavia	Slovakia	
		Slovenia	
		South Korea	
		Ukraine	
High	Bangladesh	Botswana	Ghana
	Benin	India**	Malaysia
	Greece	Kenya	Mali
	Indonesia (AB)	Lesotho**	Mozambique
	Portugal	Malawi**	Namibia
	Spain	Nigeria**	South Africa
		Senegal	Tanzania
		Sri Lanka**	Thailand
		Uganda	
		Uruguay	

Table 3.2: Summary of Satisfaction with Democracy in New and Low-Income Democracies around the World, 1990-2006.

* Changing satisfaction rose above the midpoint threshold into high satisfaction (one country).
** Changing satisfaction fell below the midpoint threshold into low satisfaction (11 countries).

Sources: World Values Survey, Latinobarometer, Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, AsiaBarometer, Afrobarometer.

Argentina suffered a severe currency devaluation crisis in the late 1990's that hastened on grave political instability in the early 2000's, when the country shuffled through five presidents in a two-year span. Mean satisfaction declined in Argentina at the rate of 0.6% per year, from 39.5% to 33.3%, between 1997 and 2007. In the heart of the former Soviet Empire, Russia and the Ukraine suffered severe economic crises in the

early 1990's. Russian President Boris Yeltsin's "shock therapy" of market-oriented reform in Russia resulted in sharp inflation, massive unemployment, contracting productivity, and decaying social services. A deep recession besieged the newly-democratic Ukraine. Both countries had among the lowest mean satisfaction in the world. In the Ukraine, satisfaction plunged from .291 to .198 by -.013 yearly between 1991 and 1998. Russia recorded satisfaction of .279 in 1998 (CDCEE) and .187 in 1999 (WVS).

On the other hand, economic wealth and health boost satisfaction with democracy. Of the four relatively rich new democracies in this study (where "rich" is defined as over $10,000 GDP per capita)—Portugal, Spain, Greece, and South Korea—the first three enjoy satisfaction ratings significantly above the midpoint.[29] The WVS measured the three in 1999 and 2000, registering .618 in Portugal, .559 in Spain, and .512 in Greece. Satisfaction with democracy in Venezuela skyrocketed from 32.5% to 51.0% (an average yearly increase of 1.8%). A good part of the explanation undoubtedly lies in the phenomenal economic growth Venezuela has experienced recently. Inflation-adjusted GDP growth, most of it in the non-oil sector, averaged over 12% from 2005 to 2007, the highest rate in Latin America and among the highest in the world. Furthermore, the benefits of growth were distributed broadly: by some estimates, poverty was halved between 2003 and 2007, and social spending has skyrocketed some 300% during Chavez's tenure (Weisbrot 2008). Chile's solid economic growth and macroeconomic stability contributed to a 0.8% yearly increase in satisfaction, from 28.4% to 37.1%, between 1997 and 2007. Satisfaction in Malaysia satisfaction registered .704 in 2003 and .748 in 2004, a period preceded by many years of rising prosperity as a

[29] The outlier was South Korea, which transitioned from military rule in 1987 after an "endogenous" process of democratization (Boix and Stokes 2003). The East Asian country scored satisfaction of .429 in 2001 (WVS), .476 in 2003 (ASB), and .408 (ASB).

manufacturing hub. Among the most prosperous of the post-Communist Eastern European states, Slovenia has also consistently had high satisfaction rates relative to the rest of the region, .451 in the WVS 1999 survey compared to the WVS fourth wave average of .353.

Elections, Fraud, and Post-Electoral Violence

Elections appear to affect satisfaction with democracy in two, opposite ways. Satisfaction with democracy seems to spike in election years, but post-electoral controversy deflates satisfaction. Elections, especially competitive ones, lift satisfaction because they hark back to the initial jubilation that attended democratic transition and the foundational election. As we saw above in the Mexican case, election years marked local peaks in satisfaction (in the context of a general decline), but proved ephemeral. Sometimes the salutary effects of elections endure longer. The downward trend in Bolivian and Nicaraguan satisfaction reversed course after elections in 2005 and 2006, respectively. The 2005 Bolivian election that brought leftist and former *cocalero* (coca leaf grower) union head Evo Morales to power was preceded by three years' average satisfaction of 22%, and followed by the three years from 2005 to 2007 in which average satisfaction rose to 34.7%. The 2006 Nicaraguan election returned former Sandinista Daniel Ortega to the presidency, which he had exercised in the 1980's after the victorious Sandinista revolution (a period most observers classify as pre-democratic). The two years prior to the election registered average satisfaction of 19.5%, and the two years after, 34.5%.

In Asia, elections were held in Malaysian, the Philippines, and Thailand in 2004. AsiaBarometer put satisfaction in Malaysia at .748 and Thailand at .729, both high relative to the mean of .626 for the six countries surveyed that year. Aggregate

satisfaction in the Philippines, .534, had improved on that posted in the 2001 WVS survey (.473). Political satisfaction, though, has since fallen in these countries. The 2004 Philippine elections were widely held to have been rigged, and President Gloria Macapagal silenced protests with gag orders on legislators and reporters. She declared martial law in 2006 after surviving a coup attempt. Thai democracy collapsed in a September, 2006, when the Thai army took control to defuse a social crisis precipitated by the prime minister's dissolving parliament in response to public protests over corruption. (The country restored parliamentary elections in December, 2007.) AsiaBarometer results for 2007 have mean satisfaction at .370 in the Philippines and .393 in Thailand.

Clean elections that resulted in peaceful inter-party transfers of power contributed to high, rising satisfaction in the West African countries of Benin, Ghana, and Cape Verde. Benin and Ghana saw peaceful elections after years of military rule under Major Mathieu Kerekou and Air Force Captain Jerry Rawlings, respectively. Kerekou handed over power to the opposition after 1990 elections, and subsequent elections in 1996, 2001, and 2006 elections (which saw him return to power) were widely regarded as free and fair. Benin's mean satisfaction in 2006 was 0.56, significantly above Africa's 2006 predicted mean of 0.47. For his part, Ghana's Rawlings honored the constitutional two-term limit in 2000 and handed over power to a successor from the opposition party; elections since then have been clean. Between 2002 and 2006, Ghana's predicted mean satisfaction rose from .511 to .695 at a clip of .045 per year. Finally, the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), a Marxist guerrilla organization that had won independence from Portugal in 1974 and formed a one-party socialist state, alternated in power with the *Movimento para a Democracia* (MPD) have alternated in

power since the country's 1991 foundational election. Satisfaction has risen there from .434 to .555 between 2004 and 2006.

In contrast, post-electoral conflict and perceptions of fraud reduce satisfaction with democracy. In Mexico, as we have seen, a majority of the population believed there were widespread irregularities in the 2006 elections, and satisfaction declined rapidly after then. As recently as 2008, a third of the electorate continued to believe there had been fraud.[30] In Armenia, independent and democratic since the 1991 disbandment of the Soviet Union, fraud increasingly stained elections since 1995; mean satisfaction there was .252 in 1997. The country's Freedom House political rights rating would slip to "not free" in 2007 and 2008.

Irregularities and violence have plagued elections in several African countries. Nigeria's 2003 election of former dictator Olesegun Obasanjo was riddled with fraud, and the country's predicted mean satisfaction score declined from .653 in 2002 to .261 in 2006. Political violence surrounding the 2007 election of Obasanjo's anointed successor left around 2,000 dead. In Zambia, labor leader Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) won 1991 elections after ending two decades of post-independence single-party rule under pan-Africanist Kenneth Kuanda and the United National Independence Party (UNIP). But Chiluba's 1996 and 2001 victories were stained by numerous irregularities, and mean satisfaction in Zambia declined from .573 to .416 between 2002 and 2006. Similarly, Malawi's satisfaction declined from .565 to .361 from 2002 to 2006 after Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) unsuccessfully attempted to repeal constitutional two-term limits, settling on transferring power to hand-chosen dauphins instead. In the Southern African country of Lesotho,

[30] Mitofsky poll, "Dos años después de la elección presidencial en México", http://www.consulta.com.mx/interiores/12_mex_por_consulta/mex_por_c_menu.html.

political instability resurfaced in 1998 when the Lesotho Congress for Democracy rioted in protest of election fraud. South Africa and Botswana sent peacekeeping forces into the country, and elections would not be held until four years later in 2002. These gains were erased in 2006 snap elections, after which opposition parties disputed the allocation of seats and called a general strike. The government imposed a curfew, and the homes of several opposition leaders were attacked. Satisfaction with democracy declined from .534 to .491 between 2002 and 2006.

Secession, Civil War, and International Conflict

Secessionist struggles, civil war, border disputes, international war also tamp down enthusiasm for democracy. When it works, democracy replaces bullets with ballots. But large-scale political violence indicates schisms between political elites that can leave lasting scars on the body politic.

Conflict over secession lowers satisfaction with democracy, whereas successful resolution appears to boost satisfaction. The Yugoslav wars of the early 1990's were sparked by Croatian then Bosnian declarations of independence, followed by Serbian military action to maintain its historic dominance over the Balkans. The wars provide a sort of natural experiment: the province that broke away earliest and relatively peacefully after a 10-day skirmish, Slovenia, had the highest mean satisfaction of the Yugoslav republics, .451 in the 1999 WVS survey. The two most beset by the civil war and ethnic cleansing of the early 1990's, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, scored satisfaction means of .311 and .389, respectively.[31]

Elsewhere, the Chechen War over secession 1994-1996 may have contributed to low mean satisfaction with democracy in Russia (.279 on the 1998 CDCEE and .187 on

[31] Macedonia is the exception: its independence was completely without violence, yet its satisfaction level was the lowest in the ex-Yugoslav republics, .27.

the 1999 WVS). In the former Soviet republic Moldova, the eastern region of Transnitria attempted a "preemptive" secession in the early 1990's. Largely ethnic Ukraines and Russians, Transnitrians feared that other Moldovans would reunite with their co-nationals in the former homeland of Romania. The region declared independence in an attempt to forestall forcible reunion with Romania. The dispute over Transnitrian independence remains "frozen", and Moldova's mean satisfaction (as measured by the WVS) was .258 in 1996 and .268 in 2002. Finally, East Timor's bid to secede from Indonesia—which succeeded in 1999—undoubtedly lowered enthusiasm for democracy in the 2001 WVS measurement of Indonesia, .397.

Of course, a party to a civil war may wish to gain control over the central government rather than separate from it. In the Caucasus, a bloody Georgian civil war followed a 1992 coup that installed former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in power. Mean satisfaction on the 1996 WVS was .314. Nepalese democracy collapsed in the early 2000's under the weight of a Maoist-inspired guerrilla war and palatial intrigues that resulted in a royal massacre, ending over a decade of parliamentary rule brought about in 1989 by the *Jan Andolan* ("People's Movement"). AsiaBarometer pegged Nepalese satisfaction with democracy at .391 in 2005.[32]

Latin America provides additional evidence on the effects of internal political strife. Colombia is home to the longest ongoing guerrilla war in the world, lasting over four decades. In the 1960's, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other groups took up arms after a 1958 agreement between Liberals and Conservatives (historically inimical parties) to alternate in power and divide the spoils of governing between themselves, excluding other political and social forces. Despite a wildly popular

[32] Fortunately, 2006 saw a democratic restoration of parliamentary rule thanks to pressure from a resurgent pro-democracy movement. Thus, Nepal both democratized and *redemocratized* during the third wave.

Alvaro Uribe presidency, whose approval ratings have been consistently high since Uribe assumed office in 2002 and hovered around 80% in 2008, satisfaction with democracy has languished around 25% from 1997 to 2007. In Bolivia, the eastern provinces of Santa Cruz, Pando, and others are demanding greater constitutional autonomy and control over their considerable mining and energy wealth. The sometimes violent conflict between supporters of the eastern oligarchs and the central government, though far from constituting a civil war, has undoubtedly contributed to low satisfaction with democracy. Though satisfaction has risen, especially since the election of Evo Morales, the predicted mean remained at 28% in 2007.

Finally, international war may reduce satisfaction with democracy. Armenia and neighboring Azerbaijan warred over the latter's Nagorno-Karabakh region, dominated by ethnic Armenians, in the early 1990's. Despite a Russian-mediated truce in 1994, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved. Armenian satisfaction in the 1997 WVS stood at just .252.

In contradistinction, successful resolution of civil war redounds in democratic "peace dividends" that contribute to high satisfaction with democracy. Left-wing guerrillas and military governments in El Salvador and Guatemala signed peace accords in 1991 and 1996, respectively, ending murderous civil wars in which state-sponsored death squads carried out massive atrocities. In 2007, predicted satisfaction percentages were 46% for Guatemala and 40.6% for El Salvador, high compared to the Latin American predicted mean of 33.6% that year. Satisfaction subsequently declined in both countries, though: neither was capable of translating the initial peace divided into lasting gains. In Sri Lanka, the government sat down at the peace table with the secessionist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam rebels in 2002. Satisfaction rose from .540 to .590 during the 2003-2005 period. In 2006, talks broke down, and the Sri Lankan military

has won a series of decisive victories against the Tamil Tigers; it may be that resolving a civil war by a decisive victory on one side or the other also increases satisfaction with democracy.

Peaceful secession may also dispose citizens more favorably toward their democracies. Czechoslovakia dissolved peacefully into its two constituent countries after the "Velvet Revolution" of 1992. The 1999 WVS survey puts the Czech Republic's satisfaction mean at .419, significantly higher than the WVS's fourth wave mean for post-Communist Europe, .353. (Slovaks'.334 mean is statistically indistinguishable from the regional mean.)

Ethnic and Religious Conflict

Violence between members of different ethnic and religious groups also dampens satisfaction with democracy. In Kenya, ethnic tension between Kikuyus (Kenya's most numerous ethnic group, perceived to have been favored under the National Rainbow Coalition-led post-transition government since 2002) and Luhyas and Luos continued to build after the democratic transition. Satisfaction declined from .663 to .554 between 2004 and 2006. In 2007, post-electoral violence erupted along ethnic fault lines, leaving hundreds dead. Fortunately, the country avoided Rwandan- or Bosnian-style "ethnic cleansing". In Nigeria, ethnic tension is overlaid with sectarian violence between Muslims in the North and Christians in the South—another factor contributing to the precipitous decline in satisfaction from .653 to .261 between 2002 and 2006.

Inter-ethnic and –religious hostility challenges democracy in several Southeast Asian countries. The Philippines continues to face an armed Islamic insurgency. Though Philippine satisfaction of 2004 of .534 was higher than the 2001 mean, it was nonetheless lower than the AsiaBarometer mean of .626 for that year. Islamic extremism, Papuan

separatism, and Christian-Muslim fighting afflict Indonesia, which registered mean satisfaction of .397 in the 2001 WVS.

Prior Experience with Democracy

Another factor that seems to boost satisfaction with democracy is experience with it prior to the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991). Even brief exposure to the principles and practice of self-governance creates historical memory that makes subsequent transitions smoother. In South America, the Southern Cone nations of Uruguay and Chile had significant prior experience with democracy. Uruguay had enjoyed over seven decades of democracy until the 1973 coup that brought Juan Bordaberry to power. Though Uruguay's satisfaction percentage score declined from 63.7% to 57.9% in the decade spanning 1997 to 2007, it was still the highest in Latin America. Chile was continuously democratic from 1932 until General Augusto Pinochet overthrew the democratically elected socialist government of Salvador Allende in 1973. But the party system emerged from 16 years' hibernation in 1989 virtually intact, picking up where it had left off. Chilean satisfaction rose from 28.4% to 37.1% (1997-2001).

Several Eastern European countries had fleeting democratic episodes in the interwar period. The three states on the Baltic Sea (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) had the deepest, most enduring prior experience with democracy of any of the Soviet republics. The three gained independence from the Russian Empire after World War I and were independent until the Soviet Union forcibly annexed them in 1940. Estonia and Latvia had held free, multi-party elections from independence until autochthonous coups in 1934 (during the economic depression sweeping the West), and Lithuania, for a seven-year period after the Great War until democratic breakdown in 1925. The three countries had the highest satisfaction scores of all ex-Soviet Republics: Estonia averaged .402 over

four measurements (WVS 1996, 1999; CDCEE 1991, 2001); Latvia, .364 over three measurements (WVS 1996, 1999; CDCEE 1998); and Lithuania, .382 over four (WVS 1997, 1999; CDCEE 1991, 2001). The average for all other ex-Soviet republics is .270.

Czechoslovakia was democratic for two decades after the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1919. Its satisfaction rating, .409 over three measurements (WVS 1999; CDCEE 1990, 2001), was higher than any other post-Communist Central European country. The combined average for Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia was .378. Former East Germany had glimpsed democracy twice, but the democratic impulses of 1848 were thwarted by Bismarck, those of the Weimar Republic crushed by Nazism. Satisfaction with democracy rose there from .390 to .455 from 1992 to 2000. Spain's democratic spark in the 1936-1939 Republican period may have stood it in good stead to rekindle their democracy four decades later. Nearly a quarter decade after shucking off the yoke of *franquismo,* Spaniards are still satisfied with their democracy at .559 (WVS 1999).

In addition to cases of erstwhile democracies that redemocratized, the older, low-income democracies considered are, on the whole, relatively more satisfied with democracy. In Latin America, Venezuela has been democratic since the 1958 *Pacto de Punto Fijo* (notwithstanding backsliding under Hugo Chávez, in the perceptions of many analysts). As I note above, satisfaction with democracy has risen vertiginously to 51.0%. Costa Rican democracy dates from the mid-19th Century, interrupted only by a coup d'état in 1917 and a brief 1948 civil war in the wake of a disputed presidential contest that led to a military junta. Despite going into a rapid tailspin (from a predicted score of 69% in 1997 to 47.9% a decade later), satisfaction remains among the highest on the continent. Costa Ricans' "reserve of good will" toward democracy (Easton 1975: 444; Fuchs *et al.* 1995: 327) has proven deep indeed.

Asia contains three countries that have been continuously democratic since before the third wave: India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka. South Asia, including India and Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), won freedom from Britain in 1947 when the Indian independence movement forced an end to colonial rule. Both India and Sri Lanka have mean satisfaction above the midpoint: .563 (WVS 2001) and .565 (AsiaBarometer 2003-2005), respectively. A former British colony, Malaysia has been democratic since leaving the Commonwealth in 1963. The peninsula averaged satisfaction of .726 (AsiaBarometer 2003, 2004). In Africa, Botswana—also a former British colony—has had a parliamentary democracy since becoming independent in 1966. Though the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has governed throughout the country's independent life, it has won elections widely regarded as free and fair. Satisfaction in Botswana averaged .619 from 2002 to 2006 (Afrobarometer). In fact, of eight low-income second wave democracies for which data exist (Botswana, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Venezuela), in only two—Colombia and Turkey—is mean satisfaction with democracy below the midpoint of .5.

Leadership

Satisfaction with democracy also appears to depend on the highly contingent, slippery quality of effective leadership. Citizens are more satisfied with democracies in countries that have been shepherded to democracy by morally solvent leaders committed to inclusiveness rather than driven by an animus of retribution. Poland's Lech Walesa, South Africa's Nelson Mandela, and Spain's Adolfo Suárez are often cited as examples of such leadership. In 1989, Poland's Solidarity labor movement, led by Walesa, successfully challenged a Soviet regime virtually orphaned by Mikhail Gorbachev's refusal to prop it up by force. Poland's average satisfaction over three measurements

(WVS 1999, CDCEE 1991, 2000), .403, is significantly higher than the overall Eastern European mean of .334. In South Africa the National Party (NP), architect of apartheid, lifted the ban on the Nelson Mandela-led African National Congress (ANC), releasing Mandela from decades of imprisonment. Mandela won the country's first multi-racial elections in 1994, and the ANC has remained in power ever since. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission exposed in detail the atrocities committed under the NP, but did not exact revenge against white South Africans. Satisfaction there averaged .527 between 2002 and 2006, and is on the rise. Spaniard Adolfo Suárez differs from Walesa and Mandela in one crucial respect: he did not come from the ranks of the opposition, but rather from the bureaucratic authoritarian regime into which *franquismo* had morphed after the civil service reform of the 1960's. On Franco's death in 1976, King Juan Carlos II ascended to the throne and appointed Suárez prime minister in July, 1976. Suarez quickly met with different political factions, including the outlawed Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and the Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), and hashed out the Pact of Moncloa that would erect the legal scaffolding for the Spanish transition. Suárez won 1977 elections, competing against a newly-legalized PCE, but the left would go on to govern during much of Spain's democratic life. As we have seen, Spanish satisfaction was at .559 when measured in 1999.

In contrast, other post-transition leaders have attempted to perpetuate the privileges they enjoyed under the *ancien regime*—at the expense of actors and social movements who, despite hastening on democratic transition, are unable to control it. Satisfaction with democracy is lower in these cases. Albania and Bulgaria are instructive. The national Communist parties were able to dictate favorable terms for their democratic transitions in both countries. Bulgarian Communist Party leaders set in motion a regime-initiated transition in November, 1989, when they removed long-

standing sultanistic dictator Todor Zhivkov from party leadership in November, 1989. The successor Bulgarian Socialist Party won fraudulent elections in June, 1990. Though the opposition Union of Democratic Forces won power soon after, in October, 1991, the initial distaste seems to have lingered: satisfaction remained at around .305 during the entire decade of the 1990's. In Albania, the Communist party agreed to elections in March, 1991, which it won handily. A general strike forced another round of polling several months later, but the Communists held on to a share of power as part of a national unity government. In 1992, voters routed the Communist party definitively, but as in Bulgaria the malaise endured: the WVS put satisfaction there at .342 in 2002.

For better or worse, in new democracies the first impression may be the lasting impression. The salutary effects of good leadership survive the end of the initial post-transition governments, enabling new democracies to weather spells of mediocrity. But by the same token, the pernicious effects of bad leadership also endure.

International Environment

The literature on democratic diffusion teaches us that the likelihood of a country becoming democratic depends on whether or not surrounding countries are also democratic (see, e.g., Starr 1991). An environment favorable to the spread of democracy may also enhance the spread of democracies that work well and engender high satisfaction in their citizens. Just as a country surrounded by democratic countries is likelier to become a democracy itself, a democracy surrounded by other democracies with long-standing representative institutions and egalitarian values may be a more *satisfied* democracy.

East Germany is illustrative. It differed from the rest of post-Communist Europe—and the rest of all new democracies—in one crucial respect. It alone was

absorbed into another country with a solid 40 years' democratic experience and one of Europe's highest standards of living, to boot. But the other European third wave democracies also enjoyed an ersatz version of this advantage. The European community of nations received Portugal, Spain, and Greece with open arms, throwing open the doors of its institutions (NATO, the Common Market) once they became democratic. We have already seen that satisfaction is above the midpoint in all three countries.

Region

That satisfaction with democracy in a given country could be shaped, at least in part, by satisfaction in nearby countries leads naturally to consideration of regional variation. Satisfaction with democracy does indeed vary from region to region. Figure 3.2 presents regional trends in satisfaction worldwide from 1990 to 2007:[33]



Figure 3.2: Trends in Satisfaction with Democracy by Region, 1990-2007.

[33] I report satisfaction as combined percentages of respondents in categories above the midpoint. Since satisfaction is only available as a combined percentage for Latin American countries, reporting combined percentages was necessary to compare regions.

Satisfaction with democracy is lowest in Eastern Europe, where predicted mean satisfaction declines from 25.3% in 1990 to 22.2% in 2001—a slow but steady linear fall of a third a percentage point yearly. It is next lowest in Latin America, which starts at 35.3% in 1997 and falls to 31.8% (a decline nearly identical to that in Eastern Europe). Satisfaction is highest in Africa, starting at 65.0% in 2002 and dropping to 55.4% in 2006 at a linear rate of -2.4% yearly, steeper than both Eastern Europe and Latin America. Finally, satisfaction with democracy is second highest in Asia, but plummets most sharply there. It starts at 60.1% in 2003 and nosedives to 45.8% just two years later, a yearly decline of 7.1%.

Sizing up the extent of citizen disenchantment in Mexico and new democracies worldwide, the available data portray citizenries of new and low-income democracies as generally unhappy with the state of democracy in their countries. The data detect an unmistakable secular, downward trend in satisfaction with democracy in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America—and in most of the 72 countries that constitute those regions. Why? In the next three chapters, I turn to the Mexican case to explore the reasons up close.

CHAPTER 4

Conceptions of Democracy in Mexico

It is commonplace to aver that Mexico became democratic only after the 2000 election of the first president from a party other than the PRI in post-Revolutionary Mexico. Although that year marks the culmination of Mexico's contemporary democratic transition, the *idea* of democracy has a long, storied history in Mexico—even if the actual practice of democracy comprised only short-lived, sporadic episodes. From its inception two centuries ago, Mexico's tradition of reflection on democracy (or "republican government", as it would have been called then) has drawn on European and Anglo-American political philosophy. But Mexicans have embellished "universal" ideas with indigenous flourishes, and the content of Mexican democratic thought has also been shaped by social realities in Mexico.[34]

How do Mexicans conceive of democracy? In Mexico, as elsewhere, there is no single answer to that question. Political theorists do not all share the same definition of democracy, and neither do Mexicans. In this chapter, I develop a three-fold typology of citizen conceptions of democracy in Mexico. *Liberal democracy*, rooted in post-Independence nineteenth-century liberalism, conceives of democracy as a collection of rights and liberties associated with citizenship: freedom of belief, expression, and association, equality before the law, property rights, pluralism, and others. *Substantive democracy*, a view incarnated in the 1917 Constitution, equates democracy with economic improvement and social justice. Finally, *electoral democracy*, a view that has acquired greater currency as Mexican elections progressed from fraud-plagued exercises

[34] For example, Reyes Heroles, in his definitive study of Mexican liberalism, states, "One of the main teachings of the liberal process in Mexico consists in showing the birth of a national political form that parted from a rational application of supposed universal validity" (1974: X).

in authoritarian regime legitimization to genuine choices between competing candidates, sees democracy as a mechanism by which to choose decision-makers. .

Before describing the *consequences* of ideas about democracy, I first examine their content and distribution in Mexico. Debates over the meaning of democracy do not exist in a vacuum, removed from time and history. They resonate among thinkers, politicians, and citizens. I review the embodiment of these ideas in thought, word, and deed in a brief history of the idea of democracy in Mexico. I focus on 19th liberalism, the *maderista* electoral movement that sparked the Revolution, and the social charter contained in the 1917 Constitution as defining moments in each conception of democracy.

I then consider Mexican citizens of today, whose opinions on democracy I explored via the *Desencanto Ciudadano* poll taken in June, 2006. I describe the survey items used to explore concepts of democracy and the way in which they were combined to form indices for each of the three democratic orientations found in Mexico. I also offer descriptive statistics that examine both the distribution of scores for each of the three indices and the bivariate relationships between them. In particular, I show that the indices are virtually orthogonal to one another, meaning that they indeed reflect analytically distinguishable conceptual dimensions of democracy.

The chapter then considers the question of how many Mexicans hold each conception. It turns out that substantive democrats are most numerous, followed by electoral then liberal democrats. I conclude by proffering some tentative explanations of *why* substantive democrats outnumber their electoral and liberal counterparts and *where* these ideas might come from.

THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO

Each of these three basic orientations toward democracy—liberal, substantive, and electoral—has deep roots in Mexican history. In this section, I examine the pedigree of each idea in the history of Mexican thought. I start with the oldest, liberal democracy, then turn to electoral and substantive democracy.

Liberal Democracy

Liberal ideas were present in the foundational documents emanating from Mexico's war of Independence from Spain (1810-1821) and the subsequent constitutional assembly. Crucial ingredients of that liberal ideology include federalism, pluralism, property rights, equality before the law, and freedom of the press. Studies have traced the intellectual origins of Mexican liberalism to French Enlightenment thought, and its operative content to U.S. constitutionalism and the Spanish *cortes*.[35] Newspapers such as *El Federalista* published the United States Constitution and Washington's second inaugural address, while the intelligentsia read Montesquieu, Rousseau, Locke, Madison, and Thomas Paine. Meanwhile, Mexico's most illustrious representatives gained practical legislative experience forging the political reforms of the *cortes*, roughly the equivalent of the French Estates, and the liberal 1812 Constitution of Cádiz.

The liberal principle most evident at first was that of federalism—so much so that Reyes Heroles would say that for many early Mexican liberals, federalism *was* liberalism (1985: 57). Mexican federalism established a tripartite division of powers (executive, legislative, and judicial), adapted from the French and American constitutions, and a confederation of sovereign states bound together under a relatively weak central

[35] See, e.g., the first chapter of Reyes Heroles (1974) for an excellent discussion of Mexicans liberalism's intellectual roots and Hale (1982) for a review of the influence of U.S. constitutionalism.

constitution.[36] Mexico's history of dictatorships in the 19th Century and one-party domination in the 20th would mean that this federalism was, in reality, subordinated to central rule. But the federalist template remained as a guide and would ultimately be vindicated in 1997, when the Congress effectively checked presidential authority.

Early Mexican liberalism's record on political rights and equality before the law can best be described as good intentions that were, however, less than fully realized in its political constitutions and in social life. The 1821 Plan of Iguala proclaimed equality of pportunity for all citizens, "with no distinctions between Europeans, Africans, or Indians" (Article 12), and the record of congressional debate in the first constitutional assembly (1822-1824) contains numerous pronouncements in favor of political equality. Nonetheless, the 1824 Constitution, the 1836 Seven Constitutional Laws, and the 1843 Organic Bases all failed to guarantee political equality explicitly. The 1824 Constitution provided for a bicameral legislature, with deputies directly elected by state citizens and the president elected by Congress (Articles 7, 8, 78-84). Nonetheless, the states were left to define citizenship, and a number of states imposed property or literacy requirements (Ferrer Muñóz and Bono López 1998: 167-171). It was not until the 1857 Constitution that political equality was guaranteed, and even then states' observance of this requirement was, in practice, varied and subject to capricious implementing legislation.

The concept of individual liberties and property rights was, in contrast, fairly well developed in the 1824 Constitution, some of which echoes the language of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights. That constitution prohibited "forever" confiscation of property (Article 147). It also forbade arbitrary detentions without evidence of a crime (Article 150) and illegal searches of houses and personal effects (Article 152). Finally, it

[36] The Argentinian liberal Alberdi would blame the weakness of the Mexican central state for the country's loss of half its national territory to the United States (see Reyes Heroles 1974).

guaranteed freedom of the press, the exercise of which could "never be suspended, much less abolished" (Article 50, para. 3, and Article 171).

Though the 1824 Constitution contains no explicit guarantees of freedom of association, the early constitutional drafters were aware of the need for pluralism, the existence of groups and opinions autonomous from the state. Andrés Quintana Roo, a key figure in Mexico's early political and literary history, wrote eloquently and fervently on the salutary effects of pluralism in his 1816 essay on "The Necessity for Opposition Parties to Exist", from which I quote at length here:

> In every country that desires to preserve political liberty, there must be an *opposition party* … There need be no fear that he who rules will want for support: rather, the difficulty lies in finding support for those who build a wall of containment around those who rule. This difficulty is quite considerable in Mexico, where despotism has such deep roots that those who dedicate themselves to containing it shall scarcely find anyone to thank them. But nothing is more necessary today than the spirit of censure that purifies the actions of government, that keeps rulers alert and obliges them to take all care and make all effort to fulfill the duties the nation has entrusted them … Happy the nation where the spirit of censure and vigilance over government action has taken root! (Quintana Roo 1985 [1910]: 194-196).

The anti-clericalism that characterized Mexican liberalism in the posterior phase of its development identified with Benito Juárez, however, was absent immediately following independence. Although Freemasons and free-thinkers figured prominently in the first constitutional congress, the Plan of Iguala (1821) and the 1824 Constitution established Catholicism as the state religion, prohibited the exercise of any other faith, and preserved the autonomous jurisdiction (*fuero*) of the Catholic church (Articles 3 and 154). However, the next decades would see a series of bitter conflicts between Mexican liberals and the Catholic church. Rome denied Mexico "patronage" powers (control over ecclesiastical personnel and political affairs) it had granted Spain and even refused to recognize Mexican independence until 1836 (Macune 1984). Headed by José Luis Mora,

Mexican liberals advocated revocation of Article 154 of the 1824 Constitution (Hale 1982: 111-151). These battles would culminate in the 1857 Constitution and the Laws of Reform that expropriated church lands and secularized the state by, among other things, establishing a civil registrar for issuing official documents such as marriage licenses and birth and death certificates. Juárez's 1867 military victory over Emperor Maximilian and the Conservatives established liberalism as Mexico's dominant ideology and made the church-state reforms permanent.

Electoral Democracy

The electoral vision of democracy also figures prominently in Mexican history, especially the 20th Century. Two distinct periods of electoralism may be distinguished. The first began in 1910 with Francisco I. Madero's challenge to the seemingly perpetual reelection of Porfirio Díaz, which ultimately sparked the Revolution. But Madero's electoral demands were quickly eclipsed by the social programs of other revolutionaries. The second epoch of electoralism occurred in the 1990's, when reforming Mexico's electoral institutions and achieving genuine electoral competition provided a common platform for oppositionists of all stripes.

As noted above, direct, popular election of representatives was a feature of Mexican republicanism from its first political constitution. Nonetheless, the 19th Century was plagued by numerous extra-constitutional changes of power, followed by the three-decade dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. The period between 1824 and 1858, the year Juárez assumed office, saw 49 presidencies come and go, only five of which lasted longer than two years and 11 of which were held by one man, Antonio López de Santa Anna. Porfirio Díaz's regime held power from 1876 to 1911, interrupted only twice, once when Díaz himself appointed an interim president and another time by an officer and

government official closely identified with him. Although elections were held regularly, they were riddled with fraud and Díaz was not shy about threatening and killing political opponents. During the period, underground newspapers ironized the slogan Díaz himself had used to defeat Comonfort in 1876: "*sufragio efectivo, no reelección*" (effective suffrage, no reelection) became "*sufragio efectivo no, reelección*" (no effective suffrage, reelection).

Given an entire century in which the right to vote had very little real effect on the exercise of public power, it is little wonder that Francisco I. Madero's main democratic demands were for free elections and alternation in power. Madero ran for governor of Coahuila against the official candidate in 1905, denied him by fraudulent means, and challenged Díaz himself in 1910 as candidate for the National Anti-Reelectionist Party, after which he was jailed then sent to exile in San Antonio, Texas. Madero issued the call to arms that agglutinated strong, but disperse, revolutionary energies in Mexico. The Plan of San Luis Potosí declared null the re-election of Díaz and set a date of November 20 for the uprising.

But Madero himself seems to have been a reluctant revolutionary. In *La sucesión Presidencial en 1910*, published in his native Coahuila in 1908, he is the voice of moderation itself, laying out a barebones democratic program that emphasizes election of political leaders and freedom of the press. He specifically eschews revolutionary violence, arguing that even though he would have been more than justified in using force to vindicate his stolen 1905 victory, "[t]he triumphs obtained by the democratic system are slower, but surer and more fruitful" (1999 [1908]: 13). The book, in fact, is a detailed interpretation of universal and Mexican history that vituperates against despotic militarism ("Woe the peoples whose destiny depends on the life, will, or whim of one man alone!", p. 65) and praises the benefits of democratic rule.

His vision of democracy is eminently procedural and influenced in no small measure by the U.S. electoral system. In recounting the prelude to the 1905 gubernatorial election, he recalls that "following the American custom" delegates held a party convention that issued "what is known in the U.S. as an 'electoral platform'" (p. 11) before deciding upon a candidate. Elsewhere, he praises U.S. leaders' adherence to the law as the source of its greatness, urging Mexico to imitate the U.S. in at least this aspect (p. 50).

La Sucesión Presidencial marshalls episodes of Mexican history to assert that, despite a history of militarism and pervasive illiteracy, Mexicans were "apt for democracy" (p. 293). Madero cites the 1857 constitutional assembly as the most eloquent proof that in Mexico we are perfectly capable of democracy, since no pressure whatsoever was exercised in electing [the delegates], who were genuine, legitimate representatives of the people" (p. 61). He praises Ortega's recognition of Juárez's electoral victory, declaring that by "bow[ing] to the verdict of the public vote and put[ting] his sword at the service of his rival", he drew greater glory upon himself than he could have won by even the best government. The only alternative to authoritarian dictatorship in Mexico was "alternation of officials through the implantation of democratic practices" (p. 282).

To this end, the tract proposes formation of the National Democratic Party to contest the 1910 election. The party's two guiding principles were "free suffrage" and "no re-election".[37] Madero goes on to offer thorough guidelines for the organic structure of the party (state "political clubs" that send representatives to a national party), procedures for electing candidates, and urging massive turnout at the polls and struggle

[37] During PRI rule, the slogan would back to the Díaz-era formulation of "effective suffrage".

through democratic means—although he foresees violence as the almost inevitable result if Díaz were to refuse to recognize an opposition victory.

Though Madero himself was betrayed by his own army commander, Victoriano Huerta, and executed in 1913, *maderismo* and the principle of no re-election were enshrined in the 1917 Constitution. Article 83 established, categorically, a one-term limit for presidents:

> … Any citizen who has served as President of the Republic, whether elected by the people or as interim, provision, or substitute president, shall in no case and for no reason serve again in that office.

The Constitution also guaranteed universal suffrage (Articles 30, 34, and 35) and prohibited re-election of deputies and senators for consecutive terms (Article 59). Perversely, official documents during PRI rule bore (and still bear) the legend "*sufragio efectivo, no reelección*" underneath the signature line—another vestige of *maderismo*. PRI governments observed the prohibition on re-election scrupulously, but "effective suffrage" fell by the wayside during its 71-year dominance.

It was precisely the renewed demand for the right to choose political leaders that animated the democratic transition of the late-1980's and the 1990's. The twin propellers of election reform and a citizenry organized to defend the vote thrust forward the electoral vision of democracy. Perhaps to win a legitimacy it had forfeited in the fraudulent election of 1988, the Salinas administration undertook three reforms in 1989-1990, 1993, and 1994. The first two were lukewarm efforts that did, nonetheless, produce advances: creation of IFE, putting election verification in its hands, and eliminating the "governability clause" (which created an artificial legislative majority for parties with 42.5% of the vote or more), and expanding from 100 to 200 the number of seats elected by proportional representation. Surrounded by a context of political

violence—including the assassination of Salinas's successor, PRI candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, and the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas—the 1994 reform went deeper. It "citizenized" the IFE, substituting a counsel of citizens approved by the Congress for presidentially-appointed election officials; authorized national and international election observation; and mandated massive registration and reliable voter rolls.

It was the 1996 Zedillo administration reform, however, that went furthest. The sweeping changes to the Federal Election Code (Cofipe, in Spanish) helped level the playing field for opposition parties. They instituted public funding for parties and granted them media time, both awarded according to a proportional formula with a compensatory component for small parties. The reforms also extended proportional representation to the Senate. A notable failing, however, was the omission of direct democracy measures, including citizen initiative, plebiscites, and others that then-Interior Secretary Emilio Chuayffet Chemor had promised in a major 1995 speech.

At the same time, citizen organizations sprung up to organize election monitoring, propose election reforms, and call for truly effective suffrage—conditions for electoral competition and end to fraud and vote-buying. I cite just two examples among many that could be mentioned. In 1994, several civic organizations devoted to defending elections banded together as Alianza Cívica, which has organized observation of federal elections from that year on. Some 20,000 citizens under the aegis of Alianza watched over the 1994 contest. In the following decade, their program expanded to include civic education, non-partisan get-out-the-vote campaigns, and media monitoring.

The Seminario del Grupo de Chapultepec, a group of notables comprising party representatives and intellectuals,[38] met on January 16, 1996, and proffered a series of

[38] The list of participants included party presidents Carlos Castillo Peraza (PAN), Porfirio Muñóz Ledo (PRD), and Santiago Oñate Laborde (PRI) and intellectuals Adolfo Aguilar Zínser, José Antonio Crespo, Alonso Lujambio, Juan Molinar Horcasitas, and Federico Reyes Heroles, among other luminaries.

reforms. Many were implemented in the watershed electoral reform of summer that year, including a major organic reform that reinforced the IFE's autonomy and created special election courts, and the public financing and media time schemes mentioned above.

Furthermore, other citizen organizations with non-electoral demands added their voices to those of groups with an exclusively electoral focus. Labor, feminist, gay and lesbian, environmental, anti-neoliberal, human rights, and other groups saw in elections at least a necessary condition for them to advance their political and legislative programs. Many members of these groups would go on to elected office or high-level political appointments at all levels of government. In short, society seemed to clamor with one voice for fulfillment of the principles Madero had fought for, but which dominant-party rule had denied for seven decades.

Substantive Democracy

The 1917 Constitution preserved, *aufhebung*-like, liberal precepts from the 19th Century at the same time that it encapsulated new socioeconomic demands. It carried forward the program of individual liberties and anti-clericalism characteristic of liberalism. And, as discussed above, *maderismo*'s electoralism informed the provisions for constituting the legislative and executive branches.

But the Constitution also contained a social charter, one of the most far-reaching of its time, inspired in the mosaic of ideological currents that drove the Mexican Revolution. The Mexican Liberal Party of 1906 program gave voice to the masses' and the proletariat's egalitarian aspirations:

> It is axiomatic that peoples are not prosperous unless citizens in general enjoy personal and even relative prosperity. A few millionaires, hoarding all the country's riches, … do no make for general welfare but for public misery, as we see in Mexico. ¶ Improving working conditions, on the one hand, and an

> equitable distribution of land and the means to cultivate and improve them … will produce immeasurable advantages for the Nation (cited in Córdova 1973: 123).

Dispossessed peasant masses and repressed workers opposed their vision of social revolution to the program of political reform espoused by Madero and his heirs, the *constitucionalistas* headed by Venustiano Carranza. Peasants backed their demands for land reform with military force in Emiliano Zapata's Army of the South and Francisco "Pancho" Villa's *División del* Norte. The urban proletariat did not enjoy the military cohesion of the *campesinos*, never forming an autonomous armed organization of their, but found in anarchist Ricardo Flores Magón a cogent defense of workers' class struggle against capitalists. Thus, even when the *constitucionalistas* emerged victorious from the internecine cannibalism among revolutionary leaders, their desire to keep the peasant and worker masses at bay obliged them to incorporate agrarian reform and labor rights in the 1917 Constitution (Córdova 1973: 24-25, 142-187).

Article 27 of the Constitution addressed land reform. It established the right of eminent domain (subject to reasonable compensation), declaring all land and natural resources to be property of the nation, though alienable to individuals in the form of private property. (For this reason, among others, Córdova (1973) argues that the Revolution was not essentially anti-capitalist.) The article also reversed all the land expropriations effected during Porfirio Díaz's regime in favor of the northern *latifundistas* (large landholders), Morelos cane growers, and other landed and commercial ineterests. These lands were to be redistributed to their original owners, both individual peasant small landholders and communities.

Workers' demands found expression in the monumental Article 123. The provisions of this article improved working conditions by establishing an eight-hour workday, vacation time, a minimum wage, overtime pay, maternity leave, job safety, and

employer accident liability, among other rights that could not be ceded contractually. Collective bargaining was also guaranteed, as Article 123 guaranteed the right to form unions, to strike, and to arbitration and representation in authorities that resolved labor disputes.

Also a key element of the 1917 Constitution's social charter was the establishment of free, secular primary education contained in Article 3. Subsequent modifications would specify that public education was compulsory and universal, and extend these rights to secondary education. A 1946 reform to Article 3 introduced language that would condense the essence of substantive democracy. Public education was also to be "democratic", where democracy was defined as "not only a legal structure and political regime, but also a system of life founded on a constant economic, social, and cultural betterment of the people." This idea, propagated by the powerful socializing force of the public school system, would come to dominate Mexicans' views of democracy.

MEXICANS' CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY TODAY

The liberal, electoral, and substantive concepts of democracy persist in Mexico's citizens of today. The *Desencanto Ciudadano* survey included a battery of questions specially designed to explore Mexicans' beliefs about what democracy should be and do. Each concept was articulated by four items, each asking the respondent to agree or disagree more or less strongly with a statement about democracy (or, in three cases, with one statement versus another). The response options on the agree-disagree scales were "agree very much", "agree somewhat", "neither agree nor disagree", "disagree somewhat", and "disagree very much.". For the items eliciting relative agreement or disagreement, the response categories were "agree very much with the first", "agree

somewhat with the first", "in the middle", "agree somewhat with the second", and "agree very much with the second". I scored the responses so that so that higher numbers always represent greater agreement with a given conception of democracy (which in some cases meant *dis*agreeing with the statement in the question). I then created three summary scales, one for each conception, by summing the scores for the four items representing a conception. The scores thus ranged between 4 and 20 (rescaled from 0 to 16).

Liberal Democracy Scale

Drawing on the theoretical considerations in Chapter 2 , the four items in the liberal democracy scale measure support for religious freedom and tolerance, freedom of expression and association, political pluralism, and private property. The religious tolerance item measures the extent to which Mexicans may have abandoned the principle of separation of church and state, rooted in mid-19th Century anti-clericalism. It asks if respondents agree that "[a] democratic government's public policies should reflect the majority's religious values." Although religious precepts generally orient our political views, this question asks about a much more direct transgression of secularism: the explicit translation of religious views into policy at the expense of minority religious views.

The second statement, "In a democracy, gays and lesbians have the right to organize public marches," concerns the right of unpopular minority groups to organize and express themselves publicly. I chose gays and lesbians as an example of a traditionally reviled social group that has nonetheless gained increased acceptance in the last few decades. For example, the World Values Survey asks Mexicans to place their views of homosexuality on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 meant that homosexuality is "never

justifiable" and 10 meant that it is "always justifiable". In the 1990 survey, the mean was 2.9. In 2000, approval rose to 3.6. Since gays and lesbians are neither universally accepted nor universally scorned, we might expect varying opinions about the rights they should enjoy.

The third item determines the extent to which Mexicans support pluralism—a profusion of non-state political actors that holding different, even contradictory, perspectives. Pluralists deny that anything like a "general will" exists, much less that any one individual or group could embody it. This item asks respondents to indicate the degree to which they agree more that "It's better for the President's party to have a majority in Congress so that laws don't get held up" than that "It's better to have many parties in Congress so there is more debate" or vice versa. I chose political parties as perhaps the most emblematic of the political actors embraced by the concept of pluralism. In addition to representing interests (aggregating individual preferences and articulating them into policy), parties are powerful symbols of collective identity. Given the often high emotional content of party identification, accepting the desirability of multiple parties is a highly pluralistic response.

The final item taps government respect for private property. This item poses a hypothetical situation in which "the government wants to build a social service center," and "the only feasible place is located on private property, but the owner is against it. It then asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree more that "the government should lean toward respecting private property" than toward "putting the public interest first and taking the land" or vice versa. Although the right of eminent domain is clearly part of democratic governments' legitimate repertoire of action, Mexico's history of abusive land seizures under undemocratic governments may make citizens wary of its exercise under even a democratic regime.

Figure 4.1 shows the mean values for survey respondents' scores on each of the items constituting the liberal democracy battery. On tolerating religious and political dissent, Mexicans are more liberal than illiberal, with means above the midpoint of 3 in both cases. On the other hand, they tend toward majority government at the expense of plural representation and debate in Congress. This sentiment that no doubt owes much to the gridlock that plagued Fox's presidency, for which most blame the Congress rather than what some commentators have decried as the executive branch's maladroit political operation in Congress. Finally, Mexicans overwhelmingly favor respecting private property over governmental exercise of eminent domain.



Figure 4.1: Means for Liberal Democracy Items.

Electoral Democracy Scale

The electoral democracy items inquired about whether respondents saw electoral competition and majority rule as sufficient conditions for democracy—or at least its main ingredients. The first two items, "More than anything else, democracy means selecting political leaders in free and fair elections" and "Elections alone don't make a country

democratic", are essentially opposite ways of getting at the same concept. The third item asks whether majority rule is a *sine que non*: "More than anything, democracy is for parties to compete for the majority's support". The fourth item inquires whether respondents believe that elections or protest are more effective as a means for achieving change: "If people don't like a government decision, the most effective thing among many that people can do to change the decision is 1) vote for another party in the next election or 2) protest and pressure government through means other than the vote."

Figure 4.2 displays graphically the means for each electoral democracy question:



Figure 4.2: Means for Electoral Democracy Items.

Mexicans' identify democracy with the concepts of free and fair elections, and majority rule. Most feel that the ballot box is a better method for changing policy decisions than protest. However, most reject the notion that elections alone are enough for democracy to thrive, nuancing the emphasis on elections with sensitivity to democracy's social implications (as shown below).

Substantive Democracy Scale

The substantive democracy battery asks if in addition to constituting a political system, democracy has social dimensions. Two questions, the first and last substantive democracy items, refer to greater socioeconomic equality as a necessary component of democracy: "A country with big differences between the rich and poor can't be considered a democracy" and "In addition to equality before the law, democracy is also greater economic equality among persons." The second query refers to democracy's role in elevating living conditions for the worst off: "In a real democracy, there would be no hunger or poverty." The third item in the set asks whether respondents believe, as Schumpeterians would have it, that capitalism is indispensable for democracy: "Democracy and capitalism go together" (a substantive democrat would say they are not).

Figure 4.3 represents the means for each substantive democracy question:



Figure 4.3: Means for Substantive Democracy Items.

Mexicans scored at or above the midpoint for each of the substantive democracy items. They feel strongly that a democratic government should eradicate poverty and malnutrition. They also advocate, slightly less strongly, a redistributive role for government to redress longstanding social inequalities. Finally, Mexicans are divided about the relationship between free markets and democracy, with most believing in an economic system that combines the virtues of markets with the necessity for government intervention. In the Mexican constellation of ideas about democracy, arduous defense of private property—specifically, land—against government caprice is not incompatible with redistribution of income and public goods. One involves arbitrary seizures of property, while the other involves taxation—which most people accept as part of the obligations of citizenship, even if they do not enjoy paying taxes. Even the Revolution's program of land reform was framed, and accepted as, returning lands to their rightful owners after the unjust expropriations of the *porfiriato*. In contrast to the previous two batteries of survey questions, the means are mostly indistinguishable from one another except for the third item, the mean of which is clearly higher than the that for the other three.

Distribution of Conceptions of Democracy among Mexican Citizens

To get an idea of how prevalent each view is in Mexico, I first classified respondents as liberal, electoral, or substantive democrats—three mutually exclusive categories—according to which scale they scored highest on. Figure 4.4 represents the distribution of these concepts of democracy in Mexico. Substantive democrats predominate, constituting nearly 30% of the population, followed by electoral democrats at 26% and liberal democrats at just below 22%.[39]

[39] These percentages do not add up to 100% because I have omitted ties.



Figure 4.4: Distribution of Concepts of Democracy among Mexicans.

As I have already argued, however, these three conceptions are actually independent continua rather than mutually exclusive categories. Figure 4.5 is a scatterplot of Mexicans in the three-dimensional "conceptual space" described in Chapter 2. The grouping of points in the middle indicates that most Mexicans hold each conception to some degree—suggesting that they are not mutually exclusive. On the other hand, some points are low on the electoral democracy dimension but middling on the liberal and substantive dimensions, others low on the liberal and substantive dimensions, but higher on the electoral dimension, and so on—demonstrating that the definitions are clearly distinguishable from one another.



Figure 4.5: Three-Dimensional Scatterplot of Mexicans' Definitions of Democracy in Conceptual Space.

The liberal, electoral, and substantive constructs represent analytically distinguishable conceptual dimensions of democracy. There is no correlation between the liberal and electoral democracy scales (r = .01, p-value = .806), or between the liberal and electoral democracy scales (r = .007, p-value = .865). These scales are completely orthogonal to one another. The liberal and substantive democracy scales present a statistically significant correlation of .089 (p-value = .024), but the relationship is still relatively weak. These views of democracy, then, are conceptually distinct from one another.

WHERE DO THESE VIEWS OF DEMOCRACY COME FROM?

Why are their more substantive democrats than electoral democrats, and more electoral than liberal? Who holds these conceptions of democracy? Where do they come from and how do they spread?

It is hardly surprising that in a country plagued by endemic poverty and drastic inequalities, citizens would hew most to the substantive definition of democracy. Furthermore, it seems likely that citizens have internalized the vision of democracy as spreading the wealth that the PRI propagated for so long (at least until the arrival of the technocrats)—cynically, some would say, to compensate for rigged elections, corruption, and rights violations. As one informant noted, the benefits that accrued to the citizenry during the golden age of PRI rule (solid economic growth, a burgeoning middle class) had nothing to do with political democracy.[40]

That Mexicans' second most common conception of democracy was electoral in June, 2006 also makes sense. The heated race between Calderón and López Obrador afforded ample reason to be excited about electoral democracy. And the country's recent string of three clean, competitive federal elections left an impression of a country overcoming a rich tradition of election fraud—still recent enough to cast a pall as election day grew close.

Why are liberal democrats fewest in number in Mexico? One possibility is that Mexico is just illiberal. According to the 2005 World Values Survey, for example, 33% of Mexicans would oppose having homosexuals as next-door neighbors and 22%, AIDS victims. A quarter of Mexicans believe that a university education is more important for boys than girls, and over 28% say that men make better political leaders. Over 37% believe that it is better to have more people with strong religious beliefs in elected posts.

[40] Interview with Silvia Gómez-Tagle, June 14, 2004.

On the other hand, it may be the case that Mexicans—even those whose views are liberal—simply do not believe that expanding individual freedoms is as urgent as achieving greater economic equality. Mexicans may see the country as sufficiently liberal, since even the PRI's relatively pliant brand of autocracy was compatible with the exercise of certain civil liberties.

What impels individuals to adopt one or another idea of democracy? Their social circumstances? Perhaps surprisingly, not so much. Regressing each attitude scale on party identification dummy variables for the PRI, PAN, and PRD and socioeconomic variables reveals that higher education results in a greater preference for liberal democracy. Those with graduate degrees score 1.8 points higher on the 17-point liberal democracy scale than those with no education—a result driven mostly by the greater more highly educated's greater tolerance for gays' and lesbians' right to protest. But no other sociodemographic variable had an effect on how citizens define democracy. So, for example, substantive democrats are not merely the losers under neoliberalism, nor are those who emphasize democracy's procedural aspects drawn primarily from the upper crust.

Rather, conceptions of democracy appear to be socially transmitted, with political parties as an important vehicle. PRD sympathizers are much likelier to be substantive democrats ($\hat{b}$ = .716, p = .024) as well as liberal democrats ($\hat{b}$ = .588, p = .063). For their part, *panistas* lean toward the electoral definition of democracy ($\hat{b}$ = .622, .032). Furthermore, where one lives has an important effect on how one views democracy. Between 11% and 17% of the variation in each attitude scale is attributable to aggregate-level differences across municipalities.

CHAPTER 5

The Causes: Why Mexicans Are Dissatisfied with (Their) Democracy

As Chapter 3 demonstrated, Mexicans' satisfaction with their democracy has been declining since 1997. Recapping, the percentage of Mexicans who declared themselves "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with democracy in their country declined from a high point of 45% in 1997 to around 17% in 2003 to 2005. After a momentary uptick in 2006, satisfaction settled back into its customarily low level, registering 23% in 2008. The high points of Mexican satisfaction with democracy have been short-lived. Satisfaction peaked during the mid-term election year of 1997, at the beginning of the Latinobarometer series, and the presidential election years of 2000, when the PRI lost the presidency for the first time in its seven-decade history, and 2006. As I have shown, the sharp recovery in 2006, as with previous peaks, was temporary.

This rapid, deep disillusionment is especially puzzling because we would expect the euphoria following the culmination of Mexico's transition to electoral democracy in 2000 to be higher and more enduring than it has been. Typically, the legitimacy afforded the new democratic regime after years or decades of struggle for democracy affords it a "reservoir of good will" that enables democratic governments to withstand "performance deficits". This reservoir, in theory, prevents dissatisfaction with specific aspects of democracy (politicians, policies, etc.) from being generalized to democracy as a system of government (Easton 1975: 444; Fuchs *et al.* 1995: 327). In their study of Western European democracies, for example, Fuchs *et al.* (1995) found that support for democracy was highest in Greece and Portugal, precisely the two countries which had emerged from dictatorships most recently. Having both redemocratized in 1974, these two countries had enjoyed some 17 years of democratic rule when the Fuchs survey was

taken in 1991. In contrast, Mexico took a mere eight years or less for satisfaction with democracy to decline so dramatically.

Why are Mexicans so dissatisfied with democracy in Mexico? Seeking to explain only the current low level of satisfaction with democracy (rather than the rapid rate of decline), I argue that the combination of citizen concepts of democracy emphasizing economic improvement and social equity, on the one hand, and poor government performance in just those respects, on the other hand, is partly responsible. That is, even after taking into account individual socioeconomic conditions, evaluations of incumbents, their policies, and government performance generally, how Mexicans define democracy and the expectations they have of it exercise an independent and important effect on how satisfied they are with democracy in Mexico. Specifically, citizens who view democracy as either political rights or elections will be more satisfied than those who see it as economic development and levelling.

Government political performance has been mixed. Despite congressional gridlock on major legislation and a wave of corruption scandals involving the Mexico City government and President Fox's stepsons, Mexico has seen three federal elections in 1997, 2000, and 2003 that were widely acknowledged as clean. Congress now checks executive authority (gridlock's silver lining) instead of merely rubber-stamping presidential decisions. The last two decades have also witnessed, in general, expansion of freedom of speech and an increasingly critical press.[41] Government economic performance, by contrast, has been much more unmixedly ineffective. Poverty and inequality remain, only modestly abated. In short, elections and rights have fared better

[41] Nonetheless, there are some signs that freedom of the press has diminished sharply in the last two years. See the discussion below in the section "Liberal Democracy".

than the economy. As we shall see, electoral democrats are, indeed, most satisfied with democracy, followed by liberal democrats and substantive democrats.

Chapter 5 proceeds as follows. First, I specify my main hypotheses on how conceptions of democracy affect satisfaction with it. This specification relies on a detailed review of the Mexican government's recent economic, political, and electoral performance. I then test these hypotheses empirically, relying on the survey *Desencanto Ciudadano* and other public opinion data. While satisfaction with democracy has several determinants (including evaluations of the government's political and economic performance), popular understandings of democracy do indeed play an important role. Finally, I offer some concluding remarks that highlight the implications of my findings. Particularly, I argue that dissatisfaction with democracy may be relatively enduring. It probably goes beyond waning "specific support" (in Eastonian terms) for incumbents and policies in Mexico, speaking instead to expectations of democracy that are unlikely to be fulfilled soon.

CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRACY AND DISENCHANTMENT IN MEXICO: HYPOTHESES

Building on Chapter 4's exploration of ideas of democracy in Mexico, this section explains how each of the three public orientations to democracy could affect Mexicans' evaluations of democratic development in their country. Departing from the path marked by Miller *et al.* (1997), who explored concepts of democracy among both masses and elites in Russia and other post-Soviet states (see Chapter 2), I do not examine elite opinion. What legislators, party officials, high-level bureaucrats, and business leaders think about democracy is crucial to political development in Mexico. This study,

however, focuses exclusively on popular opinion, the implications of which are no less important for the future of democracy.[42]

Substantive Democracy

Substantive democrats see democracy as a mechanism for alleviating long-standing poverty and economic inequality. Since the Fox administration—the first to follow the culmination of Mexico's transition to electoral democracy—largely failed to ameliorate these problems, I hypothesize that substantive democrats will be least satisfied with democracy in Mexico.

The economic panorama under Fox was far from uniformly bleak. By following the orthodox fiscal and monetary policies of his predecessor, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, Fox kept a lid on inflation and maintained currency exchange stability. Inflation averaged around 4% a year from 2000 to 2006 with a high of 4.7% in 2002—high perhaps by U.S. standards, but a far cry from the 52% of 1995 and 27% in 1996% following the "December mistake" and subsequent peso devaluation crisis.

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[42] For evidence about elite opinion on economic and other policy issues, see Greene and Bruhn (2007). The authors observe greater polarization among political candidates than mass publics on issues such as privatization of electricity and abortion. While noting that elite polarization has played an important role in democratic breakdown, they find grounds for optimism in the relatively more moderate masses.

More than elite polarization, however, anti-democratic views and acts on the part of Mexican elites appear to be a greater obstacle to democratic consolidation. Elite adherence to norms that regulate democratic politics is weak. For example, as noted above, the filing of criminal charges against Mexico City mayor and PRD presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador, and Congress's subsequent removal of immunity ("*desafuero*"), was seen by the public to have been a transparent political ploy by the Fox administration and competing parties, the PAN and PRI, to eliminate the left from electoral competition. The Business Coordinating Council's ads—explicitly forbidden by the election code's prohibition on third-party advertising (Cofipe Article 48, paragraphs 1 and 13)—and the Fox administration's electoral use of social programs, strongly excoriated by the Electoral Tribunal (*Dictamen relativo al cómputo final de la elección de presidente de los estados unidos mexicanos, declaración de validez de la elección y de presidente electo*, published in the *Diario Oficial de la Federación* on September 8, 2006, http://dof.gob.mx/nota_to_doc.php?codnota=4930964 [accessed on April 26, 2009]), are further evidence of elites' willingness to play outside the rules.

Mexico's currency hovered between $9.50 and $11.00 pesos to the U.S. dollar for most of the Fox presidency, reaching its weakest point in the middle of 2004, when a dollar bought $11.65 pesos. Fox managed to avoid the devaluation crises, and corresponding inflationary spirals, that scourged the country in 1982, 1987, and 1994.[43]

But avoiding crisis was insufficient to satisfy the expectations of most Mexicans. Mexicans wanted their government to alleviate poverty and create jobs. For example, an IPSO-Bimsa poll commissioned by the Chamber of Deputies' Center for Public Opinion Studies[44] found that 19% of Mexicans identified "lack of jobs" as the most important problem that leaders need to resolve, while 18% were concerned about poverty—in second and third place, respectively, after public insecurity. In the 2006 Latinobarometer, the highest percentage of Mexicans (at 18%) identified "unemployment" as the most pressing problem facing the country, followed by "crime" at 17% (Latinobarómetro 2006).

Indeed, Mexicans share these concerns with most Latin Americans. According to Latinobarometer's 2002 survey, 34.6% of citizens in the 18 Latin American countries surveyed reported "employment problems" as their main concern. An additional 26.3% cited "poverty, inequality, and insufficient income" as their country's principal difficulty (PNUD 2004: 74).

The Fox government's progress on these fronts was deficient. Evaluating success in combatting poverty depends, partly, on which of several measures is used. In general, poverty reduction appears to have been slight, while absolute levels remained high.

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[43] As of this writing in early 2009, the peso is currently trading at nearly 14 to the dollar. Currencies in countries with emerging markets have generally devalued to attract investments that have fled to havens perceived to be safer.

[44] Centro de Estudios de Opinión Pública (CEOP), "Pulso Ciudadano (indicadores selectos de opinión pública)", August, 2005, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/cesop/doctos/PCN016%20Pulso%2016.pps, p. 21 [accessed April 26, 2009].

When poverty is defined as living on two dollars or less (in purchasing power parity terms) a day, almost two out of every five Mexicans lived in poverty over the six years Fox was in office. According calculations performed by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL, in Spanish) based on data from the Mexican National Household Income and Expenditures Survey (*Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos del Hogar*, ENIGH), the poverty head count stood at 39.4% in 2002 and 37% in 2000. The same data puts extreme poverty, reduction of which was touted by the Fox government as a major achievement, at 12.6% in 2002 and 11.7% in 2004.[45]

By another measure, the relative decrease of poverty was greater, but the absolute level, higher. When defined as "patrimonial poverty", or the percentage of people living in households whose annual income is insufficient to meet basic food, clothing, housing, transportation, and education costs, roughly half of all Mexicans were poor. However, the proportion declined 53.6% in 2000 to 47% in 2005. Though patrimonial poverty declined slightly but constantly from 2000 to 2004, the absolute number of poor appears to have increased between 2004 and 2005 by about 270,000 individuals from about 48.62 to 48.89 million.

Other development indicators were stagnant or worsened. Mexico remains a country of great disparities between rich and poor in one of the most unequal regions in the world. Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, registered .514 in 2002 and .516 in 2004. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita averaged an anemic 2.3% throughout the 2001-2006 period, a figure greatly boosted by the preliminary government estimate of 4.8% in 2006. While not terrible, GDP growth was well below that needed to breach the poverty gap (4.6% per year for 11 years, according to one

[45] CEPAL, *Anuario Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe*, 2005, http://websie.eclac.cl/anuario_estadistico/anuario_2005/ [accessed April 25, 2009].

estimate)[46]—and a far cry indeed from the 7% yearly growth that Vicente Fox famously promised during the run-up to the 2000 election.

According to information from the International Labor Organization, unemployment increased from 3.4% to 4.6% during the Fox presidency.[47] However, many analysts consider the figure is artificially low because of a lax international definition of employment (working at least one hour per week, whether paid or not) and an enormous numbers of Mexicans working in the United States—estimated at 10 to 12 million—whose presence in Mexico would certainly swell the ranks of the unemployed. When the underemployed (people who worked less than 15 hours a week) are added in, the rate of un- and underemployment increased from 7.4% to 9.7% during Fox's term.

More problematic, though, is that the jobs that do exist are often precarious and poorly paid. According to the ILO report cited above, only 45% of those employed had access to public health. The percentage of urban workers in the informal sector grew from 39.4% in 2000 to 42.6% in 2005. The minimum wage remained stagnant at 70% of its 1990 value throughout Fox's term, and average real monetary income increased only slightly from $27,952 pesos per year to $30,260.

In short, Fox administration policies failed to effect significant improvement in the areas that most matter to Mexicans: poverty, growth, jobs, and income. Fox deserves credit for maintaining the macroeconomic stability that Zedillo recouped after the 1995-1997 peso crisis, but stability meant merely holding ground rather than advancing. It would hardly be surprising that those who emphasize economic improvement most in their definition of democracy are least satisfied with its performance in Mexico.

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[46] *La Jornada*, "Para abatir la pobreza, México debe crecer 4.6% durante 11 años: Cepal", August 28, 2005.

[47] Organización Internacional del Trabajo, *Panorama Laboral 2006. América Latina y el Caribe*, http://www.oit.org.pe/WDMS/bib/publ/panorama/panorama06.pdf [accessed April 26, 2009].

Liberal Democracy

Liberal democrats see democracy as a series of rights and freedoms inherent in citizenship. These rights carve out autonomous spheres of action vis-à-vis government regulation and are, thus, untouchable by the vagaries of majority rule. Crucial to this conception of democracy is preservation of the right to express unpopular opinions and organize in favor of unpopular causes. These rights include freedom of expression, of the press, of association, and of religious and political belief—rights that successive Mexican constitutions have continually expanded. Liberal democrats accept others, even those with contrary ideas, as their political equals. Consequently, they espouse the key values of tolerance and pluralism. Since they believe in active participation in public decision-making, and believe themselves competent o do so, they seek opportunities beyond the ballot box to express their points of view. And they demand transparency in government decisions to hold their political leaders accountable.

Mexico's progress toward a liberal political culture has been mixed. A liberal political culture embraces the actions and attitudes of both political leaders and the public. The following paragraphs examine on government practice of liberal values such as transparency and accountability, and freedom of association and of the press; adherence to international human rights norms; and maintenance of the rule of law. Since citizens' satisfaction with democracy presumably depends more on evaluations of government than of fellow citizens, I focus on government actions.

Transparency and Accountability

Government respect for rights has shown both notable advances and, especially at the local level, serious setbacks. On the positive side of the ledger, the Fox administration made important progress toward greater transparency. Virtually all government agencies (including the Office of the Presidency; the Ministry of Finance and

Public Credit, *Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público*; the Economy Ministry; and many others) began publishing budget information on-line. A clearinghouse (*CompraNet*) was created for information on letting of public contracts. And in 2002, President Fox signed into law a freedom of information act, the Federal Transparency and Access to Public Government Information Act, enforced by the Federal Institute for Access to Information (*Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información*, IFAI). Twenty-seven of Mexico's 32 state governments (including the Federal District) followed suit shortly after.[48]

Freedom of Expression and Association

In general, citizens enjoy freedom to organize and place demands on government. Organized civil society has flourished over the past two decades, growing from several hundred civil society organizations (CSO's) at the beginning of the 1990's to 4,500 civil society organizations currently registered with the Interior Ministry. Some estimates place the true figure at between 16,000 and 20,000,[49] which "even taking away half that are party fronts"[50] still implies a vertiginous increase in the number of non-governmental organizations. Whereas most CSO's at the beginning of the 1990's were affiliated with the Catholic church, they presently represent a broad array of social interests. CSO's embrace environmental concerns, rights advocacy for marginalized groups (women, children, the elderly, indigenous groups, gays and lesbians), electoral observation, political reform, fair trade and anti-globalization, and many, many others. Freedom House had classified Mexico as a "free" country from 2002 to 2006, awarding Mexico a

[48] Several observers, however, have suggested that transparency is more illusory than real and noted the ease with which some government agencies dodge freedom of information requests (see, e.g., Ernesto Villanueva, "IFAI: de la aperture al secreto", *Proceso*, No. 1609, September 1, 2007.

[49] Comunicación e Información de la Mujer (CIMAC), http://www.cimacnoticias.com/site/07012508-Autoritarismo-y-con.16346.0.html [accessed April 26, 2009].

[50] Interview with Julia Flores Dávila, July 23, 2004.

civil liberties rating of 2 (the maximum is 1). However, the rating slipped a point to 3 in 2007 and 2008, with Freedom House citing violence against journalists, local persecution of religious dissenters, beatings and murder of opposition activists, and human rights abuses committed by the army, among other things, as causes.

Mexico has also seen growing governmental and social tolerance of diverse sexual preferences. The Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transvestite and Transgender (LGBT) Pride march, held annually at the end of June for the past 28 years, drew over 100,000 participants—and many curious, overwhelmingly friendly, onlookers—in 2006. The march is also celebrated in the cities of Mérida, Chilpancingo, Veracruz, Monterrey, and even Guadalajara, a bastion of traditionalism. Mexico City authorized domestic partnerships in 2006, followed by the state of Coahuila. In 2007, the state congresses of Michoacán, Veracruz, and Zacatecas debated legalizing domestic partnerships.

Human Rights

Against this backdrop of general government respect for civil liberties, however, notable human rights abuses occur frequently, especially at the state and local level, where *caciquismo*[51] continues to be the norm, and in the south of the country. Although the National Human Rights Commission enjoys real autonomy and denounces violations of rights tenaciously, its non-binding recommendations are rarely taken into account by the state governors and government agencies to which they are directed. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other groups have documented numerous human rights violations in the past decade, including hundreds of cases of arbitrary arrests, torture, and violence against and killings of journalists and human rights advocates.

[51] Local political bossism sustained by alliances with the landowning class and other dominant economic groups and by the use of police forces and paramilitary groups.

Virtually all of these abuses remain unpunished by local and federal authorities, many of whom are, after all, either directly involved in or tolerate abuses.

Two cases that occurred before the June, 2006, *Desencanto Ciudadano* survey attracted international attention and may have influenced respondents' evaluations of government observance of rights. First, in May, 2004, then-mayor of Guadalajara Francisco Acuña Ramírez (now Interior Minister in Calderón's government) ordered police to jail 111 protestors after a rally against neoliberalism and globalization. Some protestors were held incommunicado and tortured to obtain confessions.[52]

Second, on May 3-4, 2006, in San Salvador Atenco, Mexico State, the Federal Preventive Police (PFP, in Spanish) and state and local police forces violently broke up a sit-in to protest forcible relocation of flower stands. Members of the PFP beat, tortured, and raped protestors in police custody as they were being transported to jail. Federal and state authorities minimized the abuses.[53] Ultimately, head of the Public Security Ministry Eduardo Medina Mora (now Attorney General in Calderón's government) denied that they had occurred.[54] Despite ample documentation of abuses by the CNDH and national and international rights groups, to date no police officer or government official has been punished.[55]

But these high profile cases are the proverbial tip of the iceberg. The litany also includes forced disappearances of over 100 suspected guerrillas in Guerrero; continued operation of paramilitary groups and landowners' armed guards (*guardias blancas*) in

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[52] Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/15/mexico9079.htm [accessed April 26, 2009].
[53] *El Universal*, "Acepta SSP excesos policiales en Atenco", May 6, 2006; *La Jornada*, "En Atenco no hubo violaciones sino *abusos deshonestos*: Yunes", May 14, 2006.
[54] *La Jornada*, "La comisión reclama congruencia al funcionario", November 14, 2006.
[55] Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR410282006 [accessed April 26, 2009].

Chiapas, Oaxaca, and other states; unpunished violations of worker rights and harassment of union leaders in Mexico's *maquila* industry, concentrated on the northern border; rape and murder of over 400 women in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, since 1993; fatal attacks of gay activists in Querétaro, Tamaulipas, Yucatán, and Colima; and many, many other cases.[56] Amnesty International's 2006 report opined that President Fox's commitment to rights was merely rhetorical, declaring that there had been "little advance in ending human rights violations and impunity, particularly at state level."

Freedom of the Press

Freedom of the press—while generally a bright spot over the past two decades in Mexico—also met with numerous obstacles. The days when the government shut down dissident papers outright, such as the infamous *Excelsior* closing in 1973, are a thing of the past. Though radio and television political news is, at best, tepid in its criticism and, at worst, unabashedly pro-PAN, the written press is generally more aggressive.

But other problems abound. Notoriously strict libel laws make defamation a criminal offense and have been used for political purposes. In the most high profile case, former first lady Martha Sahagún de Fox sued the weekly *Proceso* over critical coverage. Some 40 journalists are currently facing criminal charges in Chiapas under state libel laws. Journalism is an increasingly dangerous profession in Mexico. Around 27 reporters were killed between 2001 and 2005, making Mexico the most perilous Latin American nation. In 2006, Mexico was second only to Iraq for the number of journalists killed. Finally, the extreme concentration of electronic media in Mexico limits criticism of the government and the diversity of opinions expressed. Just two networks, Televisa and TV Azteca, control 90% to 95% of the national viewing audience. Just 13 business

[56] This list was culled from the Amnesty International and Freedom House country reports for 2002-2006.

groups own over 1,142 commercial radio stations.[57] Furthermore, a law passed in April, 2006, known derisively as the "*Ley Televisa*", virtually guaranties perpetuation of these businesses' stranglehold on information, extending existing licenses for 30 years, exempting existing broadcasters from paying for rights on new concessions, and imposing forbidding entry barriers for new media enterprises.

International media watchdog groups downgraded their ratings of press freedom in Mexico during the last years of the Fox presidency. Figure 5.1 presents the Freedom House ratings since 2000 and those of the Paris-based Reporters without Borders (*Reporters sans Frontières*, RSF, in French) since 2002 for Mexico. The figure also includes an average for Spanish-speaking Latin American countries (excluding Mexico) for comparison.



Figure 5.1: Freedom of the Press Rankings (Freedom House and *Reporters sans Frontières*) for Mexico and Latin America, 2000-2008.

[57] See Inter Press Service News Agency, "A Larger Piece of the Pie, for the Few", http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32440 [accessed April 26, 2009], and *Variety*, "Mexican Senate to Vote on Media Law", http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117940559.html?categoryid=19&cs=1 [accessed April 26, 2009].

Despite the two groups' different ideological orientations (Freedom House is conservative while RSF is liberal), they concur in placing Mexico generally below the Latin American average. Both note a sharp downturn in press liberty during the 2003-2008 period—the last three years of the Fox administration and the first two of Calderón's—from 62 to 49 on the inverted Freedom House scale (or 13% of the range) and from 82 to 51 on the RSF scale (nearly 30% of its range).[58] Mexico declined from 74th to 140th place (out of 173) in the RSF country rankings during this period.

Corruption and Impunity

Corruption of public officials and a dysfunctional justice system that cannot, or will not, bring malefactors to justice continue to scourge Mexico. *Transparencia Mexicana* (the Mexican affiliate of Transparency International) estimates that in 2007 Mexican citizens paid bribes one out of every 10 times they dealt with government bureaucracies to do things like file property taxes, seek construction permits, enroll their children in public schools, get vehicle smog certificates, and so on. This meant that Mexicans paid over 27 billion pesos (about $1.9 billion U.S.), $138 pesos per household—or around 8% of their income.[59]

The justice system also continues to constitute one of the weakest links in Mexico's nascent democracy. The vast majority of crimes remain unpunished and, given deep-seated public distrust, unreported. Local and federal authorities routinely use the courts to prosecute political vendettas. One high profile example was Puebla governor

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[58] Since the Freedom House and RSF questionnaires and ratings scales differ substantially , no direct comparison may be made between their scores. Since both groups use *lower* scores to indicate *greater* press freedom, I have inverted the scales here for greater interpretability. I subtract individual scores from 100 (the worst score possible) in the case of the Freedom House Scores and from 106 (the average worst score from 2002 to 2008) in the case of RSF.

[59] Transparencia Mexicana, *Encuesta Nacional de Corrupción y Buen Gobierno 2003*, http://www.transparenciamexicana.org.mx/documentos/INCBG/2007/Presentacion_INCBG_2007.pdf [accessed on April 26, 2009].

Mario Marín's 2005 illegal detention (in Quintana Roo) and jailing of journalist Lydia Cacho, who had exposed a child pornography ring involving businessmen close to the governor.

Citizens continually rank courts and judges as among the least trustworthy institutions. Based on public opinion polls, Covarrubias and Associates reported in August, 2005, that citizens ranked the courts as the most corrupt of 12 public institutions mentioned. Some 84% of citizens believed there was "very much" ("*muchísima*") or "a lot" ("*mucha*") of corruption in the common courts ("*juzgados*"), and 65% believe what judges say either "a little" or "not at all".[60]

As this brief review shows, the progress of civil liberties in Mexico during the era of democracy has been ambiguous, marked by advances on some fronts and setbacks on others. I thus expect liberal democrats to be more satisfied than substantive democrats, but less so than electoral democrats.

Electoral Democrats

Until the disputed 2006 presidential contest, fair and competitive elections had been the crowning achievement of Mexican democracy. The three previous federal elections—in 1997, 2000, and 2003—were largely clean and free from controversy. At both the national and subnational level, elections have become increasingly competitive over the last two decades. Particularly encouraging were the results of the 1997 and 2000 national elections, which broke the PRI's virtual monopoly on the federal government. Finally, though electoral participation has been declining over the past decade, it still remains fairly high.

[60] Covarrubias y Asociados, "Las instituciones ante el espejo de la opinión pública", http://www.amai.org/datos_files/las_inst_ante_el_espejo.pdf [accessed April 26, 2009].

In the span of 15 years, Mexican elections had progressed from mere window dressing to legitimize authoritarian governments to a genuine mechanism for selecting political leadership. Electoral fraud in 1986 in the northern state of Chihuahua, which robbed the PAN candidate Francisco Barrio Terrazas of the governorship, became a national focal point for citizen outrage with election fraud. Even the normally staid Conference of the Mexican Episcopate lodged a complaint with the Organization of American States' Inter-American Commission for Human Rights. The story was repeated nationally during the 1988 presidential election, when massive fraud helped put Carlos Salinas de Gortari in *Los Pinos* (Mexico's presidential mansion).

Perhaps to legitimize the Salinas presidency, the PRI began to recognize opposition victories. Although the PRI had recognized a handful of municipal opposition victories since 1946 (including PAN victories in Mérida in 1964 and Hermosillo in 1969), the state of Baja California became the first to be governed by an opposition party. In 1989, the PAN's Ernesto Ruffo Appel won the gubernatorial race.

Opposition victories snowballed during the 1990's in municipalities and state legislatures. By the middle of that decade, Mexico's electoral map had become a green, blue, and yellow (the PRI, PAN, and PRD colors, respectively) patchwork of overlapping opposition governments. By mid-1997, divided or "non-majoritarian"[61] governments prevailed in six of Mexico's state legislatures: Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Aguascalientes, the State of Mexico, Morelos, and Coahuila. By 1998, the PAN governed in seven states (Aguascalientes, Baja California twice, Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nuevo León, and Querétaro), and by 1999 the PRD had won four gubernatorial contests (Baja California Sur, Distrito Federal, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas).

[61] Alejandro Poiré's term for governments in which the executive belongs to one party but none has an outright legislative majority.

At the municipal level, the panorama was even more variegated. The year 1997 began with the PRI governing in about 55% of the country's municipalities, the PAN in 30%, and the PRD in 9%. It ended with the PRI controlling 46%, the PAN, 32%, and the PRD, 20%.[62]

Opposition parties' growing success at the polls percolated up to the federal level in 1997, when a combination of opposition parties wrested the Congress from the PRI's control for the first time ever in that year's midterm elections. The PRI remained the most numerous contingent in the lower house of the 57th Legislature with 239 seats (of 500), 164 from victories in single-member districts (SMD's) and 75 by PR. Voters awarded the PRD 125 seats (70 SMD, 55 PR); the PAN, 122 seats (65 SMD, 57 PR); the Workers Party (*Partido del Trabajo*, PT), 8 (1 SMD and the rest PR); and the *Partido Verde Ecologista de México*, or "Greens", 6 (all by PR). The PRI retained a simple majority in the Senate, but not the two-thirds supermajority required to reform the Constitution.

In 2000, Fox culminated Mexico's long march toward electoral democracy by upsetting PRI candidate Francisco Labastida by a margin of 42.5% to 36.1%. Strategic voting certainly favored Fox: many who would have normally voted for PRD icon Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (and did support the PRD in congressional elections) shifted their supported to the man who had promised to "take the PRI out of Los Pinos" (see Crow 2005).

National and international electoral observers generally vouched for the hygiene of the 1997, 2000, and 2003 elections. Irregularities and electoral violence was sporadic and exceptional. In 1997 and 2000, Mexican NGO Alianza Cívica and international

[62] *Reforma*, "Oposición: la nueva mayoría", November 17, 1997.

groups such as the Carter Center, Global Exchange, the European Union, and the Organization of American States found evidence of vote buying, intimidation of voters and election monitors, and use of public resources for partisan purposes, mostly in rural areas controlled by the PRI. Chiapas continued to represent a sore spot. In all three elections, inter-party political violence—fanned by the presence of paramilitary groups, the armed forces, and the guerrilla Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN, in Spanish)—resulted in poll closures and burning of ballot materials at many polling sites. Nonetheless, these groups agreed that incidents of violence and vote buying were "isolated" and insufficient to affect the final election outcome. Similarly, the press reported that the 2003 elections were mostly "without incident", except in San Salvador Atenco (in the State of Mexico), Chihuahua, and Chiapas, focusing instead on high voter abstention and the PRI's resurgence.[63]

Furthermore, Mexican voters themselves seemed to believe that the country had overcome its benighted past, turning out to vote in impressive numbers. As might be expected, turnout at the ballot boxes declined from its high point during dominant party rule, when corporatist control of voting blocks regularly got over 90% of citizens to the polls. When citizens are free not to vote, some will choose not to.[64] Nonetheless, even absent the PRI's social control mechanisms, turnout remained robust. Figure 5.2 shows

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[63] See, e.g., *La Jornada*, "Jornada tranquila en general; en Chiapas, graves incidentes", July 7, 1997; *La Jornada*, "70% consideraron *muy democráticos* los comicios, en sondeo de IFE", July 26, 1997; *El Universal*, "Denuncian apoyo al tricolor", July 1, 2000; *El Universal*, "Elección 'limpia y transparente': observadores", July 3, 2000; *El Universal*, "Sí hubo fraude electoral: observadores", July 5, 2000; Global Exchange and Alianza Cívica, *Mexican Federal Elections 2000; Electoral Observation Report*, http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/mexico/election2000/ElectionReport.pdf [accessed April 26, 2009], *El Universal*, "Califican de desigual la elección en México", September 13, 2000; *La Jornada*, "Cifras preliminares dan severo descalabro a AN", July 7, 2003; *El Universal*, "Proceso tranquilo, reportan observadores", November 10, 2003.

[64] Although Article 36 of Mexico's Constitution includes voting in its enumeration of citizen obligations, neither the Constitution nor enabling legislation provides for penalties when citizens fail to vote, rendering the "obligation" unenforceable.

turnout in Mexican presidential and midterm elections since 1991, using U.S. federal elections as a foil:



Figure 5.2: Voter Turnout in Mexican and U.S. Federal Elections, 1991-2006.

Participation in the three presidential elections of 1994, 2000, and 2006, averaged 66.6%, reaching a low of 58.6%.[65] By comparison, participation rates in the four U.S. presidential elections from 1992 to 2004 averaged 53%, nearly 14 points less.

Consistent with patterns elsewhere, turnout in Mexico's midterm elections was lower than that for presidential contests, but still vigorous—with the exception of 41.7% in 2003, when disillusionment with the Fox government began to set in. The average was 55.1%, compared to 39.8% for the U.S. Even Mexico's 2003 nadir was higher than the U.S.'s midterm zenith of 40.4% during this period, registered in the 2006 congressional

[65] If adjusted for inaccurate rosters, which are slow to remove voters who have died or emigrated and duplicate entries, these figures would certainly be higher. Election authorities estimated that, as of 2005, as many as 15% of the voters on the rolls should not have been there.

elections when anger over the Iraq war got voters to the polls. In fact, Mexico's lowest midterm turnout ever is about the same as the U.S.'s 1982 all-time high of 41.8%.

If "[n]ational elections are powerful symbols of the democratic legitimacy of a nation-state" (Topf 1995: 27), these figures evidence a vigorous belief in electoral democracy over the past 12 years. During this period, Mexicans were justifiably proud of an electoral system that had gone from being the butt of their own jokes[66] to a model for other countries.[67] Gone was the colorful lexicon—"carrousel",[68] "crazy mouse",[69] "vote taco"[70], "pregnant urn"[71], and so on—describing the myriad, folkloric forms of fraud that the PRI and its adherents had perfected during that party's tenure in power. In its stead arose the bureaucratic lingo of electoral systems: *mayoría relativa*[72], *diputados uninominales* and *plurinomales*[73] , *circunscripción*[74], and other terms. By the 2006 presidential election, Mexico had made enormous strides in instilling citizen confidence in elections. Furthermore, the PAN and PRD candidates were involved in a dead heat. What had months before seemed to be certain victory for López Obrador was now in

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[66] One joke from the Salinas era goes as follows: Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Bill Clinton, and Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien are travelling in a private jet with only the pilot. Suddenly, the engine fails and the pilot bails out, leaving only one parachute. Each man argues that he should get the parachute, but none manages to convince the others. So they decide to hold an election to determine who gets the parachute. Salinas wins. He grabs the parachute and jumps out of the plane. The other two contemplate their imminent demise in silence until Chrétien says glumly: "Well, Salinas won it." Clinton says, "Yeah, but what I don't understand is how he won by 60 votes!"

[67] For example, at least two Electoral Counsellors (members of the IFE's governing board), Alonso Lujambio and Jacqueline Peschard, advised Iraqis on their electoral system prior to their first national elections.

[68] A form of fraud where a voter receives a marked ballot from a local political strongman, gets a blank one, deposits the marked ballot in the ballot box, and returns to give the blank ballot to the local boss.

[69] When election officials move polling sites at the last minute without telling opposition voters.

[70] Rolling several ballots into a single tube similar to a rolled taco ("*flauta*") stuffed with chicken or mashed potatoes.

[71] When polling officials stuff the ballot box ("*urna*") so that there are more ballots than voters.

[72] Plurality, first-past-the-post districts.

[73] Congressional representatives from single-member (SMD) and proportional representation (PR) districts, respectively, in Mexico's mixed electoral system

[74] One of Mexico's five PR districts, each of magnitude 40.

doubt, generating an excitement and enthusiasm that harked back to 2000, after the gray 2003 midterms.

If upholding and expanding rights was a fitful process—and broad social inclusion of Mexicans in the benefits of economic liberalization, a virtually non-existent one—elections were, at least in June, 2006 (when the *Desencanto Ciudadano* survey was undertaken, before the general election in July), an unambiguously positive facet of Mexican democracy. Thus, I expect that citizens who define democracy as simply a competitive contest to choose political leaders will be most satisfied with Mexico's democratic regime.



Figure 5.3: Hypothesized Satisfaction with Democracy by Conceptions of Democracy.

A simple linear model of these relationships is:

$$SAT = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ELE + \beta_2 LIB + \beta_3 SUB + \mathbf{X}'_{\mathbf{SAT}}\, \boldsymbol{\gamma}_{\mathbf{SAT}} + u, \qquad \text{(Eq. 5.1)}$$

where SAT = Level of Satisfaction with Democracy; ELE, LIB, and SUB are the electoral, liberal, and substantive conceptions of democracy; the vector $\mathbf{X}'_{\mathbf{SAT}}$ contains

other determinants of satisfaction; the β's and the elements of the column vector γ_{SAT} associated with $\mathbf{X}'_{SAT}$ are parameters to be estimated; and *u* is a disturbance or "error term." The hypotheses are that $\beta_1 > 0$, $\beta_3 < 0$, and $\beta_1 > \beta_2 > \beta_3$.

OTHER EXPLANATIONS OF SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY: RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATIONS AND PERSONAL RESOURCES

Although conceptions of democracy are important influences on satisfaction, they are not the only ones. As I explain in Chapter 2, at least two other theoretical currents have been marshalled to explain levels of satisfaction with democracy: retrospective evaluations and personal resources. Conceptions of democracy are a crucial for explaining satisfaction with democracy, but they complement (rather than replace) existing explanations. I incorporate variables embodying these two schools of thought into my model to ensure that the effects of conceptions of democracy on satisfaction are not confounded with other possible causes. Following the order the variables are laid out in Chapter 2, I now describe the measurement and construction of control variables.

Retrospective Evaluations

The retrospective evaluations considered here are economic performance, government respect for rights, electoral conduct, satisfaction with government services, and approval of incumbent politicians.

Economic Performance

I am concerned here with between *perceptions* of economic performance, not with indicators of macroeconomic performance. I do not address the thorny epistemological question of the extent to which public perceptions reflect reality. At all events, economic information can only influence evaluations about government through the cognitive "microfoundation" of individual perceptions about the economy. I adopt the distinction

typically made in public opinion studies between "pocketbook" (or "egoistic") and "sociotropic" judgments about economic performance. In the former, respondents are asked to rate their personal or household economy on an ordinal or interval scale; in the latter, they are asked to assess the national economy. Pocketbook assessments make less strenuous cognitive demands than their sociotropic counterparts: those require only that respondents have some knowledge or impression about their own financial state of affairs while these presume respondents have some knowledge of larger macroeconomic tendencies.

Both survey questions assume that citizens attribute economic performance to government policy to at least some extent. As Weatherford puts it, "[T]he government is assumed to possess the tools and abilities to solve social problems" (1984, 189). Whether Mexicans' opinions of economic performance affect evaluations of the political system as a whole—i.e., as "an institutional design to problem solving"—or only of specific political actors is an open question (see Guillory and Anderson 1997: 72). Exacerbated presidentialism has meant that citizens ascribe the chief executive talismanic powers over almost all aspects of public life, including the economy. However, Congress's increasingly visible role in formulating economic policy—especially as a veto player that has rejected budgets and tax increases proposed by the president—means that credit or blame for economic policy might now be more diffusely distributed than in the past.

Whichever the case, the *Desencanto Ciudadano* survey questions made explicit the assumption that citizens attribute economic performance to government action. I reformulated the typical sociotropic and pocketbook economic evaluation items by asking respondents not for their perceptions about the economy and their personal finances in general, but specifically about whether "government economic decisions" have been "good for the country" and "good for me personally".

These two items were highly correlated (Pearson's r = .77) and seem to constitute two indicators of a single, broad economic perception. I thus combined them in a single, additive nine-point scale (ranging from 0 to 8). The combined variable had a mean of 3.36, considerably below its midpoint value of 4. Mexicans, on the whole, had unfavorable judgments of government economic performance.

Favorable economic judgments should results in greater satisfaction with democracy.

Political Performance: Respect for Rights

The *Desencanto Ciudadano* survey asked respondents to agree or disagree (on a five-point scale including a neutral middle category) with the statements, "The federal government respects people's rights" and "[t]he state government respects people's rights". Respondents' answers to these two items were highly correlated (Pearson's r = .69), indicating that these questions may tap an underlying, overall opinion about observance of rights in Mexico. I summed the responses to these to questions to create a single score on a nine-point scale (ranging, again, from 0 to 8). The mean for this constructed variable was 3.5, lower than the midpoint (4) but higher than the mean score for economic perceptions. Thus, Mexicans judged that the government had done a better job preserving rights than fostering economic growth, but that the government had done poorly in both respects.

A positive evaluation of Mexican governments' respect for rights will result in greater satisfaction with democracy.

Political Performance: Elections

I anticipated that respondents might differentiate their evaluations of elections according to the office being elected. There are many redoubts of political bossism

(*caudillismo*)—or "authoritarian enclaves"—at the state and local levels in Mexico that have resisted democratization. Furthermore, two thirds of the states hold state and local elections on a different date than federal elections; in all states, state and federal elections are organized by different authorities. Thus, the *Desencanto Ciudadano* survey included separate items that asked respondents to agree or disagree (on a five-point scale including a neutral mid-point category) with the statements that the "past federal elections" and the "past state elections were clean".

Nonetheless, these two items were highly correlated (Pearson's r = .71). As with evaluations about rights and the economy, these two questions seem to encompass an overall evaluation of electoral fairness. Thus, I combine them into a single, additive measure ranging from 0 to 8 with a mean of 4.21. Mexicans' judgment of elections was, in contradistinction to their assessments of the economy and rights, on the balance positive—above the midpoint of 4.

Positive assessments of the Mexican government's conduct of elections should mean greater satisfaction with democracy.

Government Services

The *Desencanto Ciudadano* survey included four items to gauge citizen opinions of services. It asked respondents to rate their satisfaction with "provision of water", "provision of electricity", "public education", and "police performance" on a scale of 1 to 7. Figure 5.4 shows the mean evaluations for each of these services. On the whole, Mexicans are satisfied with public services, with the notable exception of public security. While satisfaction with electricity, water, and education are above the midpoint of 4 on the approval scale, the police are well below the middle. These items' effects on satisfaction with democracy are evaluated separately.



Figure 5.4: Mexicans' Evaluations of Selected Government Services, 2006.

Although other items might have been selected as indicators of public contentment with government's ability to deliver basic services, these items represent areas of special concern to most Mexicans. Security and corruption continually rank high in opinion surveys where respondents are asked to identify the most important problems facing the country; police performance encompasses both of those dimensions. In these same opinion surveys, Mexicans consistently call for improvements to public education. In a 2005 Mitofsky poll, 25% of respondents mentioned "education" as the area on which the most public money should be spent, second only to health.[75] Finally, many regions of the country are plagued by water shortages, and repeated calls for privatization of electric energy cite poor service (in addition to the need for capital) as the main justification.

[75] Consulta Mitofsky, *Boletín Semanal de Consulta*, No. 135, August, 2005.

People who are satisfied with government services should also be more satisfied with democracy.

Approval of Incumbents

To determine if approval ratings of incumbents play a role in satisfaction with democracy, I included in *Desencanto Ciudadano* questions about the chief executives of the three levels of government: federal (president of the Republic), state (governor), and municipal (mayor, or *presidente municipal*). Respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction with the "performance" of each on a seven-point scale.

Furthermore, a fourth item inquired about satisfaction with the performance of "Congress", also on a seven-point scale. It unlikely, however, that this question measures respondents' opinion about the performance of individual legislators—especially since poll evidence reveals that most Mexicans do not know the name of their representative in the Chamber of Deputies (lower house) or state senators (three per state, plus an additional 32 elected by PR in a single *circunscripción*, or district). Rather, this item probably captures a more generalized evaluation of the current legislature as a whole, or perhaps even several recent incarnations of Congress.[76] Thus, the item may lie somewhere in between "incumbents" and "institutions" on the scale of attitudinal objects, combining features of both.

Figure 5.5 shows respondents' mean scores on the approval scales:

[76] Deputies' terms last three years and all elections are concurrent. Senators stay in office for six years and terms are staggered.



Figure 5.5: Mexicans' Approval of Selected Incumbents, 2006.

While approval of chief executives (mayors, governors, and president) is not overwhelming, each of these politicians comes in on the positive side of the approval ledger. Congress, however, rates slightly below the midpoint on the approval scale. Each of the four items is included separately in the multivariate analysis.

Citizens who rate incumbents more highly should be more satisfied with democracy.

Personal Resources

Reiterating, the personal resources taken into account by my analysis are income, education, age, gender, and partisanship.

Income

Income is difficult to measure in Mexico. The prevalence of workers in the service and informal economies, and of independent contractors, means that earnings typically vary significantly from month to month. Since workers may not know exactly

how much he or she earns a month (or if they do, they may be reluctant to give the figure), standard practice asks respondents to categorize themselves into pre-established income ranges. I treated these ordinal categories as equidistant in my analysis, "linearizing" the variable by assigning respondents a peso value corresponding to the midpoint in a category (e.g. $1,500 pesos if the category were "between $1,000 and $2,000 pesos) and using census data to impute values for the highest, open-ended category.

Higher-income Mexicans should be more satisfied with democracy than lower-income Mexicans.

Education

As with income, Mexican survey practice also often measures education in categories like "incomplete primary schooling" or "completed primary school." This ameliorates the potential embarrassment of respondents with lower levels of education and guards against a false sense of precision where respondents do not remember the exact year they left school. Education was also treated as a linear variable, assigning respondents the number of years represented by a completed category of education and to the midpoint between categories when respondents did not complete a given level of education.

Greater education ought to result in more satisfaction with democracy.

Age

As a proxy for experience and wisdom, age is another resource that might influence satisfaction with democracy. In Mexico (and other new democracies), older survey respondents may be more satisfied with democracy, since they have direct memories of authoritarianism. Older respondents are also likelier to have more stable

incomes and social positions. On the other hand, youth are notorious detractors from politics in general. Also, their other preoccupations (completing their studies, finding work, seeking a mate, and so on) may preclude them from high levels interest in politics—a variable potentially associated with political satisfaction.

Older citizens should be more satisfied with democracy than younger ones.

Gender

My own analyses of other survey data (including the ENCUP and CSES) lead me to suspect that men will be more satisfied with democracy than women. They also typically exhibit greater interest in politics and display higher levels of political knowledge than woman (although they do not necessarily vote in higher proportions).

Partisanship

The *Desencanto Ciudadano* survey had a battery of questions, based on the U.S. National Election Study (NES), designed to measure the direction and intensity of party support. Respondents who reported any level of identification ("a little", "somewhat", or "a lot") for a given party were counted as sympathizers of that party. I thus created dummy variable for each of Mexico's three leading parties, the PAN, PRI, and PRD, grouping those who identified no party at all (or with smaller parties) as the reference group. Figure 5.6 shows the distribution of partisan identification among Mexicans just prior to the 2006 elections:[77]

In Mexico, the PAN has been the biggest beneficiary of the transition to electoral democracy. It has controlled the federal executive branch since Fox's 2000 victory, as

[77] The distribution of partisanship—in both absolute values and rank ordering of parties—is consistent with that yielded by other surveys. Interestingly, while both the PAN and PRD candidates attracted a vote share greater than the percentage of citizens who identified with their parties, PRI candidate Roberto Madrazo actually *subtracted* votes from the party base (about a 22% vote share as opposed to a base of 25%).

well as becoming the most numerous parliamentary group from 2000-2003 (resuming its former place as second group after the 2003 midterm elections). Although PRI governors continue to predominate at the state level, the PAN scored impressive victories in gubernatorial contests during the 1990's, winning some nine states. Thus, *panistas* should exhibit satisfaction with democracy than members of other parties.



Figure 5.6: Distribution of Partisan Identification in Mexico, 2006.

THICKENING THE SATISFACTION INDICATOR

In Chapter 2's discussion of the meaning of satisfaction with democracy, I rebutted at length Canache *et. al's* assertion that the satisfaction item is invalid. However, their point about the risks inherent in using single-item indicators for satisfaction with democracy is well taken. My measure to satisfaction with democracy therefore combines two items (versions of both of which are commonly used in cross-

national research): "In general, how satisfied are you with democracy in Mexico?" and "In your opinion, how democratic is Mexico?"[78]

Fusing the two questions into a single indicator of satisfaction is justified on both theoretical and empirical grounds. A belief about the degree of democracy that Mexico has achieved presupposes, *a priori*, an evaluative judgment about how democracy is faring there. It is impossible, for example, to imagine a set of circumstances in which (taking extreme responses) someone could be "very" satisfied with democracy yet believe that the country is "not at all" democratic. Citizens are dissatisfied with democracy in Mexico precisely because they feel Mexico is less democratic than it should be.

The numbers bear this intuition out. Table 5.1 is a cross-classification of these two survey items, with the observed cell counts followed by cell counts expected under the independence hypothesis in parentheses:

		How satisfied are you with democracy in Mexico?					
		Not at All	Not Very	Neither/Nor	Somewhat	Very	
How democratic is Mexico?	Not at All	20 (6.9)	12 (10.1)	7 (7.1)	1 (13.8)	0 (2.2)	**40**
	Not Very	53 (42.3)	79 (62.3)	45 (43.6)	58 (85.5)	12 (13.3)	**247**
	Somewhat	23 (47.1)	52 (69.3)	50 (48.5)	139 (95.2)	11 (14.8)	**275**
	Very	6 (5.7)	7 (8.3)	3 (5.8)	8 (11.4)	9 (1.8)	**33**
		102	**150**	**105**	**206**	**32**	**595**

Table 5.1: Cross Classification of Level of Democracy and Satisfaction with Democracy
(Observed Cell Counts with Counts Expected Under Independence in Parentheses)

[78] I simply summed the items to obtain the satisfaction scale. Since there were five ordinal response categories to the question "How satisfied are you with democracy" ("very", "somewhat", "neither satisfied nor dissatisfied", "not very", and "not at all") and four for "How democratic is Mexico?" (the same as for the first item, omitting the middle category), adding them yields an eight-point scale ranging from 2 to 9. Mean satisfaction is 5.39—slightly lower than the scale's midpoint of 5.5—and the standard deviation is 1.6.

If these two variables are conceptually close, we would expect a high concentration of cell counts along the faux "diagonal" (including cells {2,3} and {3,4}, given that the table is asymmetrical), with observed cell counts below the expected values moving away from the diagonal. This is roughly what we observe.[79] Indeed, there are no respondents who described Mexico as undemocratic yet reported being "very" satisfied with democracy—though the opposite, believing Mexico to be "very" democratic yet being extremely dissatisfied with democracy, *is* possible. Relevant measures of association also show a high degree of correspondence between the two variables (Gamma = .424, Spearman's rho = .337, Pearson's r = .335), quite high for survey items dealing with the abstruse concepts present here (see Anderson 2002). In sum, the two items fit together well not only logically, but also empirically.

CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRACY AND DISENCHANTMENT IN MEXICO: EVIDENCE

In this section, I use data from the survey *Desencanto Ciudadano en México* to test the hypotheses set forth in the previous sections. A "first cut" analysis compares mean satisfaction with democracy across the three democratic orientations identified in

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[79] Under the usual chi-square test, the probability of observing these data if the variables were independent is .000. I also fit a topological model to the data with the following design matrix (see Powers and Xie 1999):

1	5	5	7	0
5	2	2	5	6
6	5	3	3	5
0	6	5	5	4

The model is quasi-symmetrical, fitting cells on the main "diagonal" exactly, using one parameter (denoted "5") to fit the cells immediately adjacent to the diagonal, another ("6") to fit the next "off-diagonal" band, and a cell-specific parameter ("7") for the {1,4} cell. This model embodies the hypothesis of a strong relationship between the two variables—with the characteristic strong concentration on the main diagonal that weakens the farther away a cell is from it—and fits the data reasonably well: model chi-square of .15 (here, values farther away from .00 are better) and a Bayesian Information Criterion value of -22.26, on five degrees of freedom.

Chapter 2. Figure 5.7 is a bar chart representing the mean satisfaction score (on the additive, two-item, eight-point scale) for satisfaction for each concept of democracy:



Figure 5.7: Comparison of Mean Satisfaction with Democracy by Concept of Democracy.

As expected, electoral democrats are most satisfied with democracy, with a mean satisfaction score of 3.79 (on a scale of 0 to 7), followed by liberal democrats (3.42) and substantive democrats (3.26). The midpoint of the scale is 3.5 and the average for all respondents who evidenced a definite attitude toward democracy is 3.36. Thus, liberal democrats are slightly above the average but below the midpoint, whereas electoral democrats are above both and substantive democrats, below.

The dashed line in Figure 5.7 is the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for electoral democrats (3.36, 3.97), which is above the mean score for substantive democrats (3.26) and slightly below for that of liberal democrats (3.42). The solid line is the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for substantive democrats (3.01, 3.51),

which excludes the mean for electoral democrats and barely includes that for liberal democrats. The means for substantive and electoral democrats are, in fact, different from one another, although neither is (at the 95% confidence level) distinct from that of liberal democrats.

This glimpse at the evidence supports the idea that conceptions of democracy do indeed affect support for it. But do they continue to have this apparent effect even after taking into account other causes of support? The estimates from a hierarchical linear model (HLM, also known as a random effects or multi-level model) incorporating the variables described above confirms that they do.

A word about hierarchical linear models may be in order. The two units of analysis included in the HLM were individuals nested in electoral sections.[80] There are two reasons for using HLMs, one technical, the other substantive. Technically, HLMs correct for spatial autocorrelation often present in clustered data. Respondents living in the same geographical area often share many of the attitudes and values, and therefore give similar answers to survey items. In other words, respondents from the same place often exhibit within-group correlation that puts them, on the whole, above or below the mean for all respondents, violating the classical regression assumption of zero correlation among error terms.

Substantively, HLMs allow us to test the hypothesis that, in addition to variation across individuals, there is also variation across groups. They accomplish this by producing, in addition to the usual OLS parameters, a "variance component" (σ_u^2) that represents the estimated standard deviation of group means around the overall sample mean. Since these group means can be conceived of as drawn at random from some

[80] The sample was a multi-stage, clustered sample in which 65 electoral sections were chosen randomly and then 10 individuals selected in each section.

probability distribution (usually the normal), the variance component is also called a "random effect", and models that estimate variance components are known as random effects models.

The "interclass correlation coefficient" (ICC) provides a measure of group variability as a percentage of overall variability. It is simply level-two variance divided by overall variance (the sum of level-one and level-two variances):

$$\frac{\sigma_u^2}{\sigma_u^2 + \sigma_e^2}$$

This number ranges between 0 and 1, as readily perceived from the formula. Where the ICC is statistically higher than 0, the substantive meaning is that living in a geographical cluster significantly alters one's value on the dependent variable—in this case, attitudes toward democracy. Thus, HLMs provide a way to test for the existence of "context effects", or "unobserved heterogeneity" in which unspecified environmental factors contribute to group-level variability on the dependent variable. Here, the inter-class correlation coefficient is .05, meaning that about 5% of overall variation is due to variability across electoral sections. In other words, factors

Table 5.2 presents the results. The hypothesized rank order of conceptions of democracy vis-à-vis satisfaction with democracy obtains even after including other variables that explain satisfaction. Electoral democrats are most satisfied, followed by liberal democrats. Substantive democrats are least satisfied.

Variable	B	se	p
Concepts of Democracy			
Substantive	-.055	.030	.066 *
Liberal	-.024	.030	.436
Electoral	.069	.031	.024 **
Partisanship			
PAN	.573	.196	.003 ***
PRI	-.130	.195	.504
PRD	.537	.215	.012 **
Economic Performance	.187	.038	.000 ***
Political Performance: Rights	.114	.039	.004 ***
Political Performance: Elections	.067	.039	.088 *
Government Services			
Water	.063	.041	.118
Electricity	.037	.044	.392
Public Education	.012	.042	.776
Police	-.043	.039	.271
Incumbents			
President Fox	.007	.047	.885
State Governor	.004	.041	.929
Mayor	.059	.042	.169
Congress	.139	.051	.006 ***
Sociodemographic Conditions			
Sex	.143	.147	.333
Age	-.006	.005	.293
Income (per $1,000 pesos)	-.030	.020	.129
Education	.009	.020	.648
Rho	.049		

Adj. R2 = 0.29
N = 434
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

Table 5.2: Hierarchical Linear Model Regression on Satisfaction with Democracy.[81]

[81] I also regressed the same variables on the single-item, 5-pt. indicator for satisfaction with democracy, and the results were substantially the same (using both linear and ordinal logistic parameterizations): the rank order was always the same for substantive, liberal, and electoral democrats, and the 95% confidence interval for the parameter associated with electoral democracy always excluded the parameter value for

The parameter estimates for the electoral, liberal, and substantive democracy attitudinal scales are .069, -.024, and -.055, respectively. Hypothesis testing demonstrates that the effects are mostly distinguishable from one another. The electoral democracy point estimate is clearly higher than those for the liberal and substantive democracy scales. If the electoral and liberal democracy parameters in reality had the same value, the probability of observing the difference produced by the model (.093) is p = .036. Similarly, the probability of observing the difference between the electoral and substantive democracy parameters (.124) is p = .004 under the null hypothesis that the difference is 0. (However, the parameter estimates for substantive and liberal democracy are statistically indistinguishable; under the null hypothesis of no difference, the probability of the observed difference, .031, is p = .470.)

Controlling for the model's other regressors heightens the differences between concepts of democracy, compared to the ANOVA-type analysis shown in Figure 5.7. In the means comparison, mean satisfaction for liberal democrats was not statistically different from that of either substantive or electoral democrats. In the multivariate model, however, liberal democrats were considerably less satisfied with democracy than electoral democrats.

Furthermore, definitions of democracy have important effects on support for it. The coefficient for the substantive view of democracy, -.055 (p = .066), means that moving from the minimum value on the attitudinal scale (0) to the maximum value (16) reduces a respondent's satisfaction with democracy by .88 points on the seven-point satisfaction scale, a movement of over 12.5% of the dependent variable's range.

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substantive democracy. The major differences are that the effect for electoral democracy becomes weaker and insignificant at conventional levels (B = .027, p = 0.26 in the HLM) and that there is no evidence of variation across electoral sections (rho = 0).

The electoral view of democracy has an even stronger effect in the opposite direction. The parameter value associated with defining democracy primarily as selection of political leadership through free and fair elections is .069 (p = .024). Thus, a respondent at the maximum point of the electoral scale is, on average and all other things being equal, over 1.1 points higher on the satisfaction indicator than her counterpart at the minimum of the democracy scale—a movement of around 15.8% of the dependent variable's range.

The coefficient for the liberal view of democracy as a collection of freedoms is -.024. However, the high *p*-value indicates that the liberal view of democracy has no appreciable impact on satisfaction. That is, its effect statistically indistinguishable from zero—although, to reiterate, the effect *is* significantly smaller than an electoral view of democracy's.

Other Determinants of Satisfaction

Retrospective evaluations and cognitive personal resources also had important implications for satisfaction with democracy. Of the control variables, psychological identification with two political parties, the ruling PAN and the perennial outs, the PRD, had the most significant impact on satisfaction. PAN sympathizers were, on average, nearly six-tenths of a point higher on the satisfaction scale (nearly 8.2% of the range) than other citizens. Affective affinity with the PRD caused a similar rise in satisfaction of .54 points on the seven-point scale (7.7% of the range). On the other hand, *priístas* were on the whole neither more nor less satisfied than other citizens.

The source of the PAN's satisfaction is obvious. When the survey was taken in June, 2006, it had controlled the presidency for five and a half years, constituted the

largest parliamentary group for over half of that time, and governed in nine states as well as about a fifth of Mexico's municipalities.

At first blush, the source of PRD adherents' satisfaction is less apparent, but a moment's reflection reveals that it is related to the timing of the poll. The party's candidate, López Obrador, had been ahead in the polls for two years and, despite a fierce opposition onslaught, had a better than even chance of winning the presidency. The absence of a relationship between inclining toward the PRI and support for democracy is perhaps due to the party's mixed electoral performance over the past six years. The party lost the presidency, but bounced back in the 2003 midterm elections.

Government economic and political performance also influenced satisfaction with democracy. Of the performance evaluations, respondents' overall perception of the impact of government economic policy on the country and their household economies was most associated with increasing satisfaction with democracy. The coefficient for economic performance was .187. Thus, moving from the minimum to the maximum on the eight-point economic evaluation scale elevates satisfaction by about 1.5 points, nearly 21.4% of the range.

Aspects of political performance were also important, although less so than opinions on economic performance. Interviewees' global perception of government respect for rights shapes their support for democracy significantly, with a coefficient of .114. Those at the highest point on the eight-point rights scale scored, on average, nine-tenths of a point higher on the satisfaction scale (13% of the range) than those with the lowest possible evaluation of rights.

Finally, perceptions of the federal and state governments' ability to organize clean and fair elections were positively related to support for democracy. The coefficient was .067, implying just over a half-point difference in satisfaction between those at the

maximum and minimum points on the clean election scale. This represents about 7.7% of the dependent variable's range.

These results are roughly consistent with those yielded by other polls. My own dynamic analyses of the 2001 and 2003 waves of the National Survey on Political Cultural (ENCUP) revealed that perceptions of economic performance, respect for rights, and electoral hygiene were highly related to changing satisfaction with democracy in the early years of the Fox administration (see Chapter 6 in this volume, and Crow 2004, 2006). In those analyses, democratic advancement mattered *more* to Mexicans than economic accomplishments in shaping regime support. Whether or not economics counts more than politics, both were clearly more important than other determinants of satisfaction considered in the ENCUP.

Similarly, my own analysis of the 2000 and 2003 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data in Mexico shows that citizens' beliefs about whether elections were fraudulent or not has a clear impact on both their proclivity to vote and were more satisfied with democracy. In 2000, the odds of voting for citizens who believed the last elections were clean were 25% higher than those for those who thought elections were fraudulent. For the 2003 midterm elections, believers in clean elections' odds of voting were 20% higher than skeptics' odds. In the same vein, satisfaction with the conduct of elections increased satisfaction with democracy in both years.

Another important cause of satisfaction with democracy is approval of Congress. The effect associated with this variable is comparable to that of government respect for rights. The coefficient of .139 means that the average difference in satisfaction with democracy between those with the most positive evaluation of Congress (a score of 7) and those with the most negative (a score of 1) is over eight-tenths of a point, or close to 12% of the range of the dependent variable.

As explained above, it is probably more accurate to interpret congressional approval as an attitude toward an institution rather than toward the individuals who, at the time of the poll, personified the institution. For one thing, the survey item was phrased to ask about Congress in general, rather than any specific representative. Perhaps more tellingly, an overwhelming number of Mexicans do not know who their SMD representative is. The most highly visible politicians are tapped for PR seats so they are assured a seat. Thus, the peculiarities of Mexico's mixed electoral system—and the lack of a tradition of personal representation and "constituent work" in Mexican politics—contribute to SMD legislators' status as virtual unknowns.

The variables that failed to impact satisfaction with democracy were incumbent evaluations, contentment with provision of public services, and individual conditions. Contrary to what I hypothesized, and what other studies have found, Mexicans' evaluations of federal, state, and municipal chief executives had no bearing on their evaluations of democracy. The coefficients for President Fox and state governors were .007 and .004, respectively, both with *p*-values above .88.

The lack of a relationship between presidential and gubernatorial approval and satisfaction with democracy is surprising in a country of traditionally top-down politics, presidentialism, and *caudillismo*. However, it is consistent with the interpretation that some commentators have offered of high presidential approval ratings—especially those of Fox—as reflective more of the president's positive valence than of widespread approbation of his policies or performance. Mayoral evaluations came closest to affecting satisfaction with democracy (coefficient of .059), but the *p*-value of .169 is too high to exclude the possibility that the coefficient value is an artifact of sampling variability.

Opinions of "system outputs"—basic government services such as supplying water, electricity, education, and public security—similarly had no bearing on support for democracy. Although a crucial component of modern governance is the ability to provide public goods, Mexicans' experience may lead them to dissociate supply of these goods with specifically *democratic* governance. Authoritarian rule under the PRI, especially during the heyday from around 1940 to 1970, did a reasonable job at building the country's material infrastructure. Despite numerous deficiencies, Mexico's public education system also performed adequately in raising literacy rates. So, it seems reasonable to speculate that Mexicans' expectations of democracy go well beyond getting basic services and that, therefore, how well the government furnishes them has little to do with how citizens evaluate democracy.

Also contrary to expectation is the null effect of individual socioeconomic circumstances on support for democracy. Men are not more satisfied with democracy than women. Older citizens are not more satisfied than the young, nor the well-off more than the less affluent, nor the better educated more than those with less schooling.

The sociodemographic variable that comes closest to having a discernible impact is income, but what effect there may be is in the *opposite* direction than previous studies would have led us to believe. The negative coefficient, -.03, implies that for every $1,000 pesos more a respondent makes per month, his or her satisfaction with democracy decreases by three-hundredths of a point. It may be that income here is a proxy for other assets like access to information, high-level social contacts, and education (with which income is correlated at .45), and so on, that make higher earners more critical and independent of government largesse. But a *p*-value of nearly .13 means that this effect may be merely an artifact of this particular sample.

Furthermore, it is possible that sociodemographic variables have an *indirect* effect on satisfaction through evaluations of democratic performance. That is, sociodemographic conditions may determine attitudes, which in turn affect support for democracy. In this case, the effect of social conditions would be absorbed through attitudinal variables.

CONCLUSIONS

Substantive democrats' greater disillusionment with democracy in Mexico, as well as the other causes of dissatisfaction discussed above, could have far-reaching implications both for Mexico and other emerging democracies. The analysis suggests that Mexicans' dissatisfaction is deep-seated and may have already generalized to a fairly high level. Moreover, substantive definitions of democracy are intensifying dissatisfaction with democracy elsewhere in Latin America and the world—a topic I take it in Chapter 7.

Disenchantment with democracy in Mexico goes well beyond disapproval of incumbent politicians, unhappiness with provision of services, and belonging to a party other than those currently favored by electors (or not belonging to any party at all). The most important determinant, the perception of economic malaise, is a relatively long-term judgment formed virtually over the duration of the Fox government. The greatest cause of dissatisfaction with democracy is precisely the area where Mexican democracy has performed worse, according to *Desencanto Ciudadano* respondents.

Perhaps more worrisome, those who expect democracy to deliver economic progress—substantive democrats—are those who are least satisfied with the new Mexican regime. This bespeaks a perhaps long-lasting mismatch between what citizens want and need, and what Mexican democracy is delivering. Of course, all Mexicans'

attitudes toward democracy are colored by economic performance. But substantive democrats' dissatisfaction is *on top of* their evaluations of economic performance. That is, socioeconomic expectations of democracy are added to assessments of poor economic performance, making these citizens' outlook for democracy even dimmer. And, as shown in Chapter 4, the substantive view of democracy is the most prevalent in Mexico. In short, the facts point to general dissatisfaction with democracy in Mexico rooted in causes that seem to be relatively enduring.

The Mexican holds lessons for other countries. Mexico's low-to-middling economic develop—characterized by high levels of poverty and inequality, and low economic growth of which the benefits are spread unevenly—and its low satisfaction with democracy make the country typical of new, and poor, democracies. Thus, we might expect citizens of these democracies to have a predominantly substantive view of democracy, expecting government to intervene and better their lots in life. Studies of other Latin American countries and post-Soviet societies suggest that this is indeed the case. As I show in Chapter 7, heightened socioeconomic expectations of democracy appear to be contributing to disenchantment with democracy elsewhere in the world.

Why should dissatisfaction worry us, though? An auscultation of its effects on political participation reveals that disenchantment is indeed cause for concern. In the next chapter, I turn to the consequences of dissatisfaction with democracy in Mexico—and, in particular, to its toxic effects on political participation.

CHAPTER 6

The Consequences: Dissatisfaction with Democracy and Political Participation in Mexico

In this chapter, I turn to the consequences of dissatisfaction with democracy in Mexico. In particular, I examine dissatisfaction's implications for political participation—three particular aspects of it, to be more precise. Dissatisfied citizens vote less, engage in individual, non-electoral participation less, and protest more, even after accounting for the effects of social conditions and political attitudes other than satisfaction with democracy that influence participation.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss political participation generally and in Mexico specifically, focusing on the three forms of participation my study embraces and citing survey evidence to give an idea of the prevalence of each in Mexico. I draw a broad distinction between *institutional* and *contentious* forms of participation—labels that supplant the empirically inaccurate and semantically loaded terms "conventional" and "unconventional". This distinction will be crucial for differentiating the effects of dissatisfaction with democracy on political participation.

Then, countering a central thrust of democratic consolidation theory I argue that the import of dissatisfaction with democracy lies as much in its deleterious effects on the quality of democracy as it does in the possibility of reversion to authoritarianism. The most widespread danger is not that dissatisfied citizens will clamor for a return to autocracy, but that their political systems will congeal into "diminished" or "illiberal" democracies rather than full-blown liberal democracies. The key link between

dissatisfaction and the quality of democracy is participation. Dissatisfaction diminishes institutional participation, which may in turn weaken representative links between citizens and lawmakers and reduce the possibility that the former can hold the latter accountable for their actions. Responsiveness and accountability are both crucial components of democratic quality. On the other hand, dissatisfaction increases contentious participation, which I take as an *indicator* rather than a *cause* of low democratic quality.

Finally, I present my statistical models and the results of the quantitative analysis. These results draw mainly upon the *Citizen Disenchantment* survey, but I also adduce evidence from the Mexican *National Survey on Political Culture* (ENCUP, in Spanish), carried out in 2001, 2003, and 2005. I conclude with some musings on the future of political participation in Mexico.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN MEXICO: BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS AND CONTENTION

In democracies, political participation is action that private citizens undertake to influence government and its decisions (Milbraith and Goel 1977: 2). Of course, political activity is not peculiar to democracies. Authoritarian governments often deepen their control over society by mobilizing subjects to demonstrate mass support for the regime and ferret out dissidents. Those who criticize the government do so clandestinely and often at great risk. In contrast, democratic participation is characterized by autonomy from the state and the vastly wider range of actions available to citizens. Democratic participation need not be spontaneous—in fact, it is most effective when highly organized

by skilled leaders—but it must be voluntary. It even transgresses the law at times (though it is never violent), and many democracies cherish traditions of civil disobedience.

The means citizens use to shape democratic politics are myriad: they may be individual or collective; they may be aimed at political authorities directly or indirectly, as when citizens seek to persuade and organize other citizens; and they support or confront government institutions. The ends to which these means are employed are equally broad, ranging from particularist petitions to solve individual problems to communal demands of a regional or national scope.

Empirical studies on political participation have sought to make sense of this variety of possibilities in at least two ways. Some classify similar activities into broad categories, often using data reduction techniques such as factor analysis (see, e.g., Verba and Nie 1972). Others array political activities on a continuum (sometimes using unidimensional scaling techniques) according to criteria such as the amount of effort, coordination, or risk a given activity entails, or its degree of social acceptability (see, e.g., Marsh 1974, Verba *et al.* 1978, and McAllister 1992). Having thus made participation more tractable to analysis, scholars then typically examine the socioeconomic, attitudinal, and ideological determinants of participation. Relatively few studies, however, have analyzed the role that satisfaction with democracy plays in determining both *how much* and *how* citizens participate in politics.

My aim in this study is not an exhaustive catalog of political participation in Mexico. Rather, I focus on a limited—but important—set of activities: voting, individual, non-electoral action, and protest. Nor do I contribute to the proliferation of typologies here. For my purposes, one overarching distinction suffices for explaining much of the relationship between satisfaction with democracy and political action, that between *institutional* and *contentious* participation, a distinction upon which I elaborate

below in the section “Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Participation”. The first two forms of participation, voting and individual, non-electoral activity, are institutional. Protest is contentious.

Voting

In representative democracies (that is to say, all existing democracies), voting is the quintessential act of political participation. Beyond its privileged place in democratic theory as the foremost expression of political equality, it is by far the activity in which the greatest number of citizens participates. For this reason, electoral participation merits special attention apart from other activities also classified as “institutional”.

Chapter 5 detailed turnout rates in Mexico during and after the democratic transition. They are high relative to turnout in the United States, but declining. Under dominant-party rule turnout regularly exceeded 75%, and rose as high as 90%. Lower rates during the democratic transition of the 1990’s signalled the debilitation of corporatist mobilizing structures more than citizen apathy. However, continued decline from 2000 on is probably, in part, a symptom of decreasing satisfaction with democracy, which fell concurrently with voter turnout. Though the analysis based on the 2006 *Citizen Disenchantment* survey is cross-sectional, I present evidence from surveys carried out earlier in the 2000’s that buttress this interpretation.

Individual, Non-Electoral Participation

Though voting is the main way citizens participate politically, it is not the only one. Individual citizens attempt to influence political authorities in many other ways, such as contacting legislators and signing petitions. They also attempt to persuade and organize other citizens by writing letters for publication in newspapers, calling radio talk shows, handing out political flyers, and displaying signs, among other things. This class

of activities is subsumed under the rubric of "individual, non-electoral participation"—shortened at times simply to "individual participation" or "engagement". Though some of these actions may be related to election campaigns (for example, signs typically urge neighbors to vote for one or another candidate), I use the phrase "non-electoral" to distinguish them from the act of voting. Individual participation is also institutional.

In Mexico, this type of political participation is relatively infrequent. For example, according the 2005 wave of the World Values Survey, 21% of Mexicans have signed a petition at some time (compared to 80% of U.S. citizens). The 2005 ENCUP reports that 14% of Mexican citizens have written the president or other political authorities at some point in their lives. By contrast, some 21% of U.S. citizens have called, written, or visited authorities *in the past year*, according to the 2004 American National Election Study (ANES). In the same vein, the 2005 ENCUP reports that 20% of Mexicans have written letters to newspapers, 13% have called a radio or TV program, and 10% have displayed a political sign or banner.[82] It is perhaps surprising that individual engagement is even this high, given that (according to the same survey) 68% of Mexicans believe that lawmakers either take into account their party's interests or their own personal interests when formulating legislation.

Protest

In contrast to voting and individual non-electoral action, marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, and the like are *contentious* forms of political participation. Mexicans' involvement in protest is also comparatively low. In the 2005 World Values Survey 16% of Mexicans reported having participated in lawful demonstrations (compared to 21% of U.S. citizens in the 2004 ANES). The 1999-2000 WVS put the percentage of people who

[82] No comparable data are available for U.S. citizens.

have engaged in lawful protest during their lives at 3% for Mexico, while the 2005 ENCUP puts this figure at 14%.

Studies of political participation in the industrial democracies undertaken in the 1970's—after the widespread social unrest that beset the United States and Europe during the previous decade—labelled voting and individual engagement (as well as membership in civic and community organizations) "conventional" participation. Protest was "unconventional". I eschew these labels in the Mexican case for two reasons. First, protest in Mexico may be as "conventional" as other forms of political participation. Depending on the survey one relies upon, Mexicans protest as frequently as they undertake some other, institutional political actions. Furthermore, many varieties of protest are "conventional" in the sense of drawing on well-known discursive and behavioral repertoires.

Second, the term "unconventional" carries an unfavorable normative connotation, reflective in many cases of the trepidation with which some, especially conservative scholars, viewed the protests of the 1960's and early 1970's. As I argue below, protest entails the exercise of inherently democratic rights; it is a regular feature of citizen participation in all established democracies. Thus, I use the terms "institutional" and "contentious" as rough synonyms for "conventional" and "unconventional", respectively. The former terms seem more descriptive while avoiding the judgmental baggage of the earlier language.

BEYOND CONSOLIDATION THEORY: FROM DEMOCRATIC SURVIVAL TO THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

The relatively concrete behavioral focus of this study contrasts with the more sweeping concern prevalent in other studies on popular support for democracy: democratic breakdown. Diamond has observed that each "wave" of democratic

expansion has been followed by a period of contraction, an ebbing of democracy's tides (1996). Thus, it was natural for public opinion studies in new democracies to focus on political dissatisfaction's implications for the survival of democracy (see, e.g., Mattes *et al.* 2000, Mishler and Rose 1997, Lagos 2001, and Seligson and Carrion 2002). Would dissatisfaction with the performance of democratic governments erode support for democratic ideals? Would disillusioned citizens yearn for an authoritarian past, especially one that produced some measure of economic well-being? In the Mexican context, Moreno and Méndez found that Moreno and Méndez conclude that "a large group of Mexicans would prefer to sacrifice civil and political liberties rather than submit themselves to economic adversity" (2002: 143). If democratic rule rests, at least in part, on an attitudinal foundation that views democracy as "the only game in town"—as the civic culture school of analysis holds—lopsided scores that continually favored the well-off and powerful may lead the losers to want to change the game entirely. Dissatisfaction might jeopardize consolidation of new democracies and cause reversion to authoritarianism.

The good news was that dissatisfaction with democracy among citizens in new democracies did not, for the most part, diminish attitudinal support for democratic principles or herald the collapse of democracy. I do *not* argue that disenchantment will lead to democratic breakdown in Mexico (though it may have helped hasten on a return to authoritarianism elsewhere). Though it is no longer clear that Mexico is transitioning toward liberal democracy, neither has it lapsed back into frankly authoritarian rule. President Felipe Calderón deftly defused the crisis of legitimacy after the controversial 2006 election by consolidating his standing with key constituencies (the military and business elites, for example) and, indeed, the public at large, among which he enjoys relatively high approval ratings. Similarly, democracy has survived acute economic and

political crises in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela over the last decade or so. Reversion to authoritarianism may owe more to elite polarization and strategic interaction than to feeble popular support for democracy (Przeworski 1992b).

The bad news, though, is that merely maintaining the formal trappings of democratic rule does not ensure that budding democracies will flourish and become full-fledged liberal (or substantive) democracies. Arguing against the teleological tint of democratic transition theory, Carothers (2002) observes that rather than either consolidating or failing, most new democracies remain stuck in a kind of hinterland: the military juntas of yore fail to reappear, but political authorities in democratically elected governments routinely abuse their power, abridge political and civil rights, engage in corruption, and represent their own interests at the expense of their constituents'. In Latin America and elsewhere, "feckless pluralism" produces alternation in power among political parties, but precious little improvement in citizens' lives. These "partial" or "illiberal" democracies are increasingly common, accounting for around 30% of the world's polities in 2000 (Epstein *et al.* 2006, Zakaria 2003). As Marta Lagos puts it, "For these countries, the problem is not so much the threat of renewed authoritarianism but the existence of distinct, and in some ways diminished, forms of democracy" (2001: 2). The significance of political dissatisfaction is not its implications for the *survival* of democracy, but for the *quality* of democracy.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

Political participation is related to the quality of democracy in at least two ways. On its own, participation is an indicator of democratic quality. It is also shapes other components of high quality democracy, including "vertical accountability" and government responsiveness, in significant ways. According to classical political theory,

democracy thrives when citizens are well-informed, interested in politics, and participate actively in the political process (Almond and Verba 1963, Putnam *et al.* 1993). Democracy can and does endure even in the absence of this ideal citizenry—nowhere observed in the real world—but a nucleus of "attentive citizens" (Dahl 1989) is probably necessary for democracy to deepen. The formal existence of political rights is not enough to ensure democratic quality; citizens must exercise these rights by voting, participating in political parties and civic organizations, discussing policy issues with fellow citizens, and communicating with elected officials (Diamond and Morlino 2004: 23-24).[83]

Intense participation also increases the quality of democracy by contributing to vertical accountability, or citizens' ability to hold political authorities answerable for their decisions. Citizens can wield the vote to punish abuses of power or poor performance, turning deficient politicians and parties out of power if enough citizens concur in assessing incumbents negatively (and agree on an alternative). But, as Phillippe Schmitter points out, government turnover, loss-of-confidence votes, and the like are hardly the only mechanisms through which leaders are held accountable. When politicians inform constituents of their choices and explain their policy rationales, they participate in an "ordinary cycle of accountability" (Schmitter 2004: 49) that depends no less on citizen participation than more dramatic manifestations of accountability.

[83] To be sure, there are skeptics regarding the desirability of political participation. Some conservative scholars, in particular, have argued that *excessive* participation could jeopardize political stability. Huntington, for example, claimed that protest undermines the weak institutions typical of developing countries by burdening them with demands they are incapable of processing (Huntington 1968). "Elitist democratic theory" posited that mass participation could destabilize even established democracies, and that popular demands should be channeled through elite-controlled institutions (Kariel 1970). High voter turnout could produce undesirable consequences, since it would privilege the views of lesser-educated and –informed citizens over those of those with greater cognitive competence. Even in their heyday during the late 1960's and 1970's, though, these contrarian views were in the minority, and it appears that they have fallen increasingly into disfavor.

Citizens must demand these explanations, listen to and process them, and be ready to act upon them by pressuring incumbents and, if necessary, replacing them.

Of course, political participation is only one of several ingredients in the accountability recipe. Widely available information about government activities and inter-party competition that provides citizens real alternatives to incumbents are two others. Participation is, thus, an insufficient but necessary condition for vertical accountability.

Political participation can also strengthen representative linkages between citizens and decision-makers and foster greater government responsiveness to citizen demands. In theory, the "democratic process induces the government to form and implement policies the citizens want" (Powell 2004: 91). The road that translates preferences into policy is a winding one, of course. The structure of policy choices, their complexity and citizen uncertainty about them, different rules for interest aggregation, and hurdles to collective action that inhibit achievement of shared goals are just a few of the filters through which public preferences must pass before becoming policy. Furthermore, not all linkages between citizens and leaders in democracies are programmatic: they may also be ideological, clientelistic, and charismatic (Kitschelt 2000). Political participation in the context of non-programmatic representative linkages *could* increase government responsiveness where there is an exchange of policy outcomes for votes (or other forms of support), but it could also *diminish* responsiveness by allowing well organized minorities to dominate state institutions.

Even if political participation does not guarantee responsive government, it is still an essential condition for responsiveness. Citizens must make their desires known to political leaders and press them to adopt appropriate policies. The more citizens who do so, the greater the likelihood that government will reflect public demands. Despite

difficulties in turning preferences into law, governments often *are* responsive, at least in the established democracies. A number of studies on the United States and Western Europe have compared public opinion surveys with policy outcomes over long periods of time and concluded that government policies do, in fact, generally reflect citizen preferences (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994). Of course, accountability and responsiveness are also mutually reinforcing attributes: leaders are more apt to listen to their constituents if they face consequences for not doing so.

In sum, active citizen participation in politics both indicates high democratic quality in and of itself, and nurtures (though does not assure) other elements of high quality democracy. Of the three forms of participation considered here—voting, individual political activity, and protest—the first two would appear to be unambiguously propitious for democratic quality. The more voting and non-electoral civic engagement, the better. Not only are these forms of participation desirable from the standpoint of normative political theory (most of it, anyway), they also lay the groundwork for better governance.

Protest, however, is a thornier matter: its implications for democratic quality are more ambiguous. On the one hand, peaceful demonstrations constitute an exercise of democratic rights characteristic of high-quality democracies. Organized protest has a well-established place in the repertoire of democratic political participation, and public demonstrations routinely take place in advanced democracies. Democracy itself entails freedoms (of association, of assembly, etc.) that add up to a right to collective protest. The unimpeded use of this right is a sign of a "good" democracy (Diamond 2004: 23).

On the other hand, protests can reasonably be interpreted as a sign of diminished democratic quality—especially when they are massive and sustained. They indicate a failure of institutional mechanisms for processing citizen demands. Citizens generally

turn to contentious forms of claim-making when they perceive that they cannot get what they want through institutional channels and believe strongly in their cause.[84] Protest often requires greater effort than other forms of participation, and protestors risk their own physical safety to some degree. That some citizens would resort to a relatively costly, potentially dangerous form of political participation signals a partial breakdown of political representation. Furthermore, in illiberal democracies protests often occur in "authoritarian enclaves" and are aimed at local autocratic leaders. In this case, protest is an even clearer indication of poor democratic quality.

Protest is also problematic for democratic quality because of an inherent, latent potential for violence. Even peaceful protest owes part of its effectiveness to a show of strength, and implicit possibility of violence, that unsettles political authorities (Tarrow 1998: 105, Tilly 2003: 196-197). Demonstrators could become violent. Beyond the possibility of normally level-headed citizens' tempers flaring in the heat of the moment, protests inevitably attract a radical fringe that eschews gradualism in favor of violent change. This is why organizers often train demonstrators in techniques of non-violent resistance and police their own ranks, identifying violent interlopers to police. For their part, political authorities often resort to public force in dealing with protests—especially in illiberal democracies, in which governments see every protest as a riot in the making and are less hesitant to quash dissent. Here, though, it is not the protest itself, but official repression that degrades the quality of democracy.

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[84] In contrast to this perspective of instrumental rationality, some more sociologically-inclined students of contentious politics view protest through the lens of group identity: people participate in marches, at least in part, to express and solidify their identification with others who share their worldview (see, e.g., Melucci 1988). Undoubtedly, not all elements present in a protest can be explained by a desire to change government policy; for example, some chants and slogans emphasize collective solidarity rather than make concrete demands. But instrumental rationality and social psychology explanations are entirely compatible. Even if the psychological satisfaction of collective identity-building motivates some protestors more than the prospect of making their demands known (especially given uncertainty over how, or if, authorities will respond to those demands), frustration with policy outcomes appears to be a necessary trigger for protest.

Of course, to the extent that protest becomes an institutionalized staple of the repertoire of contentious political action, the risk of violence diminishes. In some countries, police even provide advice and protection to protestors. However, in Mexico—and probably most new democracies—the degree of institutionalization is uneven across protest movements. For example, labor protests are highly conventional, but those undertaken by other social movements are more unpredictable.

My impression is that in Mexico, protest is probably a (mostly) democratic reaction to flawed democracy. Electoral competition has largely failed to open new avenues for resolving old grievances and redoubts of authoritarianism exist in states such as Puebla, Oaxaca, and others. Whatever the meaning of protest, though, those who are dissatisfied with democracy engage in it more than their more content counterparts.

At all events, the present study contemplates participation only as an indicator, not a cause, of democratic quality. Operationalizing and measuring responsiveness and accountability entails considerable difficulty, and exploration of the causal relationship between these and political participation is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The theoretical discussion of participation's salutary effects on aligning policy-making with public preferences and holding officials responsible for their acts suggests causal hypotheses that await empirical exploration at another time.

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

How might satisfaction with democracy affect political participation? Two stories could be spun; the first is one of complacency, the second, of engagement. In the first story, citizens who are happy with their democracy participate less. People essentially undertake political activity to reform laws, make demands, redress wrongs—in short, to change something or other. Those who are more or less content with the way things

become *complacent.* They do not want change; thus, they have no need to participate politically.

The second story is the obverse of the first: satisfied citizens participate *more* in politics. For them, the political system works fairly well at producing the policies and services they want. They believe that government is generally responsive to citizen input and that they personally have some capacity to shape politics. In this scenario, satisfied citizens have higher levels of political involvement precisely because they believe that involvement is efficacious.

For their part, the *dissatisfied* citizens in this second narrative disengage from politics. They become alienated from a political system in which cynical elected officials seemingly look out only for their own interests. Discouraged, they perceive that their countries are run for the benefit of the powerful and deeply distrust political parties and legislatures. For dissatisfied citizens, political participation is futile since decision-makers do not heed the opinions of their constituents.

Intuitively, the second story seems more plausible than the first. Dissatisfaction probably disheartens citizens more than it steels their resolve to work for change. The widely-noted relationship between income and education, on the one hand, and electoral turnout, on the other, militates in favor of the "engagement" over the "complacency" theory. We know that educated, well-off citizens tend to vote more than their less-educated, lower-earning counterparts, both in established democracies such as the United States (see, e.g., Silver *et al.* 1986, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) and in Mexico (Buendía 2002: 449; Buendía and Somuano 2003: 320; Moreno 2003: 152, 160). Thus,

those who have benefitted more from the allocation of resources produced, in part, by the political system (and are presumably more satisfied with democracy) also participate more—precisely the opposite of what we expect if satisfaction induced complacency.

But a more nuanced account is also possible. Both stories above assume that participation is of a piece, an all-or-nothing proposition: citizens are either generally active, availing themselves simultaneously of several arms in the arsenal of activism, or generally inactive, abstaining from town halls, the public square, and the streets in addition to the polls. But studies of political participation and the typologies they produced teach us that citizens differentiate their participation, often focusing on one category of activity at the expense of others. In their classic 1972 study on *Participation in America*, Verba and Nie contended that a complete account of political participation should take into account *types* of participation in addition *amounts* of it. They classified United States citizens into "voting specialists", "campaigners", "parochial activists" with narrow, individual aims, "communalists" who participated in civic organizations, "complete activists", and the "totally inactive" (1972: 73-81). Other typologies are also possible, of course.

Mexican citizens also participate selectively, engaging in some activities but not others. Buendía and Somuano, for example, found that "both conventional and unconventional modes of non-electoral participation are negatively correlated with electoral participation" (2003: 317). Voters apparently feel that the voting booth suffices as an opportunity to influence political decisions while activists of all stripes may eschew the vote as a means of social change in favor of more direct forms of political action.

Different levels of satisfaction with democracy constitute an important factor in Mexicans' decisions not only on whether or not to participate in politics, but also on *how* to channel their participation. The main fault line separating the types of participation in which satisfied citizens take part from those that attract dissatisfied citizens, is the attitude a given political action assumes toward established political authority: is the action *institutional* or *contentious* in nature? Ultimately, of course, all political activity seeks to influence government and its decisions (except revolution, which aims to abolish existing institutions and replace them with others). The difference between institutional and contentious participation lies in the tactical *means* that citizens bring to bear in asserting their demands.

Institutional forms of participation stay within the confines of more or less well defined legal and social norms. Participants in institutional action, or their agents, work amenably with political institutions and their representatives (legislatures, parties, politicians, bureaucracies) to effect gradual, marginal change. Citizens who are satisfied with democracy tend to participate institutionally because they perceive that, in general, government works well to process citizen input. Even when the outputs of government decision-makers disfavor otherwise satisfied citizens, they may still believe it ethically incumbent on them to support the country's institutions—a stance often aided by a temperamental disinclination toward radicalism.

On the other hand, contentious participation challenges institutions by threatening to disrupt daily life until political authorities react to protestors' demands. Contention often operates on the margins of the law and public opinion. Though, as we have seen,

democracies guarantee a right to protest, they typically place restrictions on this right, specifying acceptable times, places, and manners of protest.[85] Furthermore, the public itself often deems certain protest activities beyond the pale. Thus, contentious participation may run afoul of both legal regulations and social strictures. Concurring with Somuano's observation that "[t]hose most dissatisfied with democracy in Mexico, as well as those who perceive that political leaders don't concern themselves with people's needs, are most likely to participate unconventionally" (2002: 470), I hypothesize that dissatisfied citizens will be drawn to contentious participation. Since they view government as largely unresponsive, they believe that confrontation is required to exert pressure on authorities and shock them out of their inertia.

MODELLING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES

The preceding discussion's hypotheses can be formalized into statistical models, one for each of the three types of political participation considered here. I first detail how I use the *Citizen Disenchantment* data to operationalize my dependent variables, also providing information on the variables' univariate distributions. Then, I specify the models and hypotheses.

Voting

The *Citizen Disenchantment* survey was carried out in June, 2006, just prior to the July 2 general election. Thus, electoral participation is measured as respondents' reported intention to vote in the upcoming election, not their claimed past voting behavior. The survey asked respondents how likely they were to vote on July 2. The

[85] These restrictions themselves often become causes of contention.

response categories (with percentages of respondents in parentheses) are "definitely" (55.8%), "very probable" (28.3%), "somewhat probable" (7.5%), "not very probable" (4.5%), and "not at all probable" (3.8%).

Of course, the intention to vote is not the same thing as voting. Turnout studies based on respondents' reports of past votes also suffer from the same problem: actual behavior often differs from self-reported behavior. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the prospective intention to vote reported in the *Citizen Disenchantment* survey telegraphed real voting behavior fairly well. Taking into account only those who said they would "definitely" vote (55.8% of respondents, compared to an actual turnout rate of 58.5%), and removing undecided voters, the predicted vote shares obtained by the top two parties come reasonably close to those actually obtained: 33.7% predicted for the alliance headed by the PRD (compared to the official vote share of 35.3%) and 31.5% predicted for the PAN (with an official share of 35.8%). On the other hand, the survey overestimates the PRI's vote share (27.7% predicted, 22.3% obtained). The concordance between predicted and real vote shares is a shade closer if "very probable" voters are included with "definite" voters. Respondents in these two categories totalled 84.1% of the sample. The predicted vote shares for the top two parties (with official shares in parentheses) are PRD, 31.4% (35.3%) and PAN, 33.6% (35.8%).

The response categories of the dependent variable are ordered, but their locations are not necessarily equidistant. This suggests that an ordered logistic regression is the most appropriate statistical model:

$$\Pr(PROBVOTE > j) = F(\alpha_j + \beta_1 SAT + \mathbf{X}'_{\text{PROBVOTE}}\ \boldsymbol{\gamma}_{\text{PROBVOTE}} + u_i) \qquad \text{(Eq. 6.1)}$$

where PROBVOTE = respondent's reported intention to vote, SAT = level of satisfaction with democracy; j indexes the J response categories of the dependent variable (in this case, five); F is the cumulative logistic density function such that $F(z) = (1+e^{-z})^{-1}$; the

vector $X'_{PROBVOTE}$ contains other determinants of turnout; the α_j's are *J*-1 thresholds to be estimated corresponding to the upper bound of category *j*; the β's and the elements of the column vector $\gamma_{PROBVOTE}$ associated with $X'_{PROBVOTE}$ are parameters to be estimated; and u is a stochastic error. The hypothesis is that $\beta 1 > 0$; in words, the more satisfied citizens are, the likelier they are to vote.

Included in the independent variable vector $X'_{PROBVOTE}$ are the three broad democratic orientations (electoral, liberal, and substantive) shown to influence satisfaction in the last chapter. Although they appear on the right-hand side of the model I believe that their effect, if any, will work indirectly through satisfaction.

Individual, Non-Electoral Participation

For purposes of my analysis, individual political engagement comprises the following six activities: signing a complaint against the government, sending a letter to the editor, calling a radio or TV program, writing the president or other authorities, handing out flyers or manifestos, and putting up a banner or sign. If a respondent claimed to have done any of these things (or several of them) within the three years prior to the survey, she received a score of "1" on the individual participation variable. If she had done none of these things, the variable was coded "0".

Eleven percent (or 70) of the 646 respondents for which there is information on all six items had undertaken one or more individual political action. Of these, 23 respondents (3.6%) had participated in two activities; 6 (0.9%), in three; and one, in all six activities. By activity, from most common to least, 40 respondents (5.7%) had displayed a political sign; 27 (4.2%), called a talk show; 18 (2.8%), written a government official; 16 (2.5%), handed out flyers; 12 respondents (1.9%) had signed a complaint; and 4 (0.6%), written a newspaper.

My justification for combining these participation indicators into a single dummy variable is threefold. First, they hang together conceptually. All involve individual activity, require low degrees of effort and coordination, and entail virtually no risk. Second, they fit together empirically. I estimated a latent class model in which respondents' unobserved membership in one of two underlying categories—"non-participant" or "participant"—is hypothesized to drive their observed behavior on the six modalities of individual engagement considered here. Since the deviance (G2) statistic of 45.96 is approximately equal to the degrees of freedom (50, see Powers and Xie 2000: 68), this latent class model fits the data well: respondents may be reasonably classified, in general, as either participants or non-participants in individual political action. Finally, as a practical matter, several of the actions described above have relatively few participants, which could lead to unstable estimates and a degrees of freedom problem when regressing a single indicator on the full complement of independent variables.

Given the binary scoring decision for the individual participation variable, a logistic regression is appropriate:

$$\Pr(INDPART = 1) = g(\beta_0 + \beta_1 SAT + \mathbf{X}'_{\text{INDPART}}\ \boldsymbol{\gamma}_{\text{INDPART}}) \qquad \text{(Eq. 6.2)}^{86}$$

where INDPART is a variable indicating whether the respondent has engaged in any of the types of individual participation enumerated above, the function $g(z) = (1 + e^{-z})^{-1}$, $\mathbf{X}$ is a vector of variables affecting individual participation, $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$ is a vector of parameter estimates, and all other notation is as above in Equation 6.1. The hypothesis here is also that $\beta 1 > 0$; that is, greater satisfaction with democracy will increase individual engagement.

[86] In fact, I estimated multi-level, or random effects, logit models for this and the following "Protest" equation. For simplicity's sake, however, I specify the standard logit regression here. Interested readers are referred to Hsiao (2002, Chapter 8) for further details on the random effects logit specification.

Protest

Contentious political participation here comprises four activities: sit-ins (*plantón*), occupying public buildings, blocking roads, and land invasions. As with the individual participation indicator (and for the same reasons),[87] I operationalized the protest dependent variable as a dummy variable scored "1" if a respondent had engaged in any of the four activities listed in the three years before the survey was administered, and "0" otherwise.

Just 16 respondents of 649 (or 2.5%) for whom there is information on all four component variables had engaged in one or more types of protest. Half of these (1.2%) participated in only one protest activity; 5 (0.8%), in two activities; 2 (0.3%), in three; and just one (0.2%), in all four.

A logit model was also estimated for protest, specified as follows:

$$\Pr(PROT = 1) = g(\beta_0 + \beta_1 SAT + \mathbf{X}'_{\text{PROT}}\ \gamma_{\text{PROT}}) \qquad \text{(Eq. 6.3)}$$

where PROT is a variable indicating whether the respondent has engaged in any of the types of individual participation enumerated above, the function $g(z) = (1 + e^{-z})^{-1}$, **X** is a vector of variables affecting protest, and all other notation is as Equation 6.2. The hypothesis is that $\beta 1 < 0$; contrary to its effect on voting and individual participation, satisfaction should *decrease* protest. Or, putting it the other way around, dissatisfied citizens will resort to contentious participation more than their satisfied counterparts.

[87] I also estimated a latent class model in which a two-category latent variable underlies the four binary manifest variables. Again, the good fit indicated by the G2 statistic (2.63 on six degrees of freedom) implies that respondents are either "protestors" or "non-protestors".

RESULTS: SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN MEXICO

Data from the *Citizen Disenchantment* survey generally support the hypothesized effects of satisfaction on participation. I present the results of the three regression models I estimated, complementing them with analyses of the ENCUP.

Voting

Table 6.1 reports the results of the ordinal logistic regression of self-reported intention of voting in the July 2, 2006, on satisfaction with democracy and other independent variables. As expected, Mexicans who are satisfied with their democracy are significantly likelier to vote than unsatisfied citizens. The odds that a citizen at the maximum of the satisfaction scale will "definitely" vote (as opposed to being at most only "very likely" to vote) are 38% higher than the odds of "definitely" voting for citizens at the mean of the satisfaction scale. Put another way, holding all other variables at their means, the probability that a maximally satisfied citizen "definitely" intends to vote is .670, compared to .595 for a citizen with average satisfaction. In general, the odds that a respondents' reported likelihood of voting was in a given response category or higher increase by 16.5% for each one-point increment on the satisfaction with democracy scale.

Variable	B	se	p
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.153	0.095	0.054*
Concepts of Democracy			
Substantive	0.065	0.048	0.177
Liberal	0.031	0.046	0.504
Electoral	0.032	0.044	0.466
Partisanship			
PAN	0.326	0.292	0.264
PRI	0.369	0.338	0.274
PRD	0.577	0.357	0.107
Economic Performance	0.022	0.071	0.755
Political Performance: Rights	-0.024	0.052	0.641
Political Performance: Elections	0.106	0.055	0.053*
Government Services			
Water	-0.054	0.061	0.377
Electricity	0.068	0.062	0.271
Public Education	-0.022	0.067	0.748
Police	0.113	0.059	0.054*
Incumbents			
President Fox	0.090	0.075	0.233
State Governor	-0.046	0.066	0.489
Mayor	-0.013	0.080	0.869
Congress	-0.123	0.088	0.163
Sociodemographic Conditions			
Sex	-0.245	0.204	0.229
Age	0.028	0.010	0.005***
Income (per $1,000 pesos)	0.000	0.000	0.156
Education	0.125	0.036	0.001***
Auxiliary Parameters			
Threshold 1	1.366	1.173	0.244
Threshold 2	2.470	1.133	0.029
Threshold 3	3.314	1.199	0.006
Threshold 4	4.791	1.273	0.000
Log-likelihood	-440.94		
Wald X2	70.44		.000
N = 421			
* p < .10			
** p < .05			
*** p < .01			

Table 6.1: Ordinal Logistic Regression of Self-Reported Intention to Vote on Satisfaction with Democracy and Other Variables (with Cluster-Adjusted Standard Errors).[88]

Consistent with other voting studies, the propensity to vote is also positively related to two sociodemographic variables, age and education. Older, more educated citizens' evidenced a greater inclination to vote than did their younger, less educated counterparts. Also unsurprisingly, Mexicans' evaluations the fairness and honesty with

[88] The hypothesis test for Satisfaction with Democracy in this and all subsequent tables are one-tailed. All other tests are two-tailed.

which authorities conducted past elections is also an important determinant of the propensity to vote. Respondents with the maximum possible clean election rating were 47% likelier to say they would "definitely" vote than respondents whose rating was average.

Interestingly, assessments of electoral hygiene affect the probability of voting *independently* of satisfaction with democracy. That is, positive evaluations of elections increase turnout directly in addition to the indirect effect they wield by raising satisfaction, which, in turn, contributes to greater electoral participation. Not so with other independent variables shown in Chapter 5 to shape satisfaction with democracy, including conceptions of democracy and economic evaluations. These variables' effects appear to be subsumed within that of satisfaction.

Evidence from the Mexican National Survey on Political Culture (ENCUP) corroborates the finding of a positive effect of satisfaction on turnout. Using data from the 2001 and 2003 waves of the ENCUP,[89] I regressed self-reported turnout in presidential, gubernatorial, and state congressional elections on satisfaction and other independent variables. Since the presidential election was held in 2000, and since no state held gubernatorial elections in the lapse between the 2001 and 2003 surveys, the presidential and gubernatorial analyses are cross-sectional, based on 2001 data. On the other hand, ten states (Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tlaxcala, and Yucatán) held state and local elections between the two panel waves. Thus, the analysis for the state deputy elections is longitudinal and includes respondents from these ten states who answered the survey in

[89] A third ENCUP, from which I cite evidence above in my discussion on political participation, was carried out in 2005. However, the *Secretaría de Gobernación* (Interior Ministry) elected not to interview respondents from the prior editions of the survey, so the panel comprises only repeated measurements from the first two waves. Though this reduced the cost of the third survey, it also greatly diminished its usefulness.

both 2001 and 2003.[90] For all three analyses, I estimated random effects logits. In the first two, cross-sectional analyses (president and governor), the random effects represent unmodelled, aggregate-level effects on voting for respondents within geographical clusters (the *área geoestadística básica*, AGEB, equivalent to a U.S. census tract). In the third, longitudinal analysis, the random effects represent an unobserved, individual propensity to vote that varies across respondents. In other words, in the first two analyses the random effects model accounts for spatial correlation of voting probabilities among respondents who live in the same AGEB, and in the third analysis, for correlation of voting probabilities within the same individual over time. Table 6.2 presents the results of these three analyses.

[90] Whereas the 2003 ENCUP asked separately if respondents had voted for federal and state deputies, the 2001 ENCUP posed a single question asking whether respondents had voted for *either* state *or* federal deputies in the last election. Since an answer of "yes" can, but does not necessarily, mean that a respondent voted for state deputies, I had to impute some values for the 2001 reported state deputy vote. For respondents who reported voting for neither state nor federal deputies, the value of "0"—not voting—was retained. For respondents who answered "yes" to having voted for federal and/or state deputies, I imputed values for the state deputy vote using the following procedure. First, I regressed the self-reported 2003 state deputy vote on variables *not* included in the models reported in Table 6.2 (including turnout for other offices, party activism, and a dummy variable for states that hold their elections concurrently with federal elections). To predict the 2001 state deputy voting probabilities, I plugged the 2001 data for these same variables into an equation with the 2003 coefficient estimates. I added a random perturbation to the 2001 predicted probabilities, since the parameters for the true 2001 model might differ slightly from those estimated by the 2003 model (i.e., since the "pooling assumption" of a single model valid for both 2001 and 2003 might not hold). Assuming that each observation for the 2001 state deputy vote is an independent realization of a respondent-specific random variable, I conducted ten Bernoulli trials for each respondent using the 2001 individual predicted probabilities as the "pi" parameters. This yielded ten imputed state deputy vote variables. The average correlation between the ten randomly generated variables and the single binary voting variable without random perturbation (obtained by assigning a value of "1" to a respondent whose 2001 predicted probability of voting was over .5 and "0" otherwise), was .876. The correlations between the multiply imputed 2001 state deputy vote variables and the (known) 2003 state deputy vote variable averaged $r = .239$, a value similar to the $r = .305$ correlation between the 2001 and 2003 self-reported turnout in mayoral elections. (I also analyzed these, but omit the results here; satisfaction with democracy had a positive, but statistically insignificant, effect on mayoral voting.) Finally, I ran ten separate regressions, one for each set of imputed 2001 values. To produce the estimates given in Table 6.2, I averaged the coefficients and standard over the ten regressions, with a slight upward adjustment to the standard errors that accounts for the variability of standard error estimates *across* the imputations, in addition to within-imputation parameter variance (see Raghunathan 2004: 109).

	President			Governor			State Congress		
Variable	B	se	p	B	se	P	B	se	p
Satisfaction w/ Demo	0.107	0.058	0.033**	0.128	0.055	0.011**	0.096	0.061	0.058*
Sex (Male = 1)	0.025	0.120	0.838	-0.043	0.116	0.708	0.130	0.147	0.374
Age	0.173	0.017	0.000***	0.163	0.017	0.000***	0.156	0.023	0.000***
Age-Squared	-0.002	0.000	0.000***	-0.001	0.000	0.000***	-0.001	0.000	0.000***
Income ($10K/mo.)	0.000	0.000	0.729	0.000	0.000	0.627	0.000	0.000	0.493
Education	0.081	0.014	0.000***	0.054	0.013	0.000***	0.073	0.017	0.000***
Employed (Yes = 1)	0.068	0.125	0.586	-0.001	0.120	0.994	0.267	0.148	0.072*
Student (Yes = 1)	-0.273	0.277	0.325	-0.041	0.266	0.878	-0.118	0.384	0.759
Retrospective Sociotropic	-0.011	0.096	0.909	0.071	0.094	0.452	0.058	0.095	0.544
Retrospective Pocketbook	0.122	0.099	0.216	0.039	0.096	0.682	-0.101	0.099	0.310
Constant	-3.762	0.455	0.000***	-3.365	0.434	0.000***	-3.717	0.591	0.000***
Rho	.243		.000	.174		.000	.301		.000
Log-likelihood	-1530.76			-1579.34			-1276.32		
Wald X2 (d.f. = 10)	168.91		.000	151.80		.000	85.24		.000
N	3118			3118					

* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

Table 6.2: Random Effects Logit Regressions of Self-Reported Presidential, Gubernatorial, and State Deputy Votes on Satisfaction with Democracy.

Satisfaction increases turnout in all three elections. The odds that a citizen at the maximum of the satisfaction scale reported having voted for president are nearly 22% higher (odds ratio of 1.217) than those for citizens at the mean of the satisfaction scale. This increase in maximally satisfied citizens' odds of voting, relative to those for citizens with just average satisfaction, is about 27% (1.265) in gubernatorial elections and 30% (1.293) in state congressional elections.

As with the prospective voting model based on the *Citizen Disenchantment* survey, age and education are also significant, positive predictors of the decision to vote in the ENCUP data—though the negative, statistically significant coefficient on the square of age means that voting drops off for the very elderly. Holding a job increases turnout for state deputy elections. The odds of an employed citizen having voted for state deputy are over 30% (1.306) higher than those for the unemployed. The "rho" parameters are relatively high in all three models, indicating significant "unobserved

heterogeneity", or variation in the proclivity to vote, across geographical clusters (in the first two models) and individuals (in the third)—even after controlling for the effects of sociodemographic demographic conditions and economic evaluations.

Individual, Non-Electoral Participation

Table 6.3 presents the results of a logistic regression of individual engagement on satisfaction with democracy (and other independent variables) using the *Citizen Disenchantment* survey data. I used a random effects logit to account for spatial correlation of observations within geographical clusters (i.e., polling precincts). Satisfaction with democracy has a strong effect on citizens' inclination to engage in individual forms of political participation. Comparing citizens at the maximum of the satisfaction scale with those at the mean, the odds that the former reports having participated individually are nearly twice as high (1.94) than those for the latter. Stated another way, the probability that a citizen at the highest point on the satisfaction scale will engage in some form of individual political action (holding all variables at their means) is .128, compared to .071 for a citizen at the scale's mean.

In contrast to the null effects of views of democracy on voting, here substantive democrats appear to exhibit higher levels of individual engagement than other citizens. This result seems to counter the story of poor government economic performance leading to disillusionment and a sense that institutional participation is futile. It may be that two distinct forces are at work here. Dissatisfaction dampens individual participation for *all* citizens but especially substantive democrats, to the extent they are less satisfied with democracy than other citizens. After discounting for the general effect of dissatisfaction on individual participation, though, substantive democrats are more inclined to individual

political action, perhaps because their grievances are more numerous. This speculative explanation, though, begs further analysis.

Variable	B	se	p
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.313	0.161	0.052*
Concepts of Democracy			
Substantive	0.129	0.073	0.079*
Liberal	-0.028	0.072	0.700
Electoral	-0.033	0.075	0.659
Partisanship			
PAN	-0.097	0.486	0.842
PRI	0.146	0.513	0.777
PRD	0.794	0.495	0.109
Economic Performance	0.066	0.090	0.463
Political Performance: Rights	-0.037	0.093	0.692
Political Performance: Elections	0.052	0.095	0.581
Government Services			
Water	0.034	0.101	0.736
Electricity	-0.050	0.102	0.622
Public Education	-0.258	0.099	0.009***
Police	-0.113	0.099	0.254
Incumbents			
President Fox	0.050	0.112	0.654
State Governor	-0.234	0.096	0.014**
Mayor	0.162	0.105	0.121
Congress	0.133	0.115	0.247
Sociodemographic Conditions			
Sex	-0.031	0.351	0.929
Age	0.030	0.014	0.024**
Income (per $1,000 pesos)	0.000	0.000	0.110
Education	0.126	0.049	0.011
Constant	-6.542	1.947	0.001***
Rho	0.192		
Log-likelihood	-440.94		
Wald X2 (d.f.=22)	36.86		.025
N = 448			
* p < .10			
** p < .05			
*** p < .01			

Table 6.3: Random Effects Logistic Regression of Individual Participation on Satisfaction with Democracy

Other determinants of individual participation are age and education: older, more educated citizens are likelier to attempt to influence government decisions or fellow citizens. Education and experience (for which age serves as a proxy) both contribute to individuals' "internal political efficacy", the knowledge and skills that make citizens believe they can influence the political system. Positive evaluations of state governors'

performance and of the public education system make citizens *less* likely to participate individually. These may be cases in which the "complacency thesis" (the first theoretical "story" set forth above in the section on "Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Participation) *does* hold; that is, citizens who feel their governors are doing a good job governing and the public schools, a good job educating, see no need to press for change.

The ENCUP provides additional support for the finding that Mexicans who are relatively satisfied with their democracy engage in individual, non-electoral political action more than their dissatisfied compatriots. Using data from the 2003 wave,[91] I regressed one indicator of individual participation, signing a petition, on satisfaction with democracy and other variables. Some 20.5% of Mexicans reported signing a petition at some time in their lives, roughly concordant with the 2005 World Values Survey's figure. The dependent variable is binary scored "1" for yes and "0" otherwise. Again, I opted for a hierarchical logit regression to account for unobserved cluster-level (AGEB's) heterogeneity. Table 6.4 presents the results.

The odds that a citizen who is maximally satisfied with democracy has signed a petition are over 40% higher (odds ratio of 1.402) than those for a citizen with average satisfaction. Put another way, holding all other variables at their means a "very satisfied" citizen has about a 20.2% chance of having signed a petition, compared to 16.9% for a citizen at the mean of the satisfaction scale. Consistent with the *Citizen Disenchantment* findings, age and education also positively impact the likelihood of individual engagement in the ENCUP data.

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[91] Unfortunately, for all political participation items both the 2001 and 2003 waves asked if respondents had engaged in a given action at any time in their lives. This choice of question wording makes it impossible to tell if a "yes" answer on both occasions refers to an isolated event in the past (before the first wave) or to several events (before and after the first wave) indicative of relatively sustained engagement. Unable to take advantage of the inter-temporality of the two-wave panel, I confined myself to a cross-sectional analysis of the second wave.

Variable	B	se	p
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.136	0.048	0.003***
Sex (Male = 1)	-0.062	0.115	0.593
Age	0.025	0.019	0.195
Age-Squared	0.000	0.000	0.162
Income ($10K/mo.)	0.000	0.000	0.067
Education	0.092	0.013	0.000***
Employed (Yes = 1)	0.111	0.121	0.359
Student (Yes = 1)	-0.048	0.345	0.890
Retrospective Sociotropic	-0.073	0.080	0.366
Retrospective Pocketbook	0.250	0.079	0.002***
Constant	-3.507	0.481	0.000
Rho	.152		
Log-likelihood	-1378.27		
Wald X2 (d.f. = 10)	98.10		.000
N=2856			
* p < .10			
** p < .05			
*** p < .01			

Table 6.4: Random Effects Logit Regression of Petition-Signing on Satisfaction with Democracy.

Protest

If greater satisfaction with democracy increases institutional forms of political participation, it *decreases* contentious action. Table 6.5 presents the results of a logistic regression of protest on satisfaction with democracy and other variables. Since variability across geographical clusters was negligible, I used a simple logit regression for this analysis rather than the random effects formulations employed in the analyses above. Also, I omitted partisan identification with the National Action Party and other variables from the complement of independent variables; as noted above, only 16 respondents had engaged in one of the four forms of protest included in the dependent variable one of the four forms of protest considered here (sit-ins, occupying public buildings, blocking traffic, and land invasions), which led to sparse, quasi-separated data in some cases.

For Mexicans at the maximum of the satisfaction scale, the odds of involvement in contentious political action are about one-third (0.362) of those for citizens at the mean

of the scale. Stated in terms of estimated probabilities, maximally satisfied citizens have about an 0.27% chance of protesting, compared to 0.73% for citizens with average satisfaction.

Other variables inclining Mexicans to protest were sex, age, partisanship, evaluations of government respect for rights, and the liberal view of democracy. Protestors were over three-and-a-half times likelier (3.68) to be male than female. The propensity to protest also increases with age. Unsurprisingly, PRD sympathizers resort to contentious claim-making far more often than members of other parties or those without party affiliation. Those with positive assessments of the Mexican government's record on upholding citizen rights protested less than more critical citizens: the odds of protesting for respondents who awarded Mexican federal and state governments the highest rating on rights observance were less than a third of those for respondents who gave an average rating. Finally, liberal democrats were likelier to protest than their substantive and electoral counterparts—counter to the expectation that less satisfied, substantive democrats would be more inclined to radical political activity. The explanation may be that substantive democrats *do* protest more, but that the effect of the substantive concept of democracy operates indirectly through satisfaction. Liberal democrats defend the right to lawful protest as part of their creed, and apparently make use of that right on occasion, regardless of how satisfied they are with democracy.

Variable	B	se	p
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.313	0.161	0.052*
Concepts of Democracy			
Substantive	0.129	0.073	0.079*
Liberal	-0.028	0.072	0.700
Electoral	-0.033	0.075	0.659
Partisanship			
PAN	-0.097	0.486	0.842
PRI	0.146	0.513	0.777
PRD	0.794	0.495	0.109
Economic Performance	0.066	0.090	0.463
Political Performance: Rights	-0.037	0.093	0.692
Political Performance: Elections	0.052	0.095	0.581
Government Services			
Water	0.034	0.101	0.736
Electricity	-0.050	0.102	0.622
Public Education	-0.258	0.099	0.009***
Police	-0.113	0.099	0.254
Incumbents			
President Fox	0.050	0.112	0.654
State Governor	-0.234	0.096	0.014**
Mayor	0.162	0.105	0.121
Congress	0.133	0.115	0.247
Sociodemographic Conditions			
Sex	-0.031	0.351	0.929
Age	0.030	0.014	0.024**
Income (per $1,000 pesos)	0.000	0.000	0.110
Education	0.126	0.049	0.011
Constant	-6.542	1.947	0.001***
Rho	0.192		
Log-likelihood	-440.94		
Wald X2 (d.f.=22)	36.86		.025
N = 448			
* p < .10			
** p < .05			
*** p < .01			

Table 6.5: Logistic Regression of Protest on Satisfaction with Democracy (with Cluster-Adjusted Standard Errors).

Again, ENCUP data corroborate findings based on the *Citizen Disenchantment* survey. The 2001 ENCUP contained three protest items similar to those in my survey (but not included in the 2003 wave), asking respondents if they "have", "will", "might", or "would never" attend a demonstration, occupy a public building, or block traffic. I combined these three actions into a single "contentious action" dependent variable with three underlying, ordered categories (collapsing "might" and "will" responses into a single category). Latent class modelling assigned each survey-taker a level of contentious participation based on her pattern of responses to the three protest items.

According to the latent class analysis, 84.6% of Mexicans "would never" resort to contentious political participation; 14.1% "would" or "will" do so; and 1.3% "have already" done so. Table 6.6 contains the results of an ordinal logistic regression of contentious participation on satisfaction with democracy and other variables.

Variable	B	se	p
Satisfaction with Democracy	-0.117	0.066	0.039**
Sex (Female = 1)	-0.524	0.109	0.000***
Age	0.003	0.015	0.843
Age-Squared	0.000	0.000	0.409
Income ($10K/mo.)	0.000	0.000	0.563
Education	-0.011	0.013	0.401
Employed (Yes = 1)	-0.047	0.118	0.689
Student (Yes = 1)	0.260	0.293	0.374
Retrospective Sociotropic	-0.007	0.104	0.946
Retrospective Pocketbook	0.075	0.083	0.365
Auxiliary Parameters			
Threshold 1	0.998	0.464	0.031
Threshold 2	3.645	0.461	0.000
Log-likelihood	-1378.27		
Wald X2 (d.f. = 10)	40.93		.013
N=3562			
* p < .10			
** p < .05			
*** p < .01			

Table 6.6: Ordinal Logistic Regression of Contentious Participation on Satisfaction with Democracy and Other Variables (with Cluster-Adjusted Standard Errors).

Satisfied citizens protest less than dissatisfied ones. The odds that Mexicans who are "very satisfied" with their democracy reported involvement in contentious action (as opposed to possible future involvement in, or flat-out rejection of, protest) are almost 20% *less* (odds ratio of .807) than those for citizens with average satisfaction. In other words, all things being equal, maximally satisfied citizens have just a 13.2% chance of undertaking radical political action, or manifesting an inclination to do so, compared to 15.8% for averagely satisfied citizens.

The ENCUP data also reveal that men are far likelier—almost 70% more (odds ratio of 1.69)—to participate contentiously than women. Holding other variables at their means, the probability of men having protested radically or potentially doing so was .204, compared to .132 for women.

CONCLUSIONS

Dissatisfaction with democracy in Mexico merits increased attention on the part of policy-makers, political analysts, and citizens alike. Dissatisfaction exerts important effects on political participation, reducing institutional political participation (voting and individual engagement) while increasing contentious participation (protest). The true danger of dissatisfaction in Mexico lies not in paving the road for a return to authoritarian rule, but in reducing the quality of democracy. Less institutional participation is itself a sign of low democratic quality, but it also imperils democratic development by hampering vertical accountability and government responsiveness. Contentious participation, for its part, indicates that mechanisms of political representation have become at partially dysfunctional. Rather than progressing toward full liberal democracy, as consolidation theory would predict, Mexico appears to have stagnated as a diminished democracy.

Whither political participation in Mexico? Satisfaction with democracy continues to fall, which will probably further erode institutional participation and the already tenuous representative linkages between citizens and politicians. As a result, government policy could distance itself further from public needs and demands, coming full circle to create further dissatisfaction in an ever-widening downward spiral. It is difficult, at present, to perceive conditions that might reverse this trend.

But there may yet be solutions to the disenchantment-alienation cycle—partial, long-term, and difficult to implement, to be sure, but solutions nonetheless. Two broad sets of remedies are *procedural* and *policy-oriented*, respectively. The first set comprises institutional modifications, especially of the electoral system, designed to increase citizens' voice in the decision-making process. The second class of solutions would implement policy changes that address the root causes of dissatisfaction—particularly, social inequality.

Scholars and policy-makers recently have proposed a variety of changes to electoral rules that could improve representation and vertical accountability—which should, in turn, redound in greater citizen participation. Some have suggested doing away with the Mexican Constitution's prohibition on re-election (Dworak 2003), applicable to all offices from President to mayor. The one-term limit sharply constricts citizens' ability to hold politicians accountable for their decisions taking out of their hands a key tool for rewarding good performance and punishing bad performance, consequently reducing policy-makers incentives to take public opinion into account.[92]

Others have called for abolishing the proportional representation (PR) component of Mexico's mixed electoral system, which comprises 300 single-member districts (SMD) and 200 PR seats distributed in five districts (*circunscripciones*), each with a magnitude of 40. Camp argues that making Mexico's legislative elections strictly majoritarian would enhance representation, since "[t]wo-fifths of the lower chamber are not accountable to any specific constituency" (2007: 196).[93] Other measures, such as

[92] The one-term limit also prevents office-holders from accumulating policy knowledge and legislative expertise.

[93] In my opinion, eliminating PR would be a bad idea. Lijphart (1999) has convincingly argued that "pluralist" electoral systems better represent the diversity of citizen viewpoints than majoritarian systems, which manufacture artificial majorities that distort representation. Moreover, a lower chamber in Mexico comprising solely SMD's would probably not promote greater vertical accountability. Bonds of representation between citizens and elected officials are extraordinarily weak in Mexico (a very small

instituting legislative primary elections, could be taken to give citizens a greater voice in candidate selection and deepen citizen ties to legislators.

Finally, Mexico urgently needs mechanisms for direct democracy, such as referendums, plebiscites, and citizen initiatives. The major political parties, in theory, support participatory democracy, but have yet to institute it in practice. Direct democracy is not without pitfalls. It is susceptible to manipulation by elites and sometimes produces patently bad policy (though in the long-run, this defect can be self-correcting). Contrary to the arguments of political elites threatened by participatory democracy, though, it *complements* rather than supplants representative democracy. At all events, giving citizens a direct, binding say in decision-making would greatly enhance participation and help align policy outputs with public preferences.

Tweaking the electoral system and other institutions could help arrest the disenchantment-alienation cycle but, alone, they will not suffice. Policy changes are also necessary, especially changes that ameliorate the perennial poverty and social inequality afflicting Mexico. To the extent that Mexicans are substantive democrats who view democracy as an instrument of economic prosperity broadly spread among the populace (as I showed in Chapter 4)—and to the extent Mexicans perceive that government economic policy disfavors most citizens—greater satisfaction with democracy depends on improvements in Mexicans' material well-being.

The latter-day PRI technocratic presidents and the two PAN administrations have pursued a market fundamentalism (combined, contradictorily, with favoritism in granting privileged accesses to policy-making and state resources) that has manifestly failed to better most citizens' economic circumstances. Paradoxically, even multi-lateral lenders

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percentage of Mexicans know who their federal deputy is, for example) and there is no tradition of constituent service. In short, the roots of poor vertical accountability lie elsewhere than the electoral system.

such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, vilified by the Latin American left as ruthless enforcers of neoliberal orthodoxy, have recently recognized the importance of not just promoting growth, but paying attention to the distribution of its fruits. Needed policy changes in Mexico include increased tax revenues and a fairer distribution of the fiscal burden (which presently emphasizes a regressive value added tax), and greatly increased public investment in infrastructure, health, and especially education. All this is easier said than done, though, and efforts to bring about greater social equity will inevitably run up against resistance from powerful interests that benefit from the current distribution of resources. Changing economic policy is, thus, a question of political will in addition to technical know-how.

The cycle of disenchantment and alienation is hardly exclusive to Mexico. In the concluding chapter, I suggest (and sketch preliminary evidence) that it afflicts new democracies worldwide. The cycle's causes are similar: the gap between citizen socioeconomic of democracy and democratic governments' failures to meet those expectations. And its consequences are also common: consolidation of diminished forms of democracy.

CHAPTER 7

Do the Lessons from Mexico Generalize to New Democracies Worldwide?

Using data from the *Citizen Disenchantment* and other surveys, the previous three chapters have shown that in Mexico, conceptions of democracy shape satisfaction with it. In particular, Mexican citizens who see democracy as greater social equality are less satisfied with democracy. Satisfaction, in turn, affects both the type and amount of political participation. But do Mexico's teachings about the causes and consequences of political satisfaction obtain in other new or poor democracies around the world? This concluding chapter asserts that they do.

Returning to the regional opinion polls that formed the empirical backbone of Chapter 3's survey of discontent in new democracies, I present analyses showing that how people define democracy influences how they evaluate it around the world as well as in Mexico. Though these surveys measure concepts of democracy more obliquely and superficially than *Citizen Disenchantment*, the evidence they yield nonetheless suggests that, as in Mexico, substantive democrats are least satisfied with democracy around the world. Dissatisfaction also wreaks damage on political participation in fledgling democracies in many of the same ways it does in Mexico. Finally, as imperfect as the measurements are, they allow us to glimpse something of the distribution of views of democracy among inhabitants of new democracies. Significant numbers of citizens hold a substantive view of democracy, especially relative to the electoral view.

I conclude this study by drawing out these findings' implications for the future of democracy around the world. Democracy's reach is wider than it is deep. Most newly-democratized countries appear to be mired in low-quality, partial democracy from which

escape is exceedingly difficult. Citizen demands for greater socioeconomic equality, and their alienation when governments fail to provide it, would seem to present an insurmountable challenge. But the challenge is only *seemingly* insurmountable: a not-insignificant minority of third wave democracies *have* prospered and become full democracies. Both citizens and governments must act to restore faith in democracy. Citizens should tone down their expectations, recognizing the constraints under which their governments operate. They cannot give in to discouragement; rather, they must continue to voice their demands using every ethical means of political participation available. For their part, governments must get better at meeting citizens' *non-economic* expectations of democracy by making elections fairer and improving respect for human rights. Ultimately, they must use the policy tools they *do* have at hand to spread economic welfare and opportunity more broadly.

BEYOND MEXICO: CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRACY AND SATISFACTION WORLDWIDE

In Chapter 3, I examined satisfaction with democracy in developing polities around the world using several surveys: the World Values Study (WVS), Latinobarometer, Consolidation of Democracy in Eastern and Central Europe (CDCEE), AsiaBarometer, and Afrobarometer. I now turn back to these several of these polls—and a new one, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)—to analyze whether citizens' conceptions of democracy determine, in part, their degree of satisfaction with it in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa.

The results are striking. In all four regions, satisfaction with democracy does depend on one's definition of it, even after controlling for other factors that affect satisfaction such as retrospective evaluations of economic performance. In all four, the magnitudes of the effects of democratic type on satisfaction share the same order as in

Mexico. That is, substantive democrats are least satisfied, followed by liberals and then electoral democrats, who are most satisfied. The differences between coefficient estimates for each pair of democratic types are statistically significant in all cases save one: the difference between substantive and liberal democracy in Africa.

These results are all the more remarkable given the variety across surveys of the ways in which respondents were asked to define democracy and, especially, the ways in which the answers were coded. Three of the surveys elicited definitions of democracy with a single item—in marked contrast to the *Citizen Disenchantment* survey's more thorough, multi-item probing. LAPOP, the CDCEE, and Afrobarometer asked variations on the question, "What does democracy mean to you?"[94] Interviewers recorded up to three verbatim responses, which were coded into various categories during post-interview questionnaire processing (or, in the case of the CDCEE, on the spot by the interviewers themselves). The number of categories varied from eight in the CDCEE to 33 in LAPOP. Taking the first, "top of mind" definition offered by respondents, I combined and recoded these categories into binary variables for each of the three basic types of democracy (with a residual, fourth category for other responses) so that each respondent belongs to one, and only one, category.

Thus, in LAPOP a substantive democrat was anyone who defined democracy as "economic well-being or progress", or "more job opportunities"; a liberal democrat, anyone who defined democracy as "economic freedom", "freedom of speech", "freedom of transit", "capitalism", "free trade", "free markets", or just plain "freedom"; and an electoral democrat, anyone who defined democracy as "the right to choose leaders",

[94] LAPOP asked, "In just a few words, what does democracy mean to you, sir?" CDCEE had a longer preamble: "There is considerable argument concerning the meaning of democracy. What is your opinion about this question? What is for you the meaning of democracy?" Afrobarometer left open the possibility that democracy might hold no meaning at all for interviewees: "What if anything does democracy mean to you?"

"voting", or "free elections". In the CDCEE, substantive democrats defined democracy as "social or economic democracy"; liberal democrats, as "freedom"; and electoral democrats, as "parties" or "elections". Finally, in Afrobarometer, substantive democrats equated democracy with "social or economic development", "equality" or "justice"; liberal democrats, with "civil liberties", "personal freedoms", "accountability", or the "rule of law"; and electoral democrats, with "voting", "elections", "multi-party competition", or "majority rule".

For its part, the AsiaBarometer survey did not ask respondents directly to opine on the meaning of democracy. I thus took three variables as proxies for the three basic democratic orientations. The more a respondent agreed (on a five-point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree") with the statement that "[i]t is desirable that people are equal, even if the economy is stagnant", the higher he scored on the substantive democracy scale. Liberal democracy was measured by agreement (on the same five-point scale) that "[p]eople who work more should get more money", and electoral democracy, by agreement that "[c]itizens have a duty to vote in elections."[95] As in Chapter 5's analysis of the *Citizen Disenchantment* data in the Mexican case—and in contrast to the regional surveys in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa—respondents could hold each conception of democracy in varying degrees rather than adhering to one concept of democracy and the expense of the other two.

Table 7.1 shows the results of regression analyses of satisfaction with democracy on citizen conceptions in each of the four regions. Substantive democrats are less satisfied with democracy. The odds that a Latin American substantive democrat is "very satisfied" with democracy, as opposed to being only "fairly satisfied" with democracy or

[95] Furthermore, these proxy questions were asked only in 2005, limiting the analysis to just the four Asian democracies polled that year: Bangladesh, Mongolia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

worse, are 17% *less* (odds ratio of .829) than those for someone in the reference category, who defines democracy as something other than one of the three main types. In Asia, the odds of citizens at the maximum of the substantive five-point democracy scale being "very satisfied" with democracy are over 26% *less* than those for a countryman at the midpoint of the scale (the mean is 3.85). In post-Communist Europe, substantive democrats are on average .221 points *less* satisfied with democracy (about 2.5% of the range of the 1-to-10 scale) than those in the residual reference category.

On the other hand, electoral democrats are considerably *more* satisfied with democracy in all four regions. In Latin America, an electoral democrat's odds of being "very" satisfied with democracy are about 12.5% higher than those for citizens in the reference category. The same figure in Africa is 11.3%. An Eastern European electoral democrat is, on average, .399 points more satisfied with democracy (over 4.4% of the satisfaction scale's range) than someone who defines democracy as something other than equality, freedom, or elections. And in Asia, a citizen at the highest point (5) on the electoral democracy scale is almost 40% likelier to be "very" satisfied than another at the midpoint (3) of the electoral democracy scale.

Finally, in all regions liberal democrats' average level of satisfaction falls between that of substantive and electoral democrats. However, in only one region—Eastern Europe—does liberal democrats' satisfaction with democracy differ significantly from satisfaction among the population in general. There, adherents to the liberal conception are .212 points more satisfied with democracy (almost 2.4% of the satisfaction scale's range) than their counterparts in the residual reference category.

Variable	L. America [a]			E. Europe [b]			Asia [c]			Africa [d]		
	B	se	p	B	se	p	B	se	p	B	se	p
Concepts of Democracy												
Substantive	-.187	.059	.002***	-.221	.057	.000***	-.151	.035	.000***	.025	.055	.644
Liberal	.012	.031	.688	.212	.037	.000***	.061	.047	.198	.033	.037	.368
Electoral	.118	.060	.049**	.399	.089	.000***	.167	.062	.007***	.107	.055	.052*
Economic Performance												
Pocketbook	.118	.022	.000***	.266	.031	.000***	.232	.029	.000***	.206	.016	.000***
Sociotropic	.276	.022	.000***	.248	.028	.000***	—	—	—	.066	.016	.000***
Pol. Per formance: Rights	—	—	—	—	—	—	.223	.030	.000***	—	—	—
Pol. Performance: Elections	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.227	.008	.000***
Incumbents												
President	.807	.016	.000***	—	—	—	—	—	—	.480	.021	.000***
Present Government	—	—	—	.492	.009	.000***	—	—	—	—	—	—
National Deputies	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.003	.049	.944	.177	.021	.000** *
Government Offici als	—	—	—	—	—	—	.020	.049	.687	—	—	—
MPs Listen	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.171	.018	.000***
Sociodemographic												
Age	.005	.001	.000***	.001	.001	.643	-.005	.003	.085*	.003	.001	.018**
Income	—	—	—	.160	.012	.000***	—	—	—	—	—	—
Education	—	—	—	-.180	.029	.000***	-.104	.024	.000***	-.040	.009	.000***
Social Class	—	—	—	.027	.021	.187	—	—	—	—	—	—
Constant				.832	.101	.000***	—	—	—	—	—	—
Threshold 1	.820	.070	.000***	—	—	—	-.067	.443	.880	-.759	.117	.000***
Threshold 2	3.400	.073	.000***	—	—	—	1.518	.442	.000***	2.468	.093	.000***
Threshold 3	6.690	.669	.000***	—	—	—	2.764	.444	.000** *	4.108	.097	.000***
Threshold 4	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.860	.451	.000***	6.084	.104	.000***
Deviance (G2)	12497	p=	1.000	—	—	—	7455	p=	1.000	33319	p=	1.000
Pseudo -R2 (Nagelkerke)	.196			—	—	—	.127			.317		
Adj. R2	—	—	—	.410			—	—	—	—	—	—
N	20025			9989			2687			13841		
* p < .10												
** p < .05												
*** p < .01												

Table 7.1: Regressions of Satisfaction with Democracy on Conceptions of Democracy in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1998-2006.

[a] Latin America: ordinal regression on four-point satisfaction scale; cell values are logged odds ratios (LOR)
[b] Eastern Europe: linear regression on ten-point satisfaction scale; cell values are OLS coefficients
[c] Asia: ordinal regression on five-point satisfaction scale; cell values are LOR
[d] Africa: ordinal regression on five-point satisfaction scale; cell values are LOR

Sources: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP, 2006), Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (1998-2001), AsiaBarometer (2005), Afrobarometer (2006). Regions: **Latin America**: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela; **Eastern Europe**: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Eastern Germany, Hungaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine; **Asia**: Bangladesh, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Nepal; **Africa**: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.

Naturally, the same sorts of political and economic evaluations, and sociodemographic characteristics, found to shape satisfaction in the Mexican case are at work elsewhere in the world. In all four regions, citizens' perceptions of their national

and own household economies had large effects on satisfaction with democracy. Predictably, better perceptions of economic performance meant higher satisfaction. Approval of incumbent politicians' performance—of presidents, national governments, members of parliament—had an even greater positive effect on political satisfaction everywhere except Asia. Personal characteristics also played a role, though a lesser one. Older citizens were more satisfied with democracy in Latin America and Africa, as were higher income earners in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, education sharpened criticism of democracy in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. Nevertheless, citizen concepts of democracy affect satisfaction with democracy everywhere, even after taking into account other factors that have a hand in forming citizens' political evaluations.

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

Disenchantment with democracy also brings about in new democracies worldwide some of the same deleterious effects on political participation that we see in Mexico. Dissatisfied citizens vote less, are less civically engaged, and protest more.

Voting

Table 7.2 synthesizes some 15 regression analyses of satisfaction with democracy's effect on various forms of political participation.[96] Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa provide strong evidence that satisfied citizens vote more often than their discontent peers. In post-Communist Europe, the odds that a maximally satisfied citizen (10 on a ten-point scale) reported voting in the last parliamentary elections are 21.3% greater than for someone at the midpoint (5.5) of the scale. That figure is almost exactly the same for national elections in Africa: 21.5% (where the maximum is 4 and the

[96] The regressions control for all the independent variables in the models presented in Table 7.1; I do not report their coefficients here for the sake of convenience.

midpoint, 2.5). In the Asian survey, respondents were asked "how often" they voted in national and local elections and given five ordered response categories, "never", "rarely", "sometimes", "most of the time", and "always". The odds that respondents who placed themselves at the top of the five-point satisfaction scale claimed to "always" vote in national elections (as opposed to voting only "most of the time" or less often) are over 62% higher than the odds for respondents at the midpoint (3); the same number for local elections is nearly 69%. In Latin America, the coefficient associated with satisfaction is positive, as expected, but statistically insignificant at conventional levels.

Non-Electoral, Individual Participation

There is also considerable evidence that satisfaction boosts individual forms of civic engagement other than voting. In Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa, satisfied citizens tend to contact government officials and ask them for help more often than their less contented peers. African citizens with the highest satisfaction score were nearly 30% likelier to ask federal legislators for help, and about 26% likelier to request help from local governments, than their counterparts with middling satisfaction scores. Satisfaction had a positive, but weaker, effect on Latin Americans' proclivity to ask local government functionaries for assistance; maximally satisfied citizens were a little over 7% likelier to do so than citizens at the midpoint. (Satisfaction exerted a positive, but insignificant, effect on Latin Americans' chances of appealing to the federal government for help.) Finally, Eastern Europeans who awarded their democracies the highest satisfaction rating were 6.6% likelier to contact politicians than citizens who gave democracy only middling marks.[97]

[97] On the other hand, Asians who are satisfied with democracy are *less* likely to sign petitions demanding that the government improve living conditions. This finding appears to counter the general tenor of satisfaction's salutary effects on elevating civic engagement.

Dependent Variable	L. America			E. Europe			Asia			Africa		
	B	se	p	B	se	p	B	se	p	B	se	p
Voting												
Last Presidential Election	.027	.026	.156	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Last Nat./Parl. Elec.	—	—	—	.043	.016	.003***	—	—	—	.130	.025	.000***
How Often in National Elections	—	—	—	—	—	—	.242	.040	.000***	—	—	—
How Often in Local Elections	—	—	—	—	—	—	.262	.039	.000***	—	—	—
Individual Participation												
Asked Fed. Dep. for Help	.027	.043	.266	—	—	—	—	—	—	.130	.029	.000***
Asked Loc. Gov. for Help	.046	.030	.063*	—	—	—	—	—	—	.115	.021	.000***
Contact Politicians/Gov't. Officials	—	—	—	.032	.013	.007***	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sign a Petition	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.068	.037	.035**	—	—	—
Join with Others to Raise Issue	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.021	.017	.125
Protest												
Approve of Occupying Bldgs.	—	—	—	-.022	.011	.023**	—	—	—	—	—	—
Boycott	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.046	.038	.110	—	—	—
Protest	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.011	.019	.277
* p < .10												
** p < .05												
*** p < .01												
(all p-values are one-tailed tests)												

(Sources and regions same as for Table 7.2)

Table 7.2: Effect of Satisfaction on Political Participation in Latin American, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1998-2006.

Protest

Finally, there is some evidence that dissatisfied citizens protest more than their relatively content peers. Eastern Europeans were asked how strongly they approved, on a four-point scale ranging from "strongly disapprove" to "strongly approve", of occupying government buildings as a protest tactic. Citizens who are least satisfied are about 10.4% likelier to approve of taking buildings than citizens at the midpoint (5.5) of the ten-point satisfaction scale. Approval of a behavior is not the same as actually carrying it out (measures for which are unavailable in the CDCEE survey), but it is an attitudinal precursor. In Asia, those who give their democracies the lowest possible score are nearly 26% likelier to report having participated in a boycott than those who rate their democracies at the midpoint of the satisfaction scale (though the effect barely misses

statistical significance at conventional levels.) And Africans' penchant for protest may be higher among less satisfied citizens than among those who are pleased with their democracies (though the *p*-value associated with the effect of satisfaction makes it impossible to assert this with certainty).

In short, much of the evidence available is consistent with the theory that satisfied citizens engage more in institutional forms of political participation, while dissatisfied citizens turn more to contentious participation.

HOW PREVALENT IS THE SUBSTANTIVE CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY?

That the substantive conception diminishes satisfaction with democracy is troublesome, but would be less so if it were not very widespread in new and poor democracies—especially relative to the electoral view of democracy. Its overall effect would be negligible if it were offset by a larger, countervailing effect of electoral democracy. This is true irrespective of the proportion of liberal democrats since, as Table 7.1 demonstrates, the liberal view of democracy does not, on the whole, raise or lower satisfaction (except in Eastern Europe).

The available evidence shows that substantive democrats outnumber their electoral counterparts in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa.[98] Getting a handle on the distribution of conceptions of democracy among denizens of new democracies is difficult (for reasons I expound below), and the evidence must be regarded as inconclusive. Nonetheless, classifying Latin American, Eastern European, and African citizens into one of three democratic types (as I did for the analysis presented in Table 7.1) shows that the substantive conception of democracy prevails over the electoral in these three regions. Figure 7.1 is a bar chart that represents the percentage of substantive

[98] This does not appear to be the case in Asia.

relative to electoral democrats. In Africa, substantive democrats overwhelm electoral democrats by a nearly 4-to-1 margin (11.4% to 4.2%). Substantive democrats outpace electoral democrats by a slimmer margin in Latin America (12.2% to 11.1%, with a ±0.615% margin of error at the 90% confidence level), while substantive democracy appears to enjoy a slight, though statistically insignificant, edge in Eastern Europe (6.6% and 6.4%, respectively).[99] So, according to these measurements, at least one of every ten Latin American and African citizens, and over 1 in every 20 in Eastern Europe, is a substantive democrat.

There is some reason to doubt how accurately the regional surveys measure citizen conceptions of democracy—and, thus, the extent to which each conception has permeated citizens' ideological constructs of democracy. Asking open-ended questions, and classifying respondents into mutually exclusive categories based on short, one- or two-word answers (as LAPOP, CDCEE, and Afrobarometer do) may not provide the best measures of citizen conceptions of democracy. Though there is value in recording impulsive answers about the meaning of democracy, failing to probe further releases respondents from the cognitive burden of reflecting more deeply about democracy, the different values it comprehends, and the relation they bear to one another. Answers given from the tip of the tongue are probably at best a partial representation of answers that would come forth from the recesses of the brain. For example, does someone who immediately associates democracy with elections believe that elections alone are a sufficient condition for democracy, or is something more required? Does an answer of

[99] For the sake of comparison, liberal democrats in the three regions constitute 44.4% (Latin America), 55.8% (Eastern Europe), and 47.2% (Africa) of the citizenry. In Asia, the means of the interval-level variables that served as proxies for conceptions of democracy are: substantive, 3.86 (well above the midpoint of 3); liberal, 4.49; and electoral, 4.65.

"equality" mean socioeconomic equality (as many analysts assume) or could it refer to equality before the law or at the ballot box?



Figure 7.1: Percentages of Substantive vs. Electoral Democrats in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa, 1998-2006.

An open-ended question on the meaning of democracy could also underestimate the extent to which citizens attach social and economic desires to democratic government. Associating democracy with social equality would seem less instinctual (at least to a U.S. citizen, as I am), and more a product of reasoned reflection, than associating democracy with elections or liberty. If this is true, top-of-mind answers will emphasize elections and liberty, while probed responses will invoke economic concerns more often than spontaneous answers.

Finally, the regional surveys' coding conventions unnecessarily compartmentalize respondents into mutually exclusive categories.[100] As I argue in Chapters 2 and 4, we may simultaneously hold several conceptions of democracy to varying degrees. Thus, pigeonholing respondents into one category could distort the extent to which other views are present among the citizenry. For these reasons, measuring definitions of democracy using an approach similar to that of *Citizen Disenchantment*—multi-item, guided deliberations—may produce higher-quality data about citizen views of democracy.

Auxiliary evidence from the third and fourth waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) shows that citizens have greater socioeconomic expectations of their governments in new, poorer democracies than in established, wealthier ones. The WVS contains a series of four items about the proper role of government in the economy. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a ten-point continuum where the lower bound (1) represented extreme government intervention—indicative of a substantive view of democracy—and the upper bound (10), extreme *laissez-faire*—consistent with a belief in economic liberalism. The items inquired whether incomes should be more equal or differences larger; whether firms should be owned by the government or private parties; whether government or individuals should be responsible for well-being; and whether government regulation of firms more or greater freedom for enterprise was better. Figure 7.2 presents group averages over the four items for industrial, post-Communist, and developing countries.

[100] The AsiaBarometer analysis avoids this problem, since it uses three scales as simultaneous measures of respondents' conceptions of democracy. The problem is that the measures may not be very good approximations to concepts of democracy. For example, the electoral democracy proxy asks respondents if they believe it is a citizen's duty to vote. Very few will say no, but many who say yes may not believe that elections are the sole essence of democracy. The substantive democracy proxy forces citizens into a false dichotomy between income equality and economic growth. Even so, a surprising number of citizens said they value equality, even at the price of economic dynamism.

Unsurprisingly, citizens in new, poorer democracies support greater government economic intervention—levelling income inequality, providing for the general welfare, and regulating private enterprise—than those in the established democracies. Inhabitants of former Communist countries, on average, demand the most from their governments, scoring 5.24 on the substantive-liberal scale, followed closely by peoples in the developing world, at 5.35 (both below the 5.5 midpoint of the scale). In contrast, citizens in the older, industrial democracies have, on average, a greater free-market, individualist bent, registering 5.93 on the scale.[101]



Figure 7.2: Average Self-Placement on a Substantive-Liberal Democracy Scale in Post-Communist, Developing, and Industrial Democracies, 1996-2002.

Source: World Values Survey (third and fourth waves). Groups: **Post-Communist**: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine; **Developing**: Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Phillipines, South Africa, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela; **Industrial**: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

Caveats notwithstanding, the evidence afforded by the regional surveys and the WVS makes a reasonable *prima facie* case that the substantive view of democracy is indeed prevalent enough among citizenries of new democracies to give cause for concern.

[101] All differences are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.

FUTURE RESEARCH

All research projects necessarily leave many stones unturned. This one leaves at least four. The first is the sources of citizen concepts of democracy. My main argument had three (sequentially) moving parts: concepts of democracy, satisfaction with democracy, and political participation. A natural initial step would be to extend the chain of argumentation backward and examine where concepts of democracy come from. Chapter 4 exploited evidence from the *Desencanto Ciudadano* survey, finding that party identification was the most important determinant of citizen concepts. Contrary to what one might expect, socioeconomic indicators such as income and education appeared to have very little to do with the ideas one held about democracy. This suggests that socialization shapes concepts of democracy more than structural factors such as social class. Future research would formulate these hypotheses more rigorously, ground them theoretically, and test them with better data.

A second natural step would be to extend the research *forward*, projecting the long-range consequences of disenchantment. In Chapter 6, I sketch several ways in which disenchantment undermines the quality of democracy through its effects on participation. When people fail to vote, engage, and protest, vertical accountability and responsiveness—two key components of democratic quality—become virtually impossible. So, I would operationalize these and other indicators of quality of democracy better, and devise fair tests of the relationship between participation and quality of democracy.

Third, the research could be extended forward in another way to explore a potentially huge consequence of dissatisfaction: relapse into authoritarianism. I hint at this consequence of dissatisfaction, but it deserves fuller exposition. There are few countries that backslide into dictatorship, but dissatisfaction may have elevated the

probability of doing so in these countries. This line of research would require assembling a multi-country database over many years that includes public opinion data on political satisfaction matched with country-year data on reversion to authoritarian rule.

Finally, I would address a significant omission in Chapter 3: tests of aggregate-level causes of dissatisfaction. I presented descriptive evidence that dissatisfaction was low and falling in new democracies. Arguing inductively, I outlined several country-level characteristics that appear to affect satisfaction. A more thoroughgoing examination provided by statistical hypothesis testing would clearly benefit this analysis.

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

What has this study taught us about disenchantment with democracy? First, it has shown us that ideas count. Disenchantment with democracy depends importantly on an *idea*—how citizens conceive of democracy and what they expect of it—and not merely one or another indicator of economic or political performance. In Mexico and in new democracies around the world, the conjunction of a belief that democracy should distribute the dividends of economic growth more equitably among its citizens with the inability—or refusal—of governments to do so is a significant cause of political disenchantment.

Disenchantment, in turn, is an idea with real-world consequences. It affects political participation. As in Mexico, disenchantment discourages citizens in new democracies from participating through established institutions, inducing apathy in most and driving others to more confrontational forms of political activity. Ideas do count.

Second, champions of democracy should be concerned about growing disenchantment with it. Dissatisfaction may contribute to democratic breakdown. A more widespread consequence, however, is stagnant democratic quality. To the extent

that improving democratic quality and making governments more responsive depends on citizen participation, the "disenchantment-alienation" cycle observed worldwide makes for a bleak outlook. Most new democracies are highly flawed, partial democracies. Of the 70 countries examined in Chapter 3 that became democratic during the third wave of democratic expansion (or were already democratic but remained poor), Freedom House ranked just 28—40%—as "free" in 2007. The majority, 39 (or 56%), earned only a score of "partially free." Of course, most countries that democratize do not slip back into authoritarianism. Since the 1970's, democracy broke down outright in only 13 countries that had been democratic at some point during the third wave. Most of these subsequently redemocratized. But new democracies are much likelier to remain stuck in low-quality, semi-democracy than advance to a more robust democracy. Of 1,422 total country-years since third wave democratization in these 70 countries, 63% (890) were spent in the "partially free" state, and just 34% (480), in the "free" state.

It is difficult to see how governments will hold fair elections, respect civil rights, enact more broadly beneficial economic policies, and otherwise elevate democratic quality without public pressure. To be sure, citizen participation is no guarantee that any of these things will happen, but its absence is a guarantee they will not.

The third lesson is that citizens need to temper their expectations of democracy. Who is to blame for disenchantment, citizens or governments? Some aver that citizens' unrealistically high expectations—particularly of economic betterment—lead them to despair prematurely. Overly demanding citizens, in this view, ignore limits on even the best-intentioned governments' ability to improve citizens' lives and overlook incremental progress that *is* made. They overburden governments with unreasonable claims and are quick to remonstrate, often contentiously, when governments inevitably fail to meet these

demands. In the extreme, a restive citizenry could upend a fledgling democracy by enervating its institutional capacity to process demands.

Democracy cannot solve all social ills, whatever one may feel about where blame for dissatisfaction with it lies. At its best, democracy provides a framework in which citizens and their representatives seek solutions together. The range of solutions available is subject to very real constraints imposed by national and international political economies. But democratic governments will often fail to achieve even the most levelheaded citizen aims using means that *are* available.

When this happens, citizens must not abandon hope. The fourth lesson is that citizens must continue to participate, even when their governments fail. Citizens may take heart from the new democracies that have flourished, few though they are. They cannot relinquish the tools at their disposal to influence public decision-making, as ineffectual as those tools may seem—or be—at the moment. They must vote. They must lift their voices to their representatives, to makers of opinion, and to their fellow citizens through the many vehicles available to articulate their interests.

Above all, citizens must organize. They must seek out like-minded citizens and raise their concerns not in isolation from one another, but in unison. If all else fails, they should protest—but do so peacefully. Protest organizers should train demonstrators in techniques of nonviolent resistance, police their ranks and expel fringe saboteurs, and work with police to routinize protest. Peaceable, creative dramatizations of injustice can be morally compelling spectacles for fellow citizens; violence alienates potential allies among commoners and authorities alike.

Fifth, and most perhaps importantly, governments must also shoulder their responsibility for democratic disenchantment. If some observers hold unreasonably high, disappointed citizen expectations responsible for disenchantment, others fault

governments. If citizens are dissatisfied, it is not because their expectations are excessive but because their governments have done a poor job of meeting even citizens' most modest demands. As we saw in Chapter 3, many new democracies have been incapable of securing the most basic of democratic rights: to choose political leadership in free, fair elections. More distressingly, even when elections are reasonably clean they often change governments without, however, changing evils that linger from the old regime. Poll after poll shows that citizens in new democracies believe that legislators look out only for their own interests rather than the public good; that the powerful run the country for their own benefit; and that elected representatives do not care about or understand problems of people like them. Abuse of power and corruption continue to run rampant. Administrations come and go, argue those who would lay the blame for disenchantment at the feet of governments, but elites maintain a tight grip on the state, extracting and hoarding resources from it. In brief, if people dissatisfied with democracy, it is not because citizens aspire to too much but because democratic governments have simply not earned people's good will.

Governments may avail themselves of several strategies to assuage disenchantment: reducing the number of substantive democrats in the populace, shoring up non-economic aspects of democracy, and, in the final instance, addressing citizens' demands for a fairer economic shake. Governments can attempt to change the distribution of conceptions of democracy among citizens, emphasizing the liberal and, especially, the electoral views while diminishing the substantive view. They may promote civic education campaigns that stress the importance of voting and political participation generally. These campaigns can help foster values of religious and ethnic tolerance, and respect for dissenting points of views.

Satisfaction with democracy also depends on perceptions of *political* performance, and democratic governments may undertake reform to make elections more trustworthy and encourage greater citizen participation. These include electoral reform that balances the need for broad representation with governability; citizen participation laws that provide for direct democracy and public input into decision-making (such as Brazil's experiment in participatory budgeting); independent election authorities; campaign finance and media access reform; and human rights commissions with full investigative and sanctioning powers, subject to independent national and international oversight.

Improving elections and respect for rights will go a long way toward boosting faith in democracy, even where democracy does little to enhance the public's economic lot. There comes a time, though, when democratic governments must take on citizens' legitimate aspirations to greater economic well-being. This is especially so in new, poorer democracies, where poverty and social inequality are deeply tied to political inequality. This inevitably involves tackling thorny questions of distribution. Fostering economic growth is imperative, but it is not enough. The fruits of growth must be disseminated more evenly, as a growing body of development thinking recognizes. Governments may use fiscal policy both to incentivize productive activity and redistribute income directly. But beyond cash transfers, an even more crucial use of tax revenues is social investment in infrastructure and human capital—in a healthy, well-educated population as a productive asset. The extent to which democratic governments should be in the business of redistributing income (and wealth and land) is a subject of legitimate debate. But they must be in the business of redistributing opportunity. In the long run, this is the best cure for citizen disenchantment.

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Vita

David Crow graduated from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1992 with a B.A. in English. He lived in Mexico City from 1992 to 1999, where he taught English at (among other places) LaSalle University; translated; undertook course work in Latin American political thought and 19th Century Mexican literature at the National University of Mexico (UNAM); and co-authored over 200 weekly columns on Mexican politics and society as editor of the bilingual, weekly news bulletin *El Pulso de México / Heartbeat of Mexico*. Crow studied his Ph.D. in Government at the University of Texas at Austin, specializing in Comparative Politics and Methodology. During his doctoral studies, he returned to Mexico City in 2004, where he researched and wrote his dissertation until 2008. In addition to teaching Spanish and political philosophy at UT Austin, Crow held several other jobs during his doctoral studies: community organizer for Austin-based campaign finance reform advocates Campaigns for People, data analyst for the Mexico City market research firm Berumen y Asociados, and research assistant for the Center for Deliberative Polling. His research interests include Mexican and Latin American politics, comparative democratization, public opinion and survey research methodology, political behavior, and quantitative methods. In August, 2008, he became Associate Director of the University of California, Riverside, Survey Research Center.

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